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Systems intelligence, we have proposed, is a fundamental form of intelligence we all 
actively use when engaging with the interaction-rich systems of our everyday life. 
Since the launch of our Systems Intelligence Initiative in 2002, we have served as 
editors for a series of volumes that have addressed a wide range of themes applying a 
number of methodologies. The articles have discussed and elaborated a host of aspects of 
systems intelligence, bringing together numerous seemingly unrelated phenomena, life 
situations and theoretical issues. The contributors have included researchers, educators, 
consultants, managers and students of different disciplines ranging from decision theory, 
environmental studies, architecture, computer science, management, organization research, 
philosophy, psychology, theology and psychotherapy. The current volume is the fourth in 
the series published in English, following three previous volumes in Finnish. 
In the present volume the emphasis is on the foundational, conceptual, psychological as 
well as practice-oriented aspects of human intelligence. As is customary with systems 
intelligence, the essays represent a number of different methodologies, disciplines and 
topics of interest. 
In the opening essay, Esa Saarinen and Raimo P. Hämäläinen elaborate on systems 
intelligence as an original form of human intelligence paying particular attention to the 
origin of intelligence in the light of infant research. The paper argues for systems 
intelligence as an integrating framework which complements earlier work on human 
intelligence. In his three essays, John Rauthmann discusses conceptually and empirically 
systems intelligence with respect to classical conceptualizations of intelligence and with 
respect to certain essential psychological themes. His first article studies systems 
intelligence as a trait and ability, investigating the connections of the construct to previous 
psychological intelligence literature. In his second contribution, Rauthmann develops a new 
systemic meta-model of personality. In his third essay, Rauthmann proposes a trait-SI scale 
for operationalizing the concept.  Based on his original proposal, Rauthmann goes on to 
report what is the first empirical attempt to measure systems intelligence.  
In his methodologically innovative essay, Kalevi Kilkki creates a social systems map of 
systems intelligence by presenting and applying a novel web search engine methodology to 
the construct of systems intelligence. The result is a description of the connections of the 
notion of systems intelligence with concepts in other disciplines and with some leading 
scholars in those disciplines.  This is followed by an essay by Otso Palonen with a 
discussion of learning from the perspective of systems intelligence. In their contribution, 
Ella Rönkkönen and Esa Saarinen take the bold step of applying chemical engineering to an 
analysis of the Broaden and Build Theory of positive emotions developed by Barbara 
Fredrickson, and then link Fredrickson’s insights with systems intelligence. Anne Birgitta 
Pessi uses systems intelligence to analyse volunteerism, presenting a fresh 
conceptualization of that domain. The final essay by Pia Tikka reflects cinema as an 
intersubjective neuroscientific experience. The concepts of embodied simulation and the 
 6
cinema author’s mental workspace simulatorium are discussed in their relation to systems 
intelligence. 
We hope the essays in this volume, along with those of the previous books, will inspire 
researchers and practitioners from different backgrounds and disciplines to find new 
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The Originality of Systems Intelligence 






In their groundbreaking essay ”Emotional Intelligence” (1990), Peter Salovey and John 
D. Mayer define their new concept “as the subset of social intelligence that involves the 
ability to monitor one’s own and other’s feelings and emotions, to discriminate among 
them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions.” (Salovey and Mayer 
1990, italics in the original). 
The theory of emotional intelligence advances the work of Howard Gardner (1983) in 
his theory of multiple intelligences and that of Robert Sternberg (1985) in his theory of 
“triartic” (three part) intelligence. All these approaches draw attention to factors in human 
performance not captured by previous proposals and, in particular, in traditional IQ tests 
(Gerrid and Zimbardo 2010). 
We have proposed that the work on emotional, social and multiple intelligence has 
missed a key form of human intelligence that we have called “systems intelligence.”  By 
“systems intelligence” we mean “intelligent behaviour in the context of complex systems 
involving interaction and feedback. A subject acting with Systems Intelligence engages 
successfully and productively with the holistic feedback mechanisms of her environment. 
She perceives herself as part of the whole, the influence of the whole upon herself as well 
as her own influence upon the whole. By observing her own interdependence in the 
feedback intensive environment, she is able to act intelligently” (Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
2004, p. 3; see also Hämäläinen and Saarinen 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). 
As the phrase suggests, systems intelligence relates to systems. As is customary in 
systems approaches, systems for us are complex wholes, the functioning of which depends 
on its parts and the interaction between those parts (Jackson 2003). Like Salovey and 
Mayer, we focus upon intelligence as something that “guides one’s thinking and action”. 
Key features of the “systems” of systems intelligence include the following aspects, 
familiar from the systems literature (Senge 1990, Jervis 1998, Jackson 2003, Ramage and 
Shipp2009):
 
1) The behaviour of the system displays features that cannot be obtained by summing 
the behaviours of the isolated components. There are patterns and regularities in 
system behaviour not revealed by the behaviour of the parts as separate entities: the 
system can display emergence – “much coming from little” (Holland 1998) – as 
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well as self-organization where the system creates a new structure. Often the system 
behaviour is due to the nature of system structure. 
 
2) The relationships between parts are more important than the properties of the 
individual parts; interaction of the parts gives rise to patterns, regularities and 
complexity that is not revealed by a direct inspection of the individual parts in 
isolation.  
 
3) The systems are dynamic, display changing states and behaviours on the time axis 
often conceptualized in terms of functions, goals, or intentionality, and may involve 
surprising aspects, frequently referred to as “non-linearity” when a change 
somewhere in the system creates a disproportionate effect, perhaps due to circular 
causal interconnections.  
 
4) The boundaries of systems are re-definable, flexible and depend on the perspective 
taken. “The lesson of boundaries is hard even for systems thinkers to get. There is 
no single, legitimate boundary to draw around a system. We have to invent 
boundaries for clarity and sanity; and boundaries can produce problems when we 
forget that we’ve artificially created them.” (Meadows 2008, p. 97) 
 
The theory of systems intelligence claims that human beings do have intelligence with 
respect to entities thus described – i.e. intelligence with respect to entities that do not 
functionally reduce to their individual parts, that are dynamic and may involve emergence, 
non-linearity and surprising cumulative aspects.  
Like “system”, “intelligence” is also a multi-faceted notion. In the landmark 1921 
symposium on “Intelligence and its measurement” intelligence was described as “ability to 
learn”,  “the power of good responses from the point of view of truth or fact”, “the ability 
of the individual to adapt himself adequately to relatively new situations in life”, “the 
capacity to acquire capacity” (Thorndike 1921).  In a description by Wechsler (1958) that 
Mayer and Salovey allude to, intelligence is viewed as “the aggregate or global capacity of 
the individual to act purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively with his 
environment”.  More recently, the authoritative Task Force of the American Psychological 
Association started out their survey by stating: “Individuals differ from one another in their 
ability to understand complex ideas, to adapt to the environment, to learn from experience, 
to engage in various forms of reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking thought. … 
Concepts of ‘intelligence’ are attempts to clarify and organize this complex set of 
phenomena” (Neisser et al. 1996, p. 77). We list these descriptions here noting that our 
notion of systems intelligence fits naturally into them. 
Why systems intelligence, and why not “situational intelligence” (acknowledging “the 
power of the situation”, in the sense of Ross and Nisbett 1991) or “contextual intelligence” 
(Nye 2008), or “pragmatic intelligence” (Sternberg 1985)? The answer is: because of the 
special, subtle and intriguing aspects of the functioning of human intelligence in dynamic 
settings, the key theme of systems intelligence.  
In addition to its conceptual power as a systems concept, our proposal also has 
considerable communicative force to it. In our consultancies, organizational coaching 
Chapter 1: The Originality of Systems Intelligence 
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sessions and philosophical lecturing (Saarinen and Slotte 2003, Saarinen 2008) we have 
been struck how easily people of various backgrounds adopt the notion. It makes immediate 
intuitive sense. The concept empowers people, making them mindful (Langer 1989) of 
something they can improve. People seem to be able to approach their systems intelligence 
with a “growth mindset” (endorsing “implicit incremental theory”) as opposed to “fixed 
mindset” (endorsing “implicit entity theory”, in the sense of Carol S. Dweck (2000, 2007). 
In other words, people find it natural to reflect on the possibility of enhancing their systems 
intelligence. The concept, while personally relevant, does not seem too threatening to 
people. 
On the face of it, there is a difference between systems intelligence as a concept and the 
intelligences discussed by the multiple intelligences research community. To wit, it seems 
there is a difference in the way the “systems” of systems intelligence exist as compared to 
emotions, the social sphere, the body and movement, the visual, space, music, language or 
mathematical entities. It seems there is an element of abstract conceptuality in the notion of 
systems intelligence.  
Indeed, systems are abstract and constructed. Yet so is language.  The ontological 
status of a category such as “bodily-kinaesthetic” is also far from trivial. Besides, theories 
of intelligence are not supposed to be about ontology but of the thought-related mental 
abilities that account for human learning, adaptability and success in life.  The theory of 
emotional intelligence assumes that humans have an innate cognition of emotions; we 
assume that humans have an innate cognition of systems.  Making that assumption and 
focusing upon systems intelligence leads us to address vital phenomena the other 
intelligence constructs are not able to cover. 
Let us recall that human life is fundamentally systemic at its core. Systemicity is at the 
heart of all of life and all of reality – not only as phenomena “out there” but also as 
something humans cannot help but engage with every moment of 
their actual lives. A person can live with some success without 
significant verbal, bodily, visual, mathematical, emotional, social, 
intrapersonal or musical intelligence. But without at least 
rudimentary abilities to manoeuvre intelligently within the 
systems of one’s environment, a human being is lost. There 
simply is no way to orient oneself in any successful way for any 
significant length of time, except in relation to and in contact with 
what is taking place systemically around oneself.  
All human life is embedded and located in what is going on systemically, locally and 
globally. All human life takes place in the systemic process contexts of something-larger-
than-self. That something requires a constant and lively relating to. The success and 
survival of a human individual, for any significant length of time, calls for systems 
intelligence. 
Baby Brilliance 
As academic intellectuals, it may be tempting for many of us to take rational 
intellectualism of the adult age, along with its emphasis on explicit and verbal knowledge, 
The success and 
survival of a human 
individual, for any 
significant length of 
time, calls for systems 
intelligence.
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as the primary and paradigmatic form of intelligence.  The systems intelligence approach 
radically rejects such a notion. 
Instead, we look to babies for insight.  
In the course of the past three or four decades, infant research has demonstrated “the 
infant’s capacity to construct expectations of action sequences, which are then represented 
in a presymbolic, procedural format” (Beebe et al. 2003, p. 752). The capabilities of an 
infant go far beyond what one might have thought prima facie. As one meta-study 
emphasized, “1-year-old infants infer dispositions and future behaviors of others in 
relatively mature ways” (Uleman et al. 2007 p. 347). “Infants can also distinguish between 
intentional and accidental acts, a skill that requires mental state attributions” (ibid).  All this 
highlights what Jerome Bruner has called the striking “systematicity” in the endowment of 
an infant.  (Bruner 1983, p. 28) As Bruner put it “there may be differences of opinion 
concerning the ‘rules’ that govern this orderly behavior [of an infant], but there can be no 
quarrel about its systematicity.”  Whatever the details, “the nature of infant cognitive 
endowment”, Bruner concludes, “ is that its systematic character is surprisingly abstract.” 
(Bruner 1983, p. 29, italics in the original). 
The critical acumen is the “joint anticipatory system” (Bruner 1983) that the infant is 
capable of creating with her caretaker through “extraordinary early infant capacities” 
(Beebe and Lachmann 2002, p. xiv).  
The powerhouse at work is the infant’s innate capacity for “interpersonal engagement” 
(Hobson 2004) through her abilities for emotional and non-verbal exchange.  “Infants are 
highly attuned to other people” – they have “an active social life right from the start” (ibid, 
p. 43). With their remarkable non-verbal abilities to perceive and respond to the behaviour 
of other people in interaction, the infants “are developing increasingly rich and pleasurable 
forms of mutually sensitive interpersonal engagement.” (ibid, p, 42).  
It is instructive to consider the concepts leading infant researchers use to describe the 
endowment of capabilities the infant displays in the first weeks and months of her life in 
relation to her mother: mutual regulation, mutual influence (Beebe and Stern), 
syncronization (Stern), reciprocity (Brazelton et al.), behavioural dialogues (Bakeman and 
Brown), reciprocal and compensatory mutual influence (Capella), accommodation 
(Crown), co-ordination (Sander), rhythms of dialogue( Jaffe et al.), attunement (Stern et 
al.), protoconversation (Beebe et al.), the moment of meeting (Sander), and forms of 
intersubjectivity (Meltzoff, Stern, Tervarthen, Tronick) (for a discussion and a review, see 
Beebe et al. 2005). Even without closer analysis these concepts speak out: the infant 
contributes as an active partner to the process of her own growth.   
Particularly importantly, the infant is able to operate in relation to her mother and with 
respect to the time axis as part of the dynamics that feeds development. This is a 
sophisticated undertaking. “Patterns of experience are initially organized in infancy as 
expectancies of sequences of reciprocal exchanges … in which each partner contributes to 
the ongoing exchange” (Beebe and Lachmann 2002, p. 13). As one researcher put it, infants 
are endowed with a “motive system that is seeking another emotional being with whom to 
play together a cooperative, complementary, intersubjective game” (Kugiumutzakis 1998, 
p. 80). 
Far from being a passive receiver, the infant is an active partner of the process of her 
own growth. She actively contributes. Anticipation is in a leading role here – the infant’s 
Chapter 1: The Originality of Systems Intelligence 
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abilities for forming expectancies. She is expecting personal engagement, attunement, co-
ordination and emotional availability of her mother. Through her abilities to anticipate, to 
imitate, to perceive emotion and to react to emotion, she influences her mother to influence 
her, and vice versa. The two of them together give rise to a higher-level phenomenon with 
emergent properties and non-linear features of considerable sophistication. The infant and 
her mother are involved in non-verbal communication that is typically extremely rapid and 
frequently simultaneous. They create together a whole that has a direction and is goal-
oriented, although not consciously intentional. 
The Dyadic System as a Basic Unit 
Stemming from the seminal work of Louis Sander (1977, Amadei and Bianchi 2007, 
for an overview, see Nahum 2000), a number of leading researchers have made explicit use 
of the systems concept to account for the principal features of “the first relationship” (Stern 
1977, 2002) and the “interpersonal world of the infant” (Stern 1985). It amounts to a view 
according to which the origin of mind is dyadic, dialogic and intersubjective, involving the 
participation of a relational partner (Beebe et al. 2003). 
The formation of a dyadic system that the infant “co-creates” with her mother becomes 
“the basic unit of interest” (Beebe et al. 2003, p. 752). That dyadic system influences the 
baby and the mother, while they influence the system.  In particular, the dyad moves ahead, 
is goal-directed on the time axis and has features not detectable by the inspection of the 
baby and the mother separately as isolated individuals.  
It is important to appreciate that the infant possesses “unsuspected capacities to 
regulate his own state” (Beebe and Lachmann 2002, p. 22; Beebe and Lachmann analyse 
the case of a particular baby boy but the point is generic). These capacities are due to the 
remarkable infant skills in the art of relatedness. They reflect the infant’s ability to engage 
in interactive processes. Remarkably, interactive regulation and self-regulation become 
integrated in a coordinated and goal-directed process-
whole of a higher order. 
The fundamental point is that intersubjectivity 
precedes subjectivity. Relatedness is prior to isolation. 
This amounts to a radical rejection of “the myth of an 
isolated mind” (Stolorow and Atwood 1992). The dyadic 
system becomes the fundamental unit “within which both 
interactive regulation and self-regulation can be defined, 
each affecting the other“ (Beebe et al. 2003, p. 752). The 
“patterns of expectation” amount to “the anticipation of 
the partner’s pattern in relation to one’s own” and “define 
presymbolic representation in the first year” (Beebe et al. 2003, p. 752).   
The intersubjective system of the infant and the mother is not one of alternating turn-
taking and of a ping-pong-like reciprocal exchange where each partner would generate her 
actions in response to the other’s isolated actions. Instead, the infant and mother tune in to 
one another and synchronically work together. This is highly important from the point of 
view of systems intelligence. The non-verbal, procedural, and affective skills of relating 
The skills of relating that 
facilitate development in 
infancy, will later be the 
basis from which the subject 
can tune in to systems 
beyond what one knows 
objectively or conceptually 
about those systems
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that facilitate development in infancy, will later be the basis from which the subject can 
tune in to systems beyond what one knows objectively or conceptually about those systems. 
Since her early infancy, the baby is dealing effectively with certain unfolding 
emergencies of her environment and is able to create expectancies. She is able to regulate 
her own states at the same time as she influences the interactive processes which in turn 
influence her.   
We find it remarkable that leading researchers in the empirical field of infant studies 
have used the concept of a system to describe what may be the single most warmly attuned 
theme in human life, the infant-mother relationship. It has not been an obstacle that the 
infant remains almost totally ignorant of the objective functioning of the system that she 
cannot represent verbally or conceptually and with which she operates mostly on a non-
conscious level.  Indeed, infant researchers have made impressive progress in describing 
how exactly the infant contributes to the emergence of the dyadic system through various 
forms of implicit processing. Facial mirroring, vocal rhythm, spatial orientation, touching 
and self-touching are among the non-conceptual means that the baby utilizes in the 
intersubjective field.  
Beebe and Lachmann conclude: “the organization of behavior in infancy should be 
viewed primarily as the property of the mother-infant system rather than as the property of 
the individual … It is the dyad, rather than the individual, that is the unit of organization.” 
(Beebe and Lachmann 2002, p. 67) They stress that “it is critically important that 
interactive and self-regulation be viewed as a system” (Beebe and Lachmann 2002, p. 87) 
and to view the interaction between the infant and the mother as “an emergent dyadic 
phenomenon” (Beebe and Lachmann 2002, p. 88) in which “inner and relational processes 
are co-created in tandem” (Beebe et al. 2003, p. 754).  Critical to development, as Alan 
Fogel puts it, is “the co-regulated communications system” of the baby and the mother 
(Fogel 1993). 
From the conceptual point of view, the dyadic system is an active partner along with 
the baby and the mother. Beebe and Lachmann stress “the dyad’s ability to make use of 
whatever abilities the infant brings” (Beebe and Lachmann 2002, p. 88). In the context of 
infant research, the systems concept makes it possible to welcome capabilities from the 
implicit, non-conceptual realm. This possibility proves essential for systems intelligence. 
Broadening the Scope of Adult Intelligence 
The work on multiple intelligences has tacitly assumed that the capabilities of pre-
verbal infants need no particular focus. It has been taken for granted that there is no 
significant dimension of intelligence that would be paradigmatically represented in pre-
verbal infants. We challenge this assumption.  
Systems capabilities are fundamental in infancy and later in life, we propose. The skills 
and capabilities for relating in the non-verbal, procedural, affective, out-of-awareness 
realms is highly significant for the functioning of intelligence in dynamic settings. They are 
vital means to relate to systems.  
The contribution we offer here is conceptual but with a strong empirical footing. We 
offer a framework and a terminological platform from which to integrate phenomena that 
relate to intelligence, human adaptability, the systemically embedded nature of human life, 
Chapter 1: The Originality of Systems Intelligence 
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and early infant capabilities “of sensitivity and emotional exchange that are a feature of 
human relations from the cradle to the grave” (Hobson 2004, p. 46).  We venture to suggest 
that prior intelligence research has left gaps we hope to fill.  
Our systems intelligence perspective amounts to the vision that humans have a set of 
skills and abilities that 
 
- Involve relatedness to relatedness (skills that relate the subject to others and to the 
dimension of relatedness). 
 
- Involve relatedness to the sphere of intersubjectivity. 
 
- Make use of non-verbal and implicit expectations which take place out-of-
awareness. 
 
- Involve engagement with larger-than-self entities without clear-cut boundaries and 
with boundaries that can be re-defined in the course of the process. 
 
- Involve relatedness to the unfolding of qualities that cannot be reduced to qualities 
of the constituent parts (emergence). 
 
- Make use of human sensibilities, timing and synchronization skills, emotional 
attunement, and feedback mechanisms that involve non-explicit, non-verbal and 
non-conscious dimensions. 
 
As already observed, these skills and abilities are critically important for human 
growth. We find it significant that empirical models of those highly sophisticated 
capabilities in infants are articulated in terms of systems with the dyadic system recognized 
as “the basic unit of interest” (Beebe et al. 2003, p. 752).  The contribution we offer extends 
that discourse of systems to address the functioning of human intelligence in dynamic adult 
contexts.  
Accordingly, we suggest that the remarkable human abilities to attune to and live with 
systems that are uncovered empirically by infant research concern the whole human life 
span. The infant’s capabilities in dimensions such as attunement, mutual regulation and 
influence, coordination, reciprocal and compensatory mutual influence, synchronization 
and intersubjectivity give rise, among other things, to various forms of implicit relational 
knowing that Karlen Lyons-Ruth has stressed as fundamental to the human relational 
experience (Lyons-Ruth et al. 1998, Lyons-Ruth 1999) and to intersubjective systems 
sensibility of the kind elaborated in the intersubjective systems view of Stolorow, Atwood 
and Orange (Stolorow et al. 2002; Buirski 2005). 
The seeds of systems intelligence are sown when the infant is engaging with her mother 
in the dyadic system she co-creates with her, adaptively reaching out towards development 
and growth. 
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Systems Intelligence: A Definition 
Consider the following definition of systems intelligence: Systems intelligence (SI) 
involves the ability to use the human sensibilities of systems and reasoning about systems in 
order to adaptively carry out productive actions within and with respect to systems.  
This characterization can be compared with the description that Mayer, Roberts and 
Barsade (2008) provide of emotional intelligence in their extensive meta-study: “Emotional 
intelligence (EI) involves the ability to carry our accurate reasoning about emotions and the 
ability to use emotions and emotional knowledge to enhance thought.” (Mayer et al. 2008, 
p. 511). 
Notice the emphasis of the ability to adaptively carry out productive actions in our 
definition of SI. Here we depart from the Mayer et al. (2008) definition of emotional 
intelligence and from its strong emphasis on knowledge. We prefer to maintain the 
emphasis on action, like Salovey and Mayer in their (1990) description.  
We acknowledge the following two convictions as part of the systems intelligence 
construct: 
 
1. In terms of what are known as “dual processing accounts” (for a review, see Evans 
2008), we note that SI will involve both forms of processing identified in the 
literature. The ability to attune to and live with systems will involve fast, automatic, 
intuitive, instinctive, procedural, implicit, non-verbal and non- conscious aspects 
along with the slow, deliberate, explicit and conscious aspects of systems 
comprehension and relatedness. 
 
2.  In the process of development of thought from infancy to adulthood, systems 
intelligence is nothing short of being the primary form of intelligence, we believe.  
Intelligence is fundamentally about interconnectivity, relationality, embeddedness, 
attunement, action, and about oneself-in-relation-to-others and oneself-in-a-larger-
whole. Intelligence develops and is demonstrated primarily in dynamic settings. 
 
Typically, “intelligence” is taken to be a faculty exhibited by adults and to some extent 
by children. Howard Gardner stresses that the study of intelligence should be informed by 
work with adults and children, gifted persons and people of different cultures, as well as 
with individuals who have suffered selective forms of brain damage (Gardner 1983; cf. 
Neisser et al. 1996). Gardner does not include pre-verbal infants on his primary list. This is 
in line with the commonly accepted idea stressed also by Gardner according to which “a 
human intellectual competence must entail a set of skills of problem solving … and must 
also entail the potential for finding or creating problems – thereby laying the groundwork 
for the acquisition of new knowledge” (Gardner 1983, p. 60-61).  
Adopting Gardner’s description, systems intelligence can be conceptualized as a human 
intellectual competence that entails skills of problem solving and skills to resolve genuine 
problems and difficulties that he or she encounters in systemic settings.   
Space is a systemic setting, as is language, the world of mathematics and music.  In as 
much as these domains give rise to specific intelligences, as argued for by Gardner, those 
intelligences will involve domain-specific aspects of systems intelligence. This does not 
Chapter 1: The Originality of Systems Intelligence 
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change the fact that even before learning to master language or mathematics or her own 
movements the child already has systemic engagement with her environment of the kind 
elaborated by infant research. We highlight the general systems skills and ability to live 
with systems over and above the specialized intelligences like linguistic, mathematical or 
kinaesthetic intelligence.  
What are the most important forms of systemic engagement in human life? This 
question need not have any once-and-for-all answer.  New systemic environments relevant 
for human adaptability may well arise. Our own times bears witness to this fact. The human 
race has developed tremendously powerful system 
structures that have enormous positive leverage 
within certain boundaries but also potential for 
enormous destruction from the point of view of 
certain other boundaries. Minimally what is called for 
is systems intelligence with the man-made systemic 
environments in the systemic context of natural life. 
With the creation of powerful man-made systems 
environments, new forms of systems skills are taking 
high priority in terms of success and even survival.  
Our perspective makes room for the discussion and 
analysis of the imperatives for human intelligence in 
that vital and emergent setting.  
Notice that this vision does not refer to people 
only becoming more informed of an important systems domain (such as the functioning of 
food chain, the climate system, the functioning of the world economy). Any knowledge 
helps, but ultimately it is the actions taken in concrete terms that define the level of systems 
intelligence of each of us as individuals and of the human race as a whole. 
Systems Intelligence is Acting Intelligently with Systems 
You walk into a situation, and you enter a system. You meet a person, and something 
larger than the two of you starts to have a say. No matter where you are, systems embrace 
you, and no matter what you strive for, systems obstruct and support you, influence you, 
tempt you, inspire you, hinder you, coerce you and often also suggest how to proceed.  The 
anthropomorphic phenomenology of systems is important to acknowledge because systems 
intelligence operates with systems as they appear to us.  As structures to relate to, working 
via our beliefs, systems present themselves to us and indeed become part of us. Sensing and 
figuring out what seems possible and necessary, we set-up a realm of the “real”, along with 
the narratives that make sense of it, and act on the stage framed by our meaning-giving 
structures.   
What is remarkable is how comprehensive our perspectives typically seem. You catch a 
glance between two persons and realize that “everything has changed”. The phone rings 
and you are informed of the sudden death of your loved one, and nothing will ever be the 
same. Life is conducted in and through changing, meaning-filled contexts and 
environments that are enormously complex. Those complexes come across as integrated, 
holistic “onenesses”. We choose to call such coherent wholes systems, reflecting the 
Our vision does not refer to 
people only becoming more 
informed of an important systems 
domain.  Any knowledge helps, 
but ultimately it is the actions 
taken in concrete terms that 
define the level of systems 
intelligence of each of us as 
individuals and of the human 
race as a whole.
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assumption that their internal functioning is relational, their form of being dynamic and 
their boundaries re-definable. 
Life with systems and within systems can be conducted more or less intelligently, 
depending among other things on 
 
‐ One’s ability to identify the relevant systems with respect to given goals, purposes, 
functions and ways of meaning making. 
 
‐ One’s ability to act upon the relevant systems and take advantage of their leverage. 
 
‐ One’s ability to take advantage of a potential to change a system. 
 
‐ One’s ability to read other agents’ actions and moves within and with respect to 
systems. 
 
In order to live better with systems it is often beneficial to know more of systems.  This 
is where many schools of systems thinking have made remarkable contributions providing 
descriptions of systems on a general level as well as in specific contexts. Along with the 
generic contributions of systems theorists, scholars working within various sciences and 
disciplines have shed light on a number of specific domains through use of the systems 
framework. 
However, as John D. Sterman once so aptly put it, “all models are wrong” (Sterman 
2002).  Life is richer than any modelling of it.  A map is useful for covering a territory, yet 
movement within the territory will require more than a map.  
This is the cutting edge at which our systems intelligence hopes to make a major 
contribution. This is also where our initiative hopes to spark energy to some of the 
humanly-tuned and ethical aspects of the early systems thinkers such as Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy, Kenneth Boulding and C. West Churchman (discussed particularly lucidly in 
Hammond 2003). Bluntly put, it is more important to get actions within systems right than 
the theories of those systems right.  
Systems intelligence is a holistic and action-bound 
faculty within us humans. As observed above, it is 
already present in infancy in the form of the implicit and 
non-verbal yet sophisticated skills that operate in the 
affective dimension of relatedness and intersubjectivity. 
Systems intelligence builds on such abilities for 
interrelatedness, connectivity and sharing.  Yet the 
dominant forms of discourse in our culture are biased 
because of what physicist David Bohm (1980, p. 7) called the human “habit of fragmentary 
thought” which “divides everything up” (Bohm 1996, p. 9).  What comes naturally in 
infancy turns out tricky in adult life.  The challenge is primarily conceptual. Indeed, one of 
the reasons systems intelligence as a theoretical perspective is powerful is due to its refusal 
to bend to the demands of fragmentarism.  We insist on context-bound, local holism as part 
of the very core of human intelligence. 
Systems intelligence refuses 
to bend to the demands of 
fragmentarism.  We insist on 
context-bound, local holism 
as part of the very core of 
human intelligence. 
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It might well prove difficult to measure an intelligence that is fundamentally tied to 
sharing, to co-created processes that are ongoing, to intersubjectivity and to abilities that 
relate to wholeness.  Recall how difficult it is even to make scientific sense of what 
Gardner recently called “the synthetic mind”: “Few individuals and even fewer institutions 
have expertise in inculcating the skill of synthesis.” (Gardner 2008, p. 47). Very little is 
known of the vital act of synthesis. To quote Gardner, “even when synthesizing is desired 
and cultivated, we lack standards for determining when a productive synthesis has been 
accomplished” (ibid). 
But the fact is, people have been remarkably successful and adaptive in living with 
complex, unfolding, emergent and interrelated wholes in their environment. It seems to us 
vital to call attention to the form of intelligence that generates such a remarkable outcome – 
and also gives rise to what Gardner calls “the synthetic mind”. This is the human ability we 
call systems intelligence. 
The result is a proposal that  
 
1) Takes the systems approach of infant research, together with the rich empirical data 
that accompany it, and adds the notion of intelligence to that perspective along with 
extending to adult life the perspective of early human systemic and relational 
abilities.   
 
2) Takes the systems perspective of the systems sciences and disciplines, along with 
the holistic orientation of that perspective, integrates them with the concept of 
intelligence, with the result of introducing the perspective of an adaptive, acting and 
feeling human subject to the systems framework, along with her capabilities for 
implicit relational knowing, for systems sensibilities, and for procedural, non-verbal 
and affect-based interrelating with larger-than-self wholes. 
 
Recall our definition, according to which systems intelligence involves the ability to 
adaptively carry out productive actions within and with respect to systems. The emphasis 
on action is pivotal here and could hardly be timelier. The point of human intelligence 
comes from its service to human life. It is in the dimension of actual conduct and 
behaviours with more and more complex humanly made technological and social systems 
that a more intelligent relation and “attunement” (Stern 1985) are urgently needed.  
The call comes in various guises yet echo the same basic message.  We need what the 
Nobel Laureate Murray Gell-Mann called “a crude look at the whole” (Gell-Mann 1994), in 
order to bring “the necessary revolution” (Senge et al. 2008) of “healing our fragmented 
culture” (Goodwin 2007).   
The call is to a radical, dramatic increase of systems intelligence. 
The Positivity of Systems Intelligence 
Systems thinkers emphasize phenomena of interconnectivity and interrelatedness, 
representing what has been called “the relational turn”.  
The relational orientation is based on the idea that whatever is being studied should be 
thought of in terms of relationships and with respect to something other than itself. (Cf. 
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e.g., Senge 1990, Capra 1996, Bradbury and Lichtenstein 2000, Stolorow et al. 2002, Beebe 
and Lachmann 2002). The key idea is that “human cognition and the sense of self are 
fundamentally and originally relational.” (Fogel 1993, p. 4) 
Along with the emphasis on relations, the systems approach highlights holism and 
focuses upon “wholes”. It is interested in dynamism and change. As opposed to individual 
events, the focus is upon processes, patterns and performance over time. Instead of single 
causes, the limelight is upon multiple causes and bi- and multiple-directional relationships.  
Systems thinkers articulate modes of conceptualizing the world in terms of the big picture 
and the longer term.  
Thus described, one could say that the systems perspective is relatively straightforward. 
Key ideas of systems thinking can indeed be found in the folk wisdom of various cultures 
and traditions where they are presented as rules of thumb, proverbs and sayings. (On this, 
see Meadows 2008.) 
Yet the phenomena of gradual change, delayed effects, feedback, the big picture, 
reciprocal causality as well as those of gradual change are remarkably difficult to 
appreciate in actual human practice (for a vivid discussion, see Jervis 1998).  
One of the cornerstones of the systems thinking literature is the description and 
modelling of the most common “systems archetypes”. Among them: “Tragedy of the 
Commons” (made famous by Hardin 1968), “Shifting the Burden”, “Fixes that Fail”, 
“Eroding the Goals”, and “Limits to Growth” (for discussion, see Senge 1990).  Our notion 
of “the Systems of Holding Back” (Saarinen and Hämäläinen 2004) can also be included 
here.  
These archetypes are powerful. In her highly illuminating and accessible book Thinking 
in Systems, Donnella Meadows goes through the International Herald Tribune during one 
week, and in the coverage of world events that week finds illustrations for each one of the 
most celebrated traps identified in systems dynamics literature (Meadows 2008). Thinking 
in terms of wholes rather than parts, in terms of processes rather than time slices, in terms 
of interconnectivity rather than isolated parts may seem simple enough in theory but is 
difficult in practice.   
Yet as already observed, there is a sense in which even infants can do it. To some 
extent anybody can do it. There is a sense in which human beings cannot but be systems 
thinkers. The fact that there is an imperative to improve should not lead us to dismiss the 
worth of the endowment each one of us has right from the start.  
The promise of intelligence is one of adaptability. With your intelligence you can learn 
and adapt better. While it can be taken for granted that the world is systemic, it is a priori 
clear that at some point, intuitive systems thinking – like any intuitive thinking – is going to 
prove insufficient or inadequate (cf. Kahneman 2003). “When the interconnections are 
dense”, Jervis points out, “it may be difficult to trace the impact of any change even after 
the fact, let alone predict it ahead of time, making the system complex and hard to control.” 
(Jervis 1998, p. 17). That does not change the fact that for the benefit of the much-needed 
refinement process there is a platform and a base: our innate systems intelligence. 
The fact that systems effects are hard to predict and control is bad news but also good 
news, depending on the perspective. The systems literature often takes the negative stance, 
emphasizing the problems that arise out of the sheer complexity of the social, political or 
natural systems. Systems intelligence takes a different tone. For one thing, with its 
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emphasis on human sensibilities and notions such as feel for the system (Hämäläinen and 
Saarinen 2008), the systems intelligence perspective was never about the command and 
control of systems. The interface with systems, as with life in dynamic settings, was always 
assumed to be broadband. 
The systems intelligence perspective emphasizes what we do right, with the hope of 
generating more of it, as opposed to what we do wrong. Accordingly, in place of “Shifting 
the Burden”, “Fixes that Fail” or “Tragedy of the Commons” as negative systems 
archetypes, the focus is on “Sharing the Burden”, “Fixes that Fire” and “Miracle of the 
Commons” as systems intelligence archetypes with distinctly positive emphasis 
(Hämäläinen and Saarinen 2006).  Given the fact that “we can never do merely one thing” 
(Jervis 1998, p. 10), our actions can backfire but they also yield tremendous success.  By 
just one action we can generate a whole range of right things at the same time – with others, 
with our wide-ranging humanity, with the help of richly and prudently facilitated systems.  
In terms of its tone, our approach matches that of positive psychology (Seligman and 
Csikszentmihalyi 2000) and positive organizational scholarship (Cameron et al. 2003). It is 
in line with Fredrickson’s Broaden and Build Theory in its emphasis on the significance of 
positive emotions (Fredrickson 2003, 2009). Indeed, as we see it, the initiative of systems 
intelligence advances the original idea of Gardner’s “Project on Human Potential” (Gardner 
1983) and also follows Sternberg’s insights (1985) of appreciating intelligence in terms of 
its practical value and sensitivity to the varying aspects of the context. 
Turning the Tide with Men and Women in the Loop 
We would like to see our perspective encourage a growth-mindset in the sense of Carol 
Dweck. Trivially, the linguistic abilities of a child are lesser than those of an adult, or of a 
Shakespeare. Nobody takes this as an argument to dismiss the significance of what she does 
right with her linguistic endowment. Similarly, it is obvious that no matter how skilful 
someone is in identifying feedback loops and patterns over time in a given area of life, still 
it is possible to improve as a practitioner in that area. No matter how brilliantly adaptive 
someone is in acting within the confines of a given life system, surely there is room to do 
even better. The more there is complexity to the unfolding environment, the more there is 
space for creativity, productive actions, and for systems intelligence to grow. 
In view of the possibilities to improve, it is particularly important to realize that there is 
no particular reason to think that in the realm of systems skills, symbolically-coded and 
explicit knowledge should reign alone. It is useful to learn science-based systems 
disciplines and thereupon become a better systems thinker. But this is not sufficient.  
People still need to act with their systems knowledge with respect to systems – 
intelligently. To the extent the world is a mess globally and locally, we need more 
intelligent systems “out there”, but even more intelligence with systems in here. It is not 
only the understanding of the loops that need to be improved. Also men and women in the 
loops need to change. 
In the human world, the malfunctioning of systems is often humanly made, and hinges 
on people. Many systems thinkers have explained the world in systems terms, but the point 
is to change it through our increasing systems intelligence. Here our proposals bring back 
the ethical and emancipatory emphasis of the early systems thinkers, in particular the 
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humanistic concern of Ludwig von Bertalanffy (von Bertalanffy 1969, p. xxiii). That 
ethical emphasis has often been marginalized in the name of modelling, objective 
description, and command-and-control oriented systems practices (for an extensive 
discussion, see Hammond 2003). Our initiative attempts to turn the tide here and do justice 
to the founding fathers. 
Knowledge is the essential ingredient of the good society, yet humanity is even more 
fundamental. One should be careful not to fall into the cognitive systems trap – into 
believing that once we have cognitively identified the relevant systems, most of the work is 
done. From the point of view of systems intelligence, an adequate representation of a 
system is only the beginning, and the lively challenge lies ahead, calling for personal 
involvement. There cannot be systems intelligence with respect to systems without 
intelligent actions supported by personal responsibility as the backbone of those actions. 
We may note in passing that along with the cognitive systems trap there is the cognitive 
trap of complexity. That goes off when the concepts of complexity theory are used to 
articulate how complex the complexity is in a given field of application. A diagnosis might 
be intellectually illustrative and indeed mesmerizing but the main question concerns the 
cure. More often than not, a modelling via complexity theory does not yield much more 
than an intellectually extravagant celebration of the complexities that have been found, 
without any indication of what to do about them. (For inspiring exceptions, see Losada 
1999, Fredrickson and Losada 2005, Stacey 2003, Taylor 2004.) 
Sensing the System of Betterment 
In general, the systems perspective emphasises connections and warns against isolation.  
It warms against cut-and-dried approaches to boundaries (Midgley 2000). The systems 
intelligence perspective takes these points very seriously. We should take note not to 
separate actions from systems, systems from human sensibilities, and intelligence from the 
non-verbal, non-conscious abilities for interconnectivity that are part and parcel of the 
human condition. We should take note not to cut off 
intelligence from the dynamic setting in which it takes place. 
Recall the fact, often overlooked by scientists, that human 
beings not only have abilities to measure and calculate 
quantity but also capabilities to sense quality. That 
endowment is the basis of art and of much of what makes life 
worth living. It is also the base from which a mother and an infant regulate and co-regulate 
their intra- and inter-personal processes in a highly cost effective way. Something just feels 
right – the smile of the baby, the face of the mother – and something else – the cry of the 
baby, the inanimate object next to the face of the mother – does not.  Systems intelligence 
looks at the whole of human potential as a resource for better systems-living with others 
and with the environment.  The human ability to feel, sense and to resonate, the ability to 
move and be moved, to enhance and be enchanted, to uplift and be uplifted are some of 
those ways holism works within us as our innate systems intelligence.   
As noted above, Beebe and Lachmann emphasize the infant-mother “dyad’s ability to 
make use of whatever abilities the infant brings” (Beebe and Lachmann 2002, p. 88). It is 
We should take note not 
to cut off intelligence 
from the dynamic setting 
in which it takes place. 
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indeed intelligent to use whatever abilities you have in order to cope with and live with the 
systems at hand – it is systems intelligent.  
This is where our perspective of systems intelligence pays homage to the vision of 
Donella Meadows, in her posthumously published synthesis, when she states that “Living 
successfully in a world of systems requires more of us than our ability to calculate. It 
requires our full humanity – our rationality, our ability to sort out truth from falsehood, our 
intuition, our compassion, our vision, and our morality.” (Meadows 2008, p. 170).  
More human intelligence is needed, more systems intelligence. The point of 
intelligence is that it can foster learning and improvement. Our initiative seeks to give 
positive impetus to that vital process of uplift, glory and necessity as part of the human 
condition in our time. 
References 
Amadei, Gherardo and Ilaria Bianchi. 2007. Living systems, evolving consciousness, and 
the emerging person: A selection of papers from the life work of Louis Sander. Taylor & 
Francis, New York, USA.  
Bertalanffy, L. Von. 1969. General system theory. George Braziller.   
Beebe, Beatrice and Frank M. Lachmann. 2002. Infant research and adult treatment: Co-
constructing interactions. The Analytic Press. 
Beebe, Beatrice, Steven Knoblauch, Judith Rustin, and Dorienne Sorter. 2003. 
Introduction: A systems view. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 743–775. 
Beebe, Beatrice, Steven Knoblauch, Judith Rustin, and Dorienne Sorter. 2005. Forms of 
intersubjectivity in infant research and adult treatment. Other Press, New York, USA. 
Bohm, David. 1980. Wholeness and the implicate order. Routledge. 
Bohm, David. 1996. On dialogue. Routledge.  
Bradbury, Hilary and Benyamin M.B. Lichtenstein. 2000. Relationality in organizational 
research: Exploring the space between. Organization Science, vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 551–
564.   
Bruner, Jerome. 1983. Child’s talk. New York: Norton.   
Buirski, Peter. 2005. Practicing intersubjectively. Jason Aronson, USA.  
Capra, Fritjof. 1996. The web of life: A new scientific understanding of living systems. 
Anchor. 
Cameron, Kim S., Jane E. Dutton and Robert E. Quinn. 2003. Positive organizational 
scholarship: Foundations of a new discipline. Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 
Dweck, Carol S. 2000. Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality, and 
development.  Psychology Press.   
Dweck, Carol S. 2007. Mindset: The new psychology of success. Random House.   
Thorndike, Edward L. 1921. Intelligence and its measurement: A symposium. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, vol.12, no. 3, pp. 124–127.   
Evans, Jonathan. 2008. Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social 
cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 59, pp. 255–278.   
Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 24
Fogel, Alan. 1993. Developing through relationships: Origins of communication, self, and 
culture. University of Chicago Press.  
Fredrickson, Barbara, L. 2003. The value of positive emotions. The emerging science of 
positive psychology is coming to understand why it's good to feel good. American 
Scientist, vol. 91, no. 4, pp. 330–335.  
Fredrickson, Barbara L. 2009. Positivity, Crown and Crown.   
Fredrickson, Barbara L. and Marcial F. Losada. 2005. Positive affect and the complex 
dynamics of human flourishing. American Psychologist, vol. 60, pp. 678–686.   
Gardner, Howard. 1983. Frames of mind. Basic Books.   
Gardner, Howard. 2008. The five minds for the future. Harvard Business School Press.  
Gell-Mann, Murray. 1994. The quark and the jaguar. Freeman New York.   
Gerrid, Richard J. and Philip G. Zimbardo. 2010. Psychology and Life, 19th Edition, 
Pearson.  
Goodwin, Brian. 2007. Nature's due: Healing our fragmented culture. Floris Books. 
Hammond, Debora. 2003. The science of synthesis: Exploring the social implications of 
general systems theory. The University Press of Colorado, USA. 
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science, vol. 162, pp. 38–59.   
Hobson, Peter. 2004. The cradle of thought: Exploring the origins of thinking. Oxford 
University Press, USA.   
Holland, John H. 1998. Emergence: From chaos to order. Addison-Wesley Longman 
Publishing Co., Inc., Boston, MA, USA. 
Hämäläinen, Raimo P. and Esa Saarinen. 2006. Systems intelligence: A key competence for 
organizational life. Reflections: The SoL Journal, vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 17–28. 
Hämäläinen, Raimo P., and Esa Saarinen. 2007a. Systems intelligent leadership. In Systems 
intelligence in leadership and everyday life, R.P. Hämäläinen & E. Saarinen, eds., 
Helsinki University of Technology.  
Hämäläinen, Raimo P., and Esa Saarinen. 2007b. The way forward with systems 
intelligence. In Systems intelligence in leadership and everyday life, Raimo P. 
Hämäläinen and Esa Saarinen, eds., Helsinki University of Technology.  
Hämäläinen, Raimo P. and Esa Saarinen. 2008. Systems Intelligence - The way forward? A 
note on Ackoff's "Why few organizations adopt systems thinking", Systems Research 
and Behavioral Science, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 821–825. 
Jackson, Michael C. 2003. Systems thinking: Creative holism for managers. Wiley, 
Chichester UK. 
Jervis, Robert. 1998. System effects: Complexity in political and social life. Princeton 
University Press.   
Kahneman, Daniel. 2003. A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded 
rationality. American psychologist, vol. 58, no. 9, pp. 697–720.   
Chapter 1: The Originality of Systems Intelligence 
 25
Kugiumutzakis, Giannis. 1998. Neonatal imitation in the intersubjective companion space. 
In Intersubjective communication and emotion in early ontogeny, Stein Bråten, ed., pp. 
63–88, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.  
Langer, Ella J. 1989. Mindfulness. Addison-Wesley Reading, Massachusetts, USA.   
Losada, Marcial. 1999. The complex dynamics of high performance teams. Mathematical 
and Computer Modelling, vol. 30, no. 9-10, pp. 179–192.   
Lyons-Ruth, Karlen, Nadia Bruschweiler-Stern, Alexandra M. Harrison, Alexander C. 
Morgan, Jeremy P. Nahum, Louis Sander, Daniel N. Stern, and Edward Z. Tronick. 
1998. Implicit relational knowing: Its role in development and psychoanalytic treatment. 
Infant Mental Health Journal, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 282–289.  
Lyons-Ruth, Karlen. 1999. The two-person unconscious: Intersubjective dialogue, enactive 
relational representation, and the emergence of new forms of relational organization. 
Psychoanalytic Inquiry, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 576–617.   
Mayer, John D., Richard D. Roberts, and Sigal G. Barsade. 2008. Human abilities: 
Emotional intelligence. Annual Reviews in Psychology, vol. 59, pp. 507–536.  
Meadows, Donella H. 2002. Dancing with systems. Systems Thinker, vol.13, no. 2, pp. 2–6. 
Meadows, Donella H. 2008. Thinking in systems: A primer. Chelsea Green. 
Midgley, Gerald. 2000. Systemic intervention: Philosophy, methodology, and practice. 
Plenum Publishing Corporation, New York, USA. 
Nahum, Jeremy P. 2000. An overview of Louis Sander's contribution to the field of mental 
health. Infant Mental Health Journal, vol. 21, no. 1–2, pp. 29–41.   
Neisser, Ulric, Gwyneth Boodoo, Thomas Bouchard, Wade Boykin, Nathan Brody, 
Stephen Ceci, Diane Halpern, John Loehlin, Robert Perloff, Robert Sternberg, Susana 
Urbina. 1996. Intelligence: Knowns and unknowns. American Psychologist, vol. 51, no. 
2, pp. 77–101. 
Nye, Joseph S. 2008. The powers to lead. Oxford University Press, USA.   
Ramage, Magnus and Karen Shipp. 2009. Systems Thinkers. Springer Verlag, London, UK.  
Ross, Lee and Richard E. Nisbett. 1991. The person and the situation: Perspectives of 
social psychology. McGraw-Hill. 
Saarinen, Esa and Sebastian Slotte. 2003. Philosophical lecturing as a philosophical 
practice. Practical Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 7–23.   
Saarinen, Esa and Raimo P. Hämäläinen. 2004. Systems Intelligence: Connecting 
Engineering Thinking with Human Sensitivity. In Systems Intelligence - Discovering a 
Hidden Competence in Human Action and Organizational Life, Raimo P. Hämäläinen 
and Esa Saarinen, eds, Helsinki University of Technology, Systems Analysis 
Laboratory, Research Reports A88, October 2004. 
Saarinen, Esa. 2008. Philosophy for managers: Reflections of a practitioner. Philosophy of 
Management, vol. 7, supplement. 
Salovey, Peter and John D. Mayer. 1990. Emotional intelligence. Imagination, Cognition 
and Personality, vol. 9, no. 3.  
Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 26
Sander, Louis. The regulation of exchange in the infant-caretaker system and some aspects 
of the context-content relationship. 1977. Interaction, conversation, and the development 
of language, vol. 5, no. 40, no. 579–593. 
Senge, Peter M. 1990. The fifth discipline. Doubleday New York, USA.   
Senge, Peter M., Bryan Smith, Nina Kruschwitz, Joe Laur and Sara Schley. 2008. The 
necessary revolution: How individuals and organizations are working together to create 
a sustainable world. Doubleday Currency, USA.   
Stacey, Ralph D. 2003. Complexity and group processes: A radically social understanding 
of individuals. Brunner Routledge, New York, USA. 
Sterman, John D. 2002. All models are wrong: reflections on becoming a systems scientist. 
System Dynamics Review, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 501–531. 
Stern, Daniel N. 1977/2002. The first relationship. Harvard University Press. 
Stern, Daniel N. 1985. The interpersonal world of the infant: A viewfrom psychoanalysis 
and developmental psychology. Basic Books, New York, NY, USA.   
Sternberg, Robert J.1985. Beyond IQ: A triarchic theory of human intelligence. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK.  
Stolorow, Robert D. and George E. Atwood. 1992. Contexts of being: The intersubjective 
foundations of psychological life. The Analytic Press.  
Stolorow, Robert D, George E. Atwood and Donna M. Orange. 2002. Worlds of 
experience: Interweaving philosophical and clinical dimensions in psychoanalysis. 
Basic Books. 
Taylor, Mark C. 2004. Confidence games: money and markets in a world without 
redemption. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA.   
Uleman, James S., S. Adil Saribay, and Celia M. Gonzalez. 2007. Spontaneous inferences, 
implicit impressions, and implicit theories. Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 59, pp. 
329–360.    
Wechsler, David. 1958. The measurement and appraisal of adult intelligence. The 
Williams & Wilkins Company, Baltimore, USA. 
 
   





Psychological Aspects of Systems 
Intelligence: Conceptualisations of a New 
Intelligence Form 
John F. Rauthmann 
The construct of systems intelligence (SI) by Hämäläinen and Saarinen (2004, 
2007, 2008) is a new concept to social and human sciences and to the study of 
man. This article aims firstly at providing a psychological articulation of SI by 
using different concepts of “intelligence” as offered in psychology. The second 
aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how properties of abilities, competences, 
styles, and traits can be used to propose different approaches to SI (e.g., Trait-
SI, Ability-SI). A basis for a psychologically informed yet multi-disciplinary 
perspective on SI is set which aims at fostering future research. 
Introduction 
Systems intelligence (SI) is a wide-ranging and applicable new concept to social and 
human sciences. It focuses upon thinking, acting, and getting involved into dynamic 
processes with feedbacks within a complex system (see Hämäläinen and Saarinen 2004, 
2007, 2008). 
Even though there has been a considerable amount of impressive theorisation on the 
nature of SI (e.g., Hämäläinen and Saarinen 2004, 2007a, 2008a, 2008b; Luoma, 
Hämäläinen, and Saarinen, 2008), empirical studies are still needed. What is also lacking is 
an articulation of SI from the point of view of psychological science. The aim of this paper 
is to provide the first steps in that direction and to present a psychological view on SI. The 
results of this paper will hopefully provide a useful theoretical underpinning for empirical 
SI-assessment in the future.  
The foremost goal of this article is to inspire researchers to attend to empirical studies 
on SI. Hence, several different (and maybe even competing) possible approaches to SI are 
articulated, in the hope that other researchers will find some of them interesting and 
conduct empirical studies exploring their usefulness for SI research as well as their 
applicability for practice.  
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“Classical” Intelligence in Psychology and its Different 
Conceptualisations 
This paragraph will (a) outline different conceptualisations of “classical intelligence” in 
psychology and (b) go on to show how these conceptualisations can be applied to the study 
of SI. Then, conclusions are drawn on SI as a form of “intelligence”. 
An important question – before conceptualising SI as an ability or intelligence – is: 
What is “intelligence”? 
Indeed, numerous definitions have been given, and indeed not all find common ground, 
but the following from Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade (2008, p. 509) subsumes a lot of them 
and is yet concise: 
Intelligence: a mental ability (or set of mental abilities) that permit the 
recognition, learning, memory for, and capacity to reason about a particular 
form of information 
Neisser and colleagues (1998, p. 77) give another, more detailed definition in the APA 
Task Force on intelligence (“Intelligence: Knowns and Unknowkns”): 
Individuals differ from one another in their ability to understand complex ideas, 
to adapt effectively to the environment, to learn from experience, to engage in 
various forms of reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking thought. Although 
these individual differences can be substantial, they are never entirely 
consistent: A given person’s intellectual performance will vary on different 
occasions, in different domains, as judged by different criteria. 
Not even clarified what exactly “intelligence” is, the question of its structure arose: Can 
intelligence be seen as a single, homogeneous variable or should it rather be reckoned a 
subsuming term for multiple, more heterogeneous abilities, skills, and competences in the 
cognitive-intellectual domain? This question, which is answered in a number of different 
ways in psychology, is critically essential to SI.  
Spearman’s theory of two factors of intelligence: g and s 
Spearman (1904) posited two factors of intelligence he was able to extract from several 
different tests: g for a general mental ability (“brain power”) or a kind of mental energy 
(Spearman, 1927), and s for specific mental abilities. The s refers to the fact that Spearman 
found specific factors for the different mental tasks he used. He also found that individuals 
scoring high on one specific ability (e.g., mathematical skills) also tended to be good in 
other domains (e.g., language skills). The different abilities correlated positively with each 
other in a moderate way, which is referred to as a “positive manifold”. This suggests that 
there could be a superordinate variable behind the correlations, the g-factor of intelligence. 
The broad g-factor or general factor of intelligence tends to cover about 50 % of variance in 
cognitive tasks of all sorts (Sternberg and Grigorenko, 2002) and seems to be very 
important for everyday life and work activities (Gottfredson, 1997). Yet, its interpretation 
varies (e.g., mere statistical regularity: Thomson, 1939; generalised abstract reasoning 
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ability: Gustafsson, 1984; index measure of neural processing speed: Reed and Jensen, 
1992). 
Thurstone’s model of primary mental abilities 
Spearman’s assumption that the intercorrelation of s-factors leads towards one broad, 
general intelligence factor was opposed by Thurstone (1938) who proposed multiple 
“primary factors” of intelligence or “primary mental abilities”: v (verbal comprehension), 
w (word fluency), n (number; computational ability), s (space; visuo-spatial imagination 
and thinking), m (memory), p (perceptual speed), r/i (reasoning, induction). These factors 
are not uncorrelated and separate factors. Indeed, they intercorrelate and also form higher-
order factors. Thurstone’s assumptions fostered lines of research in the field of primary 
abilities, and over 70 primary mental abilities were found (Carroll, 1993). 
Hierarchical models of intelligence 
The g-factor of intelligence could not alone account for the correlations between the 
different kinds of cognitive tests which participants had to complete. This triggered  
research  following  the notion that there are several factors of intelligence, perhaps on 
different levels of abstraction. These conceptualisations usually propose a hierarchical 
model of intelligence factors (e.g., Burt, 1949; Vernon, 1950, 1965). There are specialised 
abilities at the very bottom of the hierarchical system, followed by minor group factors, and 
above those again major group factors. Above all, at the apex, is the g-factor. Each level is 
more abstract than the other and comprises more abilities, thus enhancing heterogeneity in 
ability content and diminishing correlations with behavioural manifestations which are 
located at the very bottom of the system. Further, the factors are still correlated; only the 
intercorrelation of lower factors can lead to the extraction of higher factors. In general, 
there are two mathematically equally viable solutions (Amelang, Bartussek, Stemmler, and 
Hagemann, 2006): First, one can extract a g-factor strong in variance and some more or less 
specific “residual factors” (s-factors). Second, one can accentuate the specific s-factors at 
the expense of the g-factor. No solution can be accounted as the “only and right” way as 
both could be transferred into each other. In this sense, hierarchical models can be seen as a 
synthesis between Spearman’s Two-Factor model and Thurstone’s model of primary 
mental abilities: While Spearman uses solution 1 (a g-factor and some minor s-factors), 
Thurstone prefers a radical solution 2 (only relatively strong s-factors, no g-factor). A 
hierarchical model can account for both sides and help elicit the structure of intelligence(s). 
Cattell’s model of fluid and crystallised intelligence 
Cattell (1963) provided a synthesis of Spearman’s two-factor theory and Thurstone’s 
primary mental abilities model by introducing the concept of fluid and crystallised 
intelligence. Cattell ran factor analyses over the different (already factor analysed) primary 
factors that still showed intercorrelations due to the oblique rotation of the factors1. So-
                                                 
1 Factor analysis aims at reducing the data and bundling it into factors (data in a factor correlate highly with each other and 
lower with data from other factors). In general, there are two different rotation forms: orthogonal and oblique. Orthogonal 
designs lead to no or only very small intercorrelations of factors: The data within a factor correlate highly with each other 
but not or only to a minimum with data in other factors. Oblique rotations allow the factors to be intercorrelated with each 
Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 32
called secondary factors or factors of higher order from the factor analysed primary factors 
were obtained: These are broader and more abstract factors, comprising several aspects in 
them and being more heterogeneous in content. 
Crystallised general intelligence (gc) refers to the cognitive ability of applying learned 
knowledge when solving problems. It is gained by education, culture, and socialisation 
which makes it highly dependent on socio-cultural and socio-economic factors as well as 
on an individual’s learning history, experiences, and autobiography. Crystallised general 
intelligence can be seen as the “end product” of fluid intelligence and individual learning 
processes.  
In turn, fluid intelligence (gf) refers to the innate (and genetically determined) ability of 
solving a problem without any specific or previous knowledge and thus adapting to given 
problems and situations. This form of intelligence is usually assessed with so-called 
“culture-fair” or at least culture-reduced tests. There should be no or only minor 
intercultural differences concerning gf. Culture-fair tests use no language and can be solved 
independently from one’s education, subculture, socialisation, and socio-economic status; 
they usually involve pictures that require some sort of logical operation (e.g., completing a 
series of symbols or figures). Tests for assessing crystallised intelligence usually involve 
language (and may also require a certain education level); they therefore mainly assess 
verbal comprehension, experiential evaluation, and semantic relations (Amelang et al., 
2006). 
Statistical analyses showed that primary mental abilities had loadings on crystallised 
and fluid intelligence; gc and gf had a relatively high correlation of r = .50 (which can be 
attributed to many factors, however). By extraction of a superordinate variable of gc and gf, 
gf(h) or “gf historical” is obtained which resembles Spearman’s g-factor. gf(h) is more 
closely associated with fluid intelligence as this intelligence form is more prominent and 
important in early years of development (Cattell, 1971; Horn and Cattell, 1967). gc, gf, and 
gf(h) as well as variables of interest, memory, and educational experiences are integrated 
into Cattell’s model of intelligence. 
Guilford’s structure of intellect model 
Guilford’s model (e.g., Guilford, 1956, 1967) is not based on a hierarchical structure of 
interrelated factors: Not oblique rotation forms are used but rather orthogonal ones (to 
obtain relatively uncorrelated factors). This complicates finding a g-factor as there is not 
enough variance from which it may be extracted by further higher-order factor analyses. 
Guilford’s model can be seen as an attempt to organise and structure all the existing 
intelligence concepts at his time. His theoretical underpinning is cognitive information 
processing which he used analogous to a stimulus-organism-response paradigm.  
Hence, he distinguished three dimenions: Input (content), operation, and output 
variables. All three dimensions have certain subclasses. Input variables can be quite 
different in their stimulus character and thus have different contents and complexities 
(Guilford and Hoepfner, 1971): visual / figural, symbolic, semantic / meaning, behavioural. 
                                                                                                                                                    
other: Data within a factor correlate quite highly but also correlate with data from other factors to some extent. Before 
using a certain rotation method, one usually has to take theoretical assumptions into account: Do we expect orthogonal, 
uncorrelated factors or interrelated, correlating factors? 
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Sometimes auditory is also included or mentioned with visual. There are mediating 
cognitive operation processes (information processing) between environmental stimuli with 
certain content (input variables) and the eventually resulting responses (output variables). 
The “organismic” operations can be classified as follows: cognition, memory, divergent 
production, convergent production, evaluation. The products (output) of the stimuli 
processed by the operations are: units, classes, relations, systems, transformations, 
implications. By combining all three dimensions with their subclasses, a 4 × 5 × 6 cube 
with 120 factors in total is obtained. Each block of the resulting cube (which serves as a 
good illustration), can be seen as a separate information processing process defined by a 
specific input, operation, and output.  
The model has great heuristic value as it allows to explore different processes one at a 
time or in combinations – but still having a system integrating the different forms. A 
problem is that the factors postulated by Guilford are not uncorrelated; there are still rather 
high and meaningful correlations. This indicates that there are still higher factors to be 
extracted; thus, the complexity of the model can be reduced (not assuming 120 separate 
factors). Also, there were several facts in Guilford’s studies that even reduced the amount 
of significant correlations (Brody and Brody, 1976): sample homogeneity, low reliability of 
tests, heterogeneous abilities in the study.2 
Jäger’s Berliner intelligence structure model 
Jäger (1984) posited a model that takes into account the two dimensions operations and 
contents which are crossed with each other and form 12 cells which are understood as 
certain performance forms and not as primary abilities. Operations are: information 
processing capacity, richness of ideas, memory, velocity of information processing. 
Contents are: verbal, numeric, visual-figural. Further, Jäger was able to extract a non-
differentiated g-factor. 
Carroll’s three stratum theory of intelligence 
Carroll’s (1993) model of intelligence relies on a comprehensive database (he 
reanalysed over 450 datasets) and basically posits three levels (strata): Stratum III can be 
deemed as a general factor of cognitive abilities, stratum II comprises crystallised and fluid 
mental abilities as well as velocity of information processing, and stratum I contains more 
specific mental abilities. All in all, Carroll’s analyses support (a) the view of a 
superordinate g-factor with more specialised s-factors and (b) a hierarchical structure of 
intelligence. 
Implications of intelligence research for SI research 
After briefly outlining some of the most prominent psychological conceptualisations of 
(cognitive) intelligence, useful elements of intelligence research to SI (see Figure 1 for an 
illustration) shall now be shown. 
 
                                                 
2 Upon conducting empirical studies in the field of SI, these are factors that should also be taken into consideration. 
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‐ First of all, given the fact that SI comprises so many different concepts (especially 
cognitive, emotional, and motivational ones) there should be a “super-factor” 
underlying all of these abilities. Therefore, SI might also have a general factor gs 
(“g systemic”). gs would be an abstract super-factor that can be extracted from the 
different areas of SI. Further, there should be lower-order but still relatively abstract 
factors gs(f) (“g systemic fluid”) and gs(c) (“g systemic crystallised”). Beneath these 
should be quite specific SI factors ss (“s systemic”). As there are no empirical data 
yet, it is hard to say (a) if there are such things as gs, gs(f), gs(c), and ss and (b) if they 
do exist, what purpose (i.e., psychological meaning) they have and how they are 
structured. gs(c) could probably be settled more in the cognitive domain as it would 
mostly comprise knowledge structures, and gs(f) could be more of an affective and 
emotional factor. Nevertheless, I have to emphasise that all of these hypotheses are 
mere speculations; empirical data will be needed to show structures of SI, possibly 
hierarchical ones. 
 
‐ Second, it could be postulated that the factors of SI are interrelated and not 
orthogonal ones. This, of course, goes along with extracting gs, gs(f), and gs(c) as it 
would otherwise be hard to do so. Particular tests for specific SI-abilities should be 
correlated at least in a moderate way (positive manifold) which would suggest that a 
superordinate SI-factor could be extracted. 
 
‐ Third, the preceding remarks point towards a hierarchical structure of SI with gs at 
the apex, followed by gs(f) and gs(c) at the next level (or stratum), and then followed 
by more specialised components of SI (see Figure 1). This structure is reminiscent 
of Carroll’s integrative Three Stratum Theory. 
 
‐ In analogy to Guilford and Jäger, we should also consider contents, operations, and 
output or performances. SI probably relates to a vast amount of contents (e.g., even 
emotions) and there should also be a huge amount of operations. It will be a goal of 
future research to clarify which contents and operations SI might have. This goes 
hand in hand with assessing the performance outputs of SI and its related abilities.  
 
‐ We should not be as quick as to make statements about gs, gs(f), and gs(c) in relation 
to the g- and s-factors of intelligence since intelligence (and its associated abilities) 
are probably an integral part of SI. Eventually, the g-factor of intelligence as well as 
crystallised and fluid intelligence could be separate factors within SI and probably 
even cover most variance. Of course, this depends highly on the definition and 
operationalisation of SI, which tasks are used in a study, which abilities are studied, 
and which characteristics the sample has. Further, it must be taken into account that 
SI probably relies especially on capacity and velocity of information processing. 
Indeed, most abilities of SI require this as a prerequisite. Therefore, the g-factor of 
intelligence should be high in SI too. This also leads to the problem of incremental 
validity: Is there a unique portion of variance that SI can account for when 
predicting relevant or critical real-life (or test) criteria above and beyond certain 
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Figure 1. A hierarchical model of systems intelligence 
 
“Other” Concepts of Intelligence in Psychology  
The previous paragraph was concerned with “classical” intelligence, meaning 
cognitive-intellectual abilities or abilities that are mostly manifested and fostered in school 
(see Neisser, 1976 with the term “academic intelligence” and most abilities referring to 
verbal or numeric abilities). It is often associated with a psychometric approach but Neisser 
and colleagues (1996, p.79) note that “to base a concept of intelligence on test scores alone 
is to ignore many important aspects of mental ability”. This form might be, amongst others, 
a core factor of SI but certainly not the only one. In the history of psychology, numerous 
other forms of “intelligence” have been proposed. Some of these other intelligence forms as 
well as their possible relevance to SI will be briefly discussed. 
Practical intelligence 
Neisser (1976, p. 137) proposes an “intelligent performance in natural settings” which 
refers to some sort of a practical intelligence (as opposed to the common “academic 
intelligence”). Considering the tasks that are administered to measure academic 
intelligence, it is obvious why there should also be a more practical intelligence (Wagner 
and Sternberg, 1985; see also Neisser et al., 1996): Most tasks are clearly and well 
structured, relatively abstract, and not relevant to everyday life (“disembedded from 
ordinary experience”; Neisser et al., 1996, p. 79); further, nearly all information is given 
from the beginning on and there is mostly only one right answer or solution to them (with 
only a single right method). Also, participants tend to have no or only low intrinsic 
motivation to solve them. As opposed to these, there are tasks in everyday life that are not 
well structured and poorly defined; fairly complex, dynamic, and intransparant; require 
own searching, generation, utilisation, and modification of information; affect our needs, 
emotions, and cognition (personal involvement; “embedded in and require prior everyday 
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experience”; Neisser et al., 1996, p. 79); do not have only one single way of solving them; 
and there is no single solution that can be deemed as the only and right one (see also 
Charlesworth, 1976, p. 150). Further, these rather “practical” tasks require more flexibility 
and situation adaptation while solving them or gathering information to do so. In many 
ways, practical intelligence resembles more a concept of complex problem solving and tacit 
knowledge. Tacit knowledge is knowledge that is more practical and informal, not directly 
taught, and gained mostly implicitly and by experience (cf. Wagner, 1987; Wagner and 
Sternberg, 1985, 1986). It is defined as an “action-oriented knowledge, acquired without 
direct help from others, which allows individuals to achieve goals they personally value” 
(Sternberg, Wagner, Williams, and Horvath, 1995, p. 916). However, practical intelligence 
seems to be more of a competence than intelligence as not only mental aspects are of 
concern but also behavioural ones. Practical intelligence might not be a homogeneous 
construct and rather an “epiphenomenon” of the interactions of other abilities (such as 
“academic intelligence”, tacit knowledge, and control mechanisms). 
When assessing3 practical intelligence or practical competences one can either try to (a) 
use self-reports (which are not very effective here), (b) tap into the motive(s) of people 
activating intellectual and practical abilities in their everyday life (which may also not yield 
sufficient results, mainly because the motives cannot be assessed in a way that would suit 
basic psychometric criteria), (c) use certain structured forms of interviews asking for 
situations and experiences referring to practical competences and people’s coping with the 
situations, (d) conduct simulations perhaps in an assessment centre setting (Frederiksen, 
1966), and (e) use comparisons of experts and novices (e.g., Wagner and Sternberg, 1986) 
(see Amelang et al., 2006). 
Successful intelligence 
Sternberg (1985) proposed in a triarchic theory three fundamental aspects of 
intelligence: analytic, creative, and practical. Later, Sternberg (1998) introduced a construct 
that referred to factors beyond education, knowledge, and creativity which are responsible 
for success in one’s career. He basically lists adjectives that refer to persistence, self-
assurance, (control of) impulsivity, frustration tolerance, etc. (Amelang et al., 2006). 
Sternberg (2003a) concretised his theorisation and research programme on successful 
intelligence and specified the original theory into a triarchic one (Sternberg, 2003b): 
Successful intelligence may be achieved by an interaction of metacomponents, performance 
components, and knowledge acquisition components, thus integrating analytical, creative, 
and practical aspects (see for these aspects also Sternberg, 1985). This makes the construct 
of successful intelligence in some terms broader than practical intelligence as it also 
comprises it to a certain extent. 
Social Intelligence and Social Competence  
There are individual differences in people’s interpersonal skills: how adept they are at 
assessing and interpreting others’ thoughts, feelings, motives, and intentions; handling 
social situations; and generating verbal and nonverbal social signals. When asking lay 
                                                 
3 These ways of assessment could also be used for SI. 
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persons about “intelligence” (e.g., Sternberg, Conway, Bernstein, and Ketron, 1981), that is 
tapping into implicit intelligence theories of lay persons (non-psychologists), then often 
abilities are found relating to efficiency in the social or interpersonal domain but also in the 
intrapersonal one (e.g., self-regulatory control mechanisms). Many interpretations of a 
“social intelligence” have been proposed throughout the years, such as Thorndike’s (1920) 
“social competence” as “the ability to understand and manage men and women, boys and 
girls – to act wisely in human relations” (p. 228), Riggio’s (1986) “social skills”, Gardner’s 
(1993) “personal intelligences”, and different forms of an “emotional intelligence” (e.g., 
Salovey and Mayer, 1990).  
A crucial question is whether these abilities (a) are alternative forms of intelligence, (b) 
can be seen as intelligence applied in the social domain, or (c) are not or only barely related 
to intelligence and form separate competences. Also, social intelligence is very 
heterogeneous in content as it encompasses many different factors such as: empathy; 
flexibility and situational adaptability; knowing  people  and  what  makes  them  tick;  acting  
“intelligently”  in  difficult  or  awkward  social situations; adjusting one’s demeanour to 
others and situational requirements; understanding and dealing with people; predicting 
people’s thoughts, feelings, motives, desires, and behaviors; “managing” people and even 
manipulating them to one’s will (e.g. Weinstein, 1969, p. 755). In addition to these 
interpersonal dimensions, social intelligence can also have an intrapersonal dimension, that 
is “the ability of understanding and managing oneself” (Salovey and Mayer, 1990, p. 187): 
Having insight into one’s own thoughts, feelings, motives, intentions, desires, and 
behaviours (see also constructs such as self-monitoring) and acting upon these insights. 
Hence, social intelligence contains both personality traits (e.g., agreeableness, flexibility) 
and abilities (e.g., handling others, adjusting to the situation) in the social domain, and 
researchers tend to lay emphasis on either one of them or sometimes confound both types in 
mixed models. 
Despite the heterogeneity of social competence(s) or intelligence, it may still be 
divided roughly into two factors (e.g., Thorndike, 1920): the aspect of social sensitivity 
(perceptive and cognitive variables in processing behavioural cues) and the aspect of acting 
or behaving appropriately in social situations (behavioural variables based on social 
information processing). Both aspects are quite difficult to assess due to the following 
reasons4 (cf. Amelang et al., 2006): 
 
‐ Different tests and tasks seem to be barely intercorrelated which points towards 
lacking homogeneity of the examined attributes (see also Probst, 1982). 
 
‐ External validity may be low as objective ratings do not correlate highly with other 
criteria such as self-reports. 
 
‐ There is only poor discriminant validity to (“traditional”) intelligence as most tests 
have correlations with the IQ that are too high to assume that social intelligence is a 
distinct factor.  
                                                 
4 These reasons are also very important for the study of SI. 
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‐ Self-reports on social competence usually do not correlate highly with behaviour in 
real social situations (although the Act Frequency Approach by Buss and Craik, 
1980, 1981, 1983a, 1983b, 1984 can be used to enhance the psychometric criteria of 
self-reports, and people could rate the frequency of behavioural indicators for a 
certain construct).  
 
‐ Assessment centres use trained assessors to evaluate people’s social competence(s) 
by letting them interact in group discussions or simulations and by observing their 
behaviour in those situations. Even though interrater agreement might be high, 
people show low cross-situational consistency in social competence. This points 
towards a lacking homogeneity of the construct but also implies that social 
competences are quite situation-specific (or rather specific in the terms of the 
content of the situations: Some situations might be more likely to trigger socially 
competent behaviours than others; these links between situation and behaviour are, 
however, interindividually different although they can be intraindividually stable; 
see also if-then dispositions by Mischel and Shoda, 1995). This point of view 
implies rather a disposition model of social competence than an intelligence model. 
 
All in all, there is not just a problem in the conceptualisation of social intelligence but 
also in its assessment. Specifically, the question is asked whether we need to assume social 
intelligence as a distinct form of intelligence; it might just be (cognitive) intelligence 
applied to social matters and associated behaviours manifested in interpersonal situations. 
Emotional intelligence 
The construct of an “emotional intelligence” (EI) can be seen as a sub-factor of a very 
broad social intelligence but is usually studied as a distinct variable since it is itself not very 
homogeneous and also usually encompasses several different aspects (among them, inter- 
and intrapersonal competences). Even though Salovey and Mayer (1990) first developed 
the concept of EI, it was Goleman (1995) who popularised the construct with his bestseller 
book “Emotional Intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ”, leading to more research 
in the field. In the course of time, roughly three different types of EI concepts emerged (cf. 
Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade, 2008): First, there are ability models (Salovey and Mayer, 
1990), also called specific-ability approaches. Second, there are integrative-model 
approaches which “describe overarching frameworks of mental abilities that combine skills 
from multiple EI areas” (Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade, 2008, p. 527). Third, so-called 
mixed-model approaches or trait models have been brought up (e.g., Bar-On, 1997), which 
focus on trait-like attributes that can be associated with (social-) emotional intelligence. 
Using an ability-model, Mayer and Salovey (1997) distinguish four broad branches of EI: 
(1) emotion perception (perceiving emotions in one self and others) and emotional 
expressivity, (2) facilitation of thinking (using emotions to facilitate thought), (3) 
understanding and analysing emotions and their meanings, and (4) emotion regulation 
(managing emotions). The branches thus encompass perceptual, cognitive, regulative, and 
behavioural domains. Trait models do not conceptualise EI as ability or intelligence per se 
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but rather as a conglomerate of different traits (that may have already been explored). 
Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade (2008, p. 527) write that the EI-related trait attributes which 
are brought up in mixed-model approaches “are not primarily focused on emotional 
reasoning and emotional knowledge” and thus do not fall within their conceptualisation of 
EI. Specifically, they conceptualise EI as “the ability to accurate reasoning focused on 
emotions and the ability to use emotions and emotional knowledge to enhance thought” (p. 
527). As far as EI’s standing within a nomological network of abilities and its criterion as 
well as incremental validity is concerned, it is indeed a “predictor of significant outcomes 
[...] in a number of real world domains” so that “it predicts social relations, workplace 
performance, and mental and physical well-being” (Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade, 2008, p. 
527). 
Gardner’s multiple intelligences 
Gardner (1983/1993, 1993, 1999) proposed in his theory of multiple intelligences 
several different forms of “intelligence”: verbal-linguistic, logical-mathematical, visual-
spatial, bodily-kinaesthetic, intra-personal, interpersonal, musical, naturalistic, spiritual, 
existential, and moral. It can be argued whether the last four should be seen as intelligences. 
In general, most of Gardner’s so-called “intelligences” might only reflect certain abilities or 
talents (not intelligences) or maybe just intelligence applied to special domains (such as 
music). Also, there is the possibility that we do not need to assume all forms of intelligence 
as there might be a small superordinate group tying all together.  
Gardner reviewed the existing literature and eventually defined eight criteria that 
should be met if we were to talk about an “intelligence” (Gardner, 1983/1993, p. 62–69): 
First, we ought to have neurological evidence for an intelligence; that is, there should be 
circumscribed brain areas “responsible” for the functions and operations of the intelligence. 
Furthermore, lesions in these areas should cause the intelligence-related abilities to be 
impaired. Second, there should be individuals exceptional in the domain of the intelligence 
(e.g., savants, prodigies, etc.). Third, there should be an identifiable set of (core) functions 
and operations associated with the intelligence form. Fourth, there should be a distinctive 
development history of the intelligence. Fifth, there should be evolutionary plausibility 
behind the intelligence. Sixth, it must be able to explore the intelligence (or rather its 
operations) by experimental means (in tasks). Seventh, there should also be psychometric 
findings concerning the intelligence. Eighth, there should be a susceptibility to encoding in 
a symbol system. According to Gardner, any ability that should be labelled “intelligence” 
needs to meet these eight criteria. 
Implications of the research on different intelligence forms for SI research 
Even though “classical” intelligence might be a strong factor in SI or even underlying it 
to a large extent, more specific aspects are probably covered by the “other” intelligence 
forms, the so-called “hot intelligences” (Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade, 2008) such as 
practical, successful, and socio-emotional (inter- and intrapersonal) intelligence.  
 
‐ Practical intelligence should be an integral part of SI as it refers to certain implicit 
and explicit knowledge structures and processes (cf. Wagner, 2000). Systems 
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intelligent people sometimes just “know” what is right and how to behave as SI can 
be seen as “behavioural intelligence of human agents in systemic environments” 
(Luoma, Hämäläinen, and Saarinen, 2008). This systems intelligent “intuitive 
performance within a system” can indeed be seen as a part of a practical 
intelligence. The question which has got to be answered is whether practical 
intelligence is a part of SI or if it may also be the other way around. Again, the topic 
of SI’s incremental validity needs to be addressed: can SI predict certain (critical) 
real-life outcomes above other intelligences (i.e., when statistically controlling 
them)? Research is badly needed in this field and I am positive that it will yield 
interesting results for SI in the near future.  
 
‐ Persons high in SI should also be very successful. It will be interesting to see 
whether SI or successful intelligence predict variables of success in people’s lives 
better (see again the incremental validity of SI as mentioned above). In particular, 
the triarchic system (metacomponents, performance, knowledge acquisition) might 
be of interest for SI as (meta-) cognitive as well as behavioural or action-related 
aspects seem to be essential to SI. 
 
‐ Especially the distinction between more intra- and interpersonal aspects in social 
and emotional intelligence forms seems interesting for the concept of SI: Both 
domains should be covered in a systems intelligent person. Being systems 
intelligent does not just mean self-reflection and (self-related) deep thoughts but 
also (pro-) active interaction with the surrounding systems. In this sense, SI should 
indeed be seen in an intra- and an interpersonal manner. Possibly, more perceptual, 
cognitive, and meta-cognitive (and even affective-emotional and motivational) 
domains of SI refer mostly to intrapersonal mechanisms, whereas domains of 
control, management, regulation, and action can be considered as a part of 
interpersonal competences in the domain of SI. Same as social intelligence, SI 
should include capacities of appraisal and understanding of human relationships (cf. 
Lee, Wong, Day, Maxwell, and Thorpe, 2000). SI was also linked to the social 
competence of reading others’ intentions (Hämäläinen and Saarinen, 2008b, p. 823). 
 
‐ EI offers four branches of abilities that seem very similar to the five levels of SI 
from Hämäläinen and Saarinen (2007, p. 50; see also Table 7) without the 
leadership level (that can rather be seen as a result from the preceding levels): 
perception-, cognition-, and action-related domains are addressed. This triarchic 
constellation subsumes several lower factors (especially the action-domain) and 
allows us to create a preliminary more detailed (hypothetical) structure of SI (see 
Figure 2). Yet, we must consider that this is solely a theoretical assumption (in 
analogy to the conceptualisation of EI) and that empirical data should guide further 
approaches. Specifically, perception might dissolve in a higher-order cognitive 
domain and more emotion-based factors could evolve. Admittedly, this will be more 
likely if we do not see SI as a mere ability but also as a construct that resembles 
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people’s disposition(s) (in the sense of a trait) to think and perform systems 
intelligently. 
 
‐ It can be debated whether SI should be regarded as an addition to Gardner’s 
intelligences or not. In particular, associations with naturalistic, spiritual, existential, 
and moral “intelligence” forms could be explored. Also, SI should be critically 
assessed regarding Gardner’s eight criteria of what we can assume to be an 
“intelligence” (see for a brief discussion 4.1. “Ability-SI: systems intelligence as an 
intelligence”). Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade (2008, p. 521) come to the conclusion 
that “it appears likely that other intelligences beyond EI will add to the prediction of 
critical life outcomes such as academic and work performance, social relationships 







Figure 2. An extended hierarchical model of systems intelligence and hypothesised 
relationships 
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Systems Intelligence: Trait, Style, or Ability?  
A general problem: Trait vs. style vs. ability 
In personality psychology, one can very roughly distinguish:  
 
‐ traits or dispositions – opposed to momentary states – that describe stable, 
consistent, and enduring characteristics (i.e., cognitive, affective-emotional, 
motivational, behavioural patterns),  
 
‐ styles that describe the manner of mental processes (cognition, emotion/affect, 
motivation, etc.) or behaviour, and  
 
‐ abilities that describe a (maximum) form of performance of individuals, 
 
‐ as well as needs and motives, habits, and preferences.  
 
Even though these four are part of a personality and dynamically interact in everyday 
life, they still  ought  to  be  distinguished  as  there  are  not  just  conceptual  differences  but  also  
different  methodological approaches in measuring them. These distinctions are essential as 
SI may be seen as a trait, motive, style, or ability (i.e., intelligence, skill, competence). 
Generally speaking, we can ask: when am I doing what how much how often? 
 
‐ The “what” can be any mental process or behaviour: what is exhibited? 
 
‐ The “when” refers to domain specifics, circumstances, contexts, and situations of a 
“what”: When is what exhibited? 
 
‐ The “how much” refers to degrees, levels, and intensities of a “what”: how much is 
what exhibited? 
 
‐ The “how often” refers to frequency and representativity of a “what”: how often is 
what exhibited? 
 
Depending on how the questions are answered, different psychological concepts can be 
distinguished, such as traits, styles, and abilities as well as different mixed models (see 
Table 1): 
 
‐ If the “how” is not of concern, the “when” rather generalised, and “how often” and 
“how much” more of interest, then we may speak of traits or dispositions as 
enduring characteristics of a rather broad “what” in relation to a broad “when”. 
 
‐ If the “how” and “how often” are of concern, “how much” and “when not”, then we 
may speak of styles as enduring manners and preferences of a “what”. 
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‐ If the “when”, “how”, and “how often” are not of concern, but only the (maximum) 
“how much” of a “what”, then we can speak of abilities as enduring performance 
aspects of a “what”.  
 
‐ If the “when” plays a role or is specified more closely (i.e., domain-specifically), 
then we might want to speak of certain specialised competences and skills. 
 
Based on the preceding remarks, we can conceptualise SI from the point of view of five 
broad categories: it can either be seen as (1) a trait or disposition of enduring mental and 
behavioural patterns, (2) a need-like construct that refers to the motive of behaving systems 
intelligently, (3) different styles of behaving systems intelligently, (4) an ability to perform 
systems intelligent actions, and (5) specific competences and skills in the domain of 





Even though need-SI and style-SI might also be interesting facets of SI that should be 
explored, I will only focus on Ability-SI and Trait-SI in this work. This has following 
reasons: It is debatable whether Need-SI and Trait-SI are really genuinely different 
constructs although we should not jump to the conclusion that needs and motives are the 
same as traits. Rather, both interact and bring forth different patterns of behaviour in 
relation to certain contextual aspects. Style-SI, on the other hand, is a matter of its own as it 
could be conceptualised near to traits or near to abilities (see the remarks stated below). 
Therefore, Trait-SI and Ability-SI comprise most important aspects of SI for the beginning 
but further theorisation and empirical studies should also be concerned with need- and 
style-SI. 
 
The trait of being systems intelligent:                                                                                       
systems intellect (Trait-SI) 
 
The motive or need of thinking and performing systems intelligently (as a special  form of 
Trait-SI):  
need-SI (nSys), need for SI (NFSI) 
 
Individual style(s) of thinking and performing systems intelligently:  
style-SI 
 
The general ability of thinking and performing systems intelligently:  
systems intelligence (ability-SI) 
 
Specific abilities concerning different parts of the broad systems intelligence construct, gs 
(“g systemic”), may be referred to as specific systems intelligence skills and 
competences, the ss. 
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Figure 3 shows the general relationship between different factors related to the domains 
of dispositions, styles, and abilities. The subsuming term “information processing” is used 
as this is one of the most prominent factors in SI. 
An individual’s biological basis (with its anatomy, neurophysiology, biochemistry, 
endocrinology) is expressed through its genes. This basis determines basic dispositional or 
temperamental aspects of information processing. “Dispositional”5 means in this context 
that biological dispositions are the main influence on psychological functions. These basic 
dispositional factors can be referred to as abilities. Although some abilities can be trained, 
information processing abilities are usually determined to a large portion by genetic and 
biological aspects. There is only a certain quantity of information we can process and hold 
                                                 
5 Note that “disposition” often means the same as “trait”. However, “disposition” can be used as an umbrella term for any 
psychological variable that is characteristic for an individual and usually is determined by more biological factors (but 
does not have to be). I will use the term “disposition” in its broadest sense: It refers to any person-related structure or 
process that can describe the individual (in general) – be it genetically and biologically determined or acquired through 
learning and training. 
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(capacity) and some individuals process information faster than others (velocity). These 
basic abilities of information processing are a crucial prerequisite to SI: One can hardly act 
systems intelligently if he or she cannot identify and process systemic information (that is 
usually fairly dynamic, time-dependent, and interrelated). These abilities mostly merge into 
cognitive and meta-cognitive ability branches of SI. However, also the emotional and 
motivational ability branch is affected as temperament factors also play a significant role. 
Temperament is related to variables of activation, affect, and attention (Asendorpf, 2004 
called them the “three As of personality”) and usually refers to form aspects of affect and 
behaviour. When speaking of form aspects we are near the term of style as both concepts 
describe manners of psychological functions. Yet, styles are merely tendencies towards a 
certain manner which is a mixture of the dispositional, temperamental (and ability-related) 
form aspects, the learning history, and autobiography of the individual; they can be flexible 
to some extent. Form aspects, on the other hand, are more genetically and biologically 
determined and can hardly be modulated unless modifying aspects of one’s 
neurophysiological basis and biochemistry (e.g., accidents, operations, intoxications, etc. 
which can cause changed behaviours, even maladaptive ones). One’s tendencies or style(s) 
of thinking, feeling, acting, etc. usually result in certain habits or preferences. This might 
also be due to the fact that individuals tend to seek and avoid situations that are congruent 
or incongruent respectively with their individual preferences (except there are inevitable 
external obligations to do something). These habits differ from styles in the sense that they 
are heavily influenced by the individual’s self-concept and associated cognitions. We also 
have a self-concept of our abilities and styles; it might be congruent in some terms with the 
actual abilities and styles but need not be. We can ask someone about his abilities and he or 
she might not be able to evaluate them properly; he or she might down- or upsize him- or 
herself when thinking about own abilities. Also, the tendential style is not directly 
accessible to oneself: to assess one’s own styles of thinking, feeling, acting, etc. we would 
need a great deal of meta-cognition and monitoring of ourselves. Some parts of styles 
might, however, be expressed if we ask people. Yet, we would obtain best results if we ask 
people about their preferences and habits: they would be able to verbalise them and think 
about what they like or dislike doing and how they like or dislike doing it. These habitual 
preferences can still be confounded with the subjective self-concept (in the respective area) 
and need not be accurate. The chance of accuracy is still higher for habitual preferences as 
for dispositional abilities and related tendential styles.  
These differences make it evident that we have to use different methods to assess these 
constructs: We cannot just simply ask someone “How systems intelligent are you?” and 
think that we are tapping into the actual ability domain of SI; rather, we are inquiring the 
individual’s subjective self-concept of his or her abilities in SI (or a related domain of SI). 
Abilities are best assessed by objective tests; styles could be assessed by behavioural 
observation (i.e., “How does someone behave?”) and partly by self-reports (but we would 
have to be careful not to merely tap into preferences and self-conceptual information). 
These problems will be addressed more in detail in part II of this chapter, where Q-data 
(data from questionnaires), L-data (data from one’s life: observations, writings, biography, 
etc.), and T-data (data from objective tests) are described.  
Taking all of the preceding remarks into account, we can state for SI: The genetical and 
biological basis of an individual determines its dispositional ability of systems intelligence. 
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By interacting with its surroundings, the individual learns and gains experience. Due to 
dispositional and learned aspects, certain tendential styles of systems intelligence or 
Intellect arise (e.g., a person could be more affective-emotionally, cognitively, or 
interpersonally systems intelligent) which can also be preferential to the individual. The 
individual develops hence certain habitual preferences of systems intelligence or Intellect 
that are expressed most of the time in its everyday life and are somewhat characteristic and 
representative for it. These preferences can also merge into the individual’s subjective self-
concepts, self-evaluations, and self-related cognitions (and emotions) concerning its 
abilities of systems intelligence and styles of systems intelligence or Intellect. They, in turn, 
may also affect preferences. Additionally, when very often exhibiting preferences that an 
individual might want to adopt and thus habitualise, they may also affect styles in some 
way as styles are flexible to a certain extent. Still, the dispositional form aspects will not or 
only barely be affected as they are genetically and biologically determined to a large extent. 
Styles, preferences, and self-concepts are associated with a trait-conceptualisation of 
systems intelligence, systems intellect. There can be congruencies and incongruencies 
between ability, style, preference, and self-concepts (the last three are more trait-like) but 
the strongest dichotomy arises between ability and preferences (along with self concepts), 
whereas style stands somewhat in between of these two concepts.  
Even though we can theoretically or conceptually divide SI in these categories, there 
must be a debate on which of these are best for SI: for example, classical intelligence is best 
seen as an ability, not as a style or trait; thinking styles should not be reduced to abilities or 
traits; traits such as Extraversion, for instance, are best seen as traits and not as abilities or 
styles.  
Since SI comprises so many different aspects, it could very well be conceptualised by 
different concepts equally well. However, I doubt this and plead in favour of further 
research. Also, we need to assess if we should at all distinguish these different concepts and 
if all of them are necessary: do we really need style-SI and/or Preference-SI or is it enough 
to distinguish Ability-SI and trait-SI? We should treat the different concepts equally, 
though – and try to elucidate their properties as well as their advantages and limitations. I 
hope that these quite different SI conceptualisations will inspire other researchers to refine 
and advance the basic theorisations presented here as well as provide bottom-up research as 
opposed to the top-down style of this work. 
Now that the general properties of traits, styles, and abilities – along with their 
similarities and distinctive characteristics – have been clarified and possible different 
concepts of SI proposed, I will go on to specify Ability-SI and especially Trait-SI along 
with elucidating the properties of a systemic-synergetic disposition model for Trait-SI. 
 
 





Figure 3. The relationships between information processing abilities, styles, and 
preferences as well as the data-type (L/B, Q, T) associated with them 
Ability-SI: systems intelligence as an “intelligence” 
Without going too deep into different definitions of “intelligence”, it might be best to 
evaluate an intelligence and also SI according to Gardner’s eight criteria that an intelligence 
should meet (see Table 2). From the eight criteria, SI currently does not meet five of them 
which makes it difficult to label it an intelligence at present (at least according to Gardner). 
However, this does not mean that SI is not an intelligence or that it will never be one; the 
construct is simply too “young” and not “popular” enough to have already undergone 
extensive top-down and especially bottom-up research. SI’s future will indeed be exciting 
as it will be a key task to evaluate whether or not SI meets Gardner’s eight criteria. In the 
process of investigating this, it will also show which conceptualisations of SI are more 
“useful”6 than others. There is one advantage of the young construct SI, though: It has 
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frequently been linked to more applied areas and shown to be very useful there 
(organisations: Salonen, 2004; Fischer, 2004; Hukki and Pulkkinen, 2004; Särs, 2004; 
Nuorkivi, 2004; Westerlund, 2004; leadership: Hämäläinen and Saarinen, 2007b, 2007c; 
Viluksela, 2007; Ojala, 2007; public policy: Siitonen and Hämäläinen, 2004; social systems 
and interactions: Lavikka and Luoma, 2008) as SI is a genuinely applicable construct.  
There is, however, a problem with the term “intelligence” 
that needs to be addressed if we were to call SI an 
intelligence: The term “intelligence” is mostly associated 
with a psychometric approach and “test psychology” (see 
also Neisser at al., 1996). This approach focuses on the 
measurement of intelligence and also emphasises the 
outcome- and performance-aspects of intelligence (rather 
than the underlying processes). The question is now whether 
SI fits into this view of “intelligence”. Of course, there are other conceptualisations of 
“intelligence” (see, for example, trait-models of emotional intelligence) but it is often 
debated whether these meet the criteria for being an intelligence. Ultimately, this results in 
the question what “intelligence” is and what not.  
As I do not want to delve into these difficult questions, I focus on SI: is it an 
“intelligence”? It is important to acknowledge that Hämäläinen und Saarinen did not 
conceptualise SI as “just another intelligence” but rather there was a necessity to assume 
that there is something else beyond the “usual” intelligences if we look at everyday life: 
people perform intelligently in ever-changing dynamic systems with positive and negative 
feedback loops. As Luoma, Hämäläinen, and Saarinen (2008, p. 757) put it, “SI looks for 
efficient ways for an agent to change his/her own behaviour in order to influence the 
behaviour of a system in different environments.” There are two implications from this SI-
approach which makes it difficult to conceptualise SI in psychological terms as an 
“intelligence”. 
First, SI goes beyond regular psychology in the sense that it might be a construct that is 
very difficult to assess and measure. Classical tests will then be insufficient in determining 
one’s SI level – they may rather assess only sub-constructs of SI. For example, tests might 
measure some kind of interpersonal intelligence which might be a factor in SI but certainly 
not SI. This problem stems from SI’s “macro-character”. This means that a systems 
intelligent person acts over a certain time-span intelligently within a system. What is 
“intelligent” is then defined by the person × system characteristics rather than by absolute 
standards. SI can then only be inferred from dynamic aspects and is thus not clearly 
defined. In contrast, an intelligence test is more “absolute”: a task can be solved or not. In 
SI this view cannot be taken: there is no absolute standard to be systems intelligent and it 
cannot be defined nomothetically. Also, it might seem at some point that the person x 
systems interactions are not working well but this can easily change again. This makes it 
necessary to not just observe a person at one or two occasions but in many. Further, a 
person might be only in some situations systems intelligent and in most others not (which 
would imply that we would need to distinguish state-aspects of SI but also determine 
whether these SI-states follow a certain intraindividually stable pattern; cf. if-then 




systems with positive and 
negative feedback loops 
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defined without reducing SI to some kind of subcomponent. This makes it difficult to 
measure SI as an ability. 
 
Table 2. Gardner’s eight intelligence criteria and SI’s standing on them 
 
Gardner’s eight 
criteria for an 
“intelligence” 
Are they 
met by SI 
currently? 
Could systems intelligence potentially meet 
them in the future? 
Where are we currently 





by brain damage 
 
( ) 
Since SI is a holistic concept, there should be 
associations between brain areas and SI 
functions. Their relationships remain unclear 
as of yet. It will be a future goal to obtain 
neurological evidence for SI- capacities. 
No neuro(physio)logical 
studies in the area of SI  







If SI is an ability- or trait-continuum, then 
there should be exceptionally low and high 
ends of SI.  
Hämäläinen and Saarinen 
(2007b) list several exceptional 
individuals. 
identifiable set of 
(core) operations  ( ) 
 
If there is such a thing as SI, then there ought 
to be core operations too (that distinguish it 
from other concepts). This also taps into the 
debate of SI’s incremental ability which will 
have to be fought in the near future. 
We are beginning to explore 
sets of operations specific for 
SI, and core operations have 
been identified to some extent 




history, along with 
a definable set of 
“end-state” 
performances 
  There should be lifespan developments of SI. 
Developmental (and cross-
cultural) studies have yet to 





( )  SI ought to have some evolutionary function. 
SI has been linked to human 
phylogenesis (see Timonen, 
2004). Yet, more integrative 
research is needed on the 
evolutionary basis of SI 
(Hämäläinen and Saarinen, 




  There should be SI-specific laboratory tasks. 
No experimental psychological 
tasks have been conducted yet 






SI could potentially be measured in 
individuals, groups, and organisations. 
Different concepts of SI should be 
distinguished (e.g., ability, trait, need, style, 
etc.) 
No psychometric findings have 
been proposed thus far. 
However, this volume provides 
a first scale for measuring trait-
SI that can be revised in the 
future by rigorous validation 
studies. 
susceptibility to 




To which extent SI fulfils this criterion is 
unclear as of now but, generally speaking, it 
seems not too far-fetched to assume it. 
This criterion of SI has yet to 
be explored, even though 
SI challenges the justification 
of this criterion 
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A second point concerns the SI approach per se: Hämäläinen and Saarinen (2008b, p. 
822) state that the “systems intelligence approach wants to pay homage to the full systems 
capacity in the human being-in-the-world and acting-in-the-world.” Noteworthy is that SI is 
tied very much to practical aspects – for example, in organisations. The positive and 
practical note that the SI approach spreads is, however, likely to lead us to focus more on 
“that SI works” than “how and why it works”. One of SI’s biggest assets is its rootedness in 
philosophy (it goes beyond systems thinking; see Hämäläinen and Saarinen, 2008b) as well 
as its applicablity to so many different topics (see the volumes by Hämäläinen and 
Saarinen, 2004, 2006, 2007). The question is now whether the SI approach, as a form of 
philosophy, is compatible with psychology. SI addresses such a wide range of topics and 
offers a plethora of applications but this makes it difficult to grasp it as an “intelligence”. 
Somehow SI has got to be measured, and then we will have to evaluate whether SI has 
incremental predictive abilities above and beyond other forms of intelligences (and also 
traits). Perhaps SI shows no incremental abilities beyond other intelligences and it could be 
fully explained by (the interaction of) different already known intelligences. Even if this 
were to happen, it does not mean that there is no SI: the dynamic interaction of different 
intelligences may constitute SI. It would therefore be more of an emergent (order) 
parameter. Probably, psychologists have been referring to “systemic competences” all 
along but never seen them in the big picture and combined them to an integrated view – one 
that the SI-approch provides. There are perhaps different perspectives and different terms 
but we may be looking at the same. 
In summary, it is debatable whether SI is an intelligence simply because psychological 
thinking and terms might not suit the SI-approach. However, SI is a genuinly multi-, trans-, 
and inter-disciplinary construct, and it should be possible to at least conceptualise some 
parts of it psychologically and also use psychometric approaches. We should be aware of 
the difficulties that come with the term “intelligence”, but be uninhibited by it and proceed 
with exploring psychological aspects of SI.   
Concluding Remarks 
The main purpose of this article was to conceptualise SI in a “psychological way” and 
outline different conceptualisations of SI. It was not a goal to provide an integrated 
framework for SI and its different components. This should be done after empirical studies 
have been conducted and further theorisations (based on empirical findings) done. 
In particular, I foresee following multiple and productive lines of research on SI in the 
(near) future if we continue to work across disciplinary boundaries: 
 
‐ refinements of different conceptualisations of SI (trait, ability, motive or need, style, 
preference or habit, skill or competence, mixed models, etc.) 
 
‐ integration of different SI conceptualisations and aspects in overarching frameworks  
 
‐ constitution of a nomological network for SI and its aspects 
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‐ identification of SI-relevant contexts, mental processes, and behaviours (in 
everyday life)  
 
‐ identification of (critical) real-life criteria and outcomes for SI and its different 
aspects 
 
‐ construction and validation of measurements for SI (with Q-, T-, and L-/B-Data) 
 
‐ conducting sound empirical studies for SI 
 
‐ integrating theory, empirical findings, and evidence from practice into the study of 
SI  
 
‐ determining the structures, processes, and dynamics of SI  
 
‐ determining the underlying neurophysiological structures of SI 
 
‐ developing an evolutionary approach to SI by evolutionary genetics and 
sociogenomics 
 
‐ determining biological, psychological, and social factors of SI 
 
‐ assessing Gardner’s eight criteria for intelligence regarding SI 
 
As a general way of approaching SI, following steps could be employed: 
First, we should clarify what or which aspects of SI we are looking at (trait, ability, 
etc.) and especially which we need or do not need (e.g., style-SI might not be necessary but 
that concept has not yet been elaborated and might still prove useful in some research 
areas). Subsequently, we ought to identify the respective mental processes involved (be 
they explicit and/or implicit) and assess behavioural manifestations. This will be a major 
goal of research as it will enhance the understanding of SI the most and also bear important 
insights for furthering SI in individuals, groups, and organisations. To go beyond this 
would be to propose integrative structure- and process-oriented models of SI to obtain 
overarching frameworks. SI is quite a complex construct and there might be multiple and 
even competing lines of research in the field; therefore, it will become more important to tie 
together the different approaches and try to integrate them. This also means that approaches 
will have to be tested empirically and empirical evidence will have to be interpreted in the 
light of previous theorisation. By doing this, we can also proceed to elucidating the 
underlying biological/physiological structures of SI and its aspects. This, however, requires 
razor-sharp operationalisation of what SI is and which specific aspects are of interest. 
Another step further would be to describe the evolutionary genetics and sociogenomics of 
SI (as well as its evolutionary significance). By doing all of this, we should step by step try 
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to assess Gardner’s eight intelligence criteria – and show that systems intelligence may 
indeed be considered as a (new) form of intelligence. 
 
Theorisation and research might want to study SI from different psychological aspects 
which can also be seen as major lines of (possible future) research: 
 
General view: a general view on the mental processes and behaviours of SI should be 
formulated. This will help to understand how SI manifests most of the time for most of 
the people. Cognitive and behavioural sciences will be major disciplines contributing to 
this line of research.  
 
Differential view: this view is concerned with inter- and intraindividual differences of SI 
and its aspects. Whereas the general view yields information on general factors of SI and 
its aspects, a differential view can account for individual and maybe even idiosyncratic 
forms. Social and personality psychology will be key disciplines in this area.  
 
Developmental view: this view regards the development of SI and its associated aspects. 
Longitudinal data of SI should be obtained. Short-time developments can be of interest 
(e.g., when training individuals in SI) as well as long-time outcomes (e.g., SI over the 
lifespan). Developmental and lifespan psychology as well as gerontopsychology will be 
of particular use in this line of research. 
 
Biological view: the underlying neurophysiological processes, anatomical structures and 
“localisations” of SI and its aspects should be explored. This can be complemented by 
evolutionary approaches and genetics. Besides biological and physiological psychology, 
especially (cognitive and affective) neurosciences could prove fruitful here.  
 
Social view: while most other lines of research might tend to focus on intrapersonal aspects, 
SI and its aspects require also a heavy duty of interpersonal research. Not only 
individual–environment inter-/transactions should be viewed but also communication 
and interaction between individuals. Dyadic and group processes should be studied in 
both face-to-face and mediated (e.g., by computer) communication. Also, socio-cultural 
aspects of SI should be explored in intra- and intercultural designs. This interpersonal 
view will complement the intra-personal perspective and will most likely benefit from 
social psychology, culture sciences, anthropology, and sociology. 
 
Organisational view: to enlarge the scope of SI to a macro-variable that is even manifest in 
large groups and organisations, organisational SI should be explored. This, however, is a 
genuinely applied branch of research that takes place mostly in actual practice, whereas 
the preceding areas are more theoretically grounded in their research purposes. The 
focus will be on assessing and furthering SI in groups and organisations.  
 
Clinical, pathological, abnormal view: this view could also prove fruitful to study 
“abnormalities” in SI. This could include any abnormal state of SI (e.g., exceptionally 
high and low SI). Also, this view could explore if there is such a thing as using one’s SI 
for malicious purposes. Further, lesions and brain damages could be explored with 
respect to neurophysiological evidence of SI. Also, it could be explored which clinical 
groups of people generally lack SI (or simply do not attain high scores), have high SI (if 
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this were to be the case), and why that is. To adopt this view, it will be necessary to at 
least have findings in the area of the general, differential, biological, and social view. 
 
Methodological view: how to assess which aspect of SI should be a separate line of research 
from which all other lines will benefit. Methodology, research methods, and statistics 
should be pointed out for an empirical approach to SI and its aspects.  
 
A psychologically informed view on SI should also consider – besides theory and 
empirical research – practical aspects of SI in individuals, groups, and organisations. 
Positive psychology might be a branch very fruitful for the study of SI: Emphasised key 
areas of positive psychology include, among others, flourishment, hope, upward spirals, 
growth-fostering, life-giving, aliveness, transcendence, etc. (e.g., Cameron et al., 2003; 
Keys and Haidt, 2003; Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener, 2005; Seligman and 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Snyder and Lopez, 2002). 
As Hämäläinen and Saarinen (2007b, p. 4) state, “the systems intelligence approach 
combines holistic orientation with a humanly-tuned emphasis that highlights the human 
potential” and “stems from a deep belief in the human potential.” This links it explicitly to 
positive psychology which seeks to gain an integrated and holistic view on humans and 
their positive potential in emotions, character, and life. However, it also connects to 
humanistic psychology (e.g., Maslow, 1998; Rogers, 1961/1989, 1980) and to positive 
organizational scholarship (e.g., Cameron, Dutton, and Quinn, 
2003; Kim et al., 2003) which, in turn, are also linked to notions of 
positive psychology. Hämäläinen and Saarinen (2007b, p. 5) 
further point out that SI is not merely an academic or theoretical 
approach but that it is deeply rooted in practice, that is, SI “strives 
to be also a source of empowerment and inspiration for action” and 
it should “be also a trigger for action – intelligent action within 
systems and in order to create more intelligent systems for people to use as platforms for 
further intelligent actions.” Empowerment, inspiration, and systems intelligent actions can 
be a guide to a healthy and fulfilled life – one of the things positive psychology emphasises. 
Thus, the SI approach and positive psychology can very well work together and inform 
each other in the goal of identifying positive human aspects and possible ways of fostering 
them. Ultimately, the goal of human growth is tackled.  
“A key point of systems intelligence is its positive emphasis” (Hämäläinen and 
Saarinen, 2007b, p. 23) and, indeed, the SI approach does not highlight human pitfalls, 
errors, or negative traps but rather their positive assets – what we (just) do right, even in 
sheer complex and dynamic systems. “What we do right” refers, according to Hämäläinen 
and Saarinen (2007c, p. 41), to some kind of “pre-rational and pre-reflective systems-
thinking” which is “an inherent feature of the human life-orientational basic intelligence.” 
Positive aspects (e.g., human flourishment), and not negative ones (malfunctions), are in 
the focus here. 
We should refrain from favouring one specific manifestation, aspect, or area of SI. 
Different aspects of Ability-SI and trait-SI (and maybe also need-SI, style-SI, habit-
/preference-SI, competence-/Skill-SI) need to be studied in both a bottom-up (empirico-
theoretically: observations lead to theories) and top-down (theoretico-empirically: theories 
SI is not merely an 
academic or 
theoretical approach 
but it is deeply 
rooted in practice
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lead to observations) fashion with a good mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Theory, empirical research, and practice should be fruitfully interlocked in the study of SI.    
 
If this article was a bit inspiring to researchers in the multi-, inter-, and 
transdisciplinary field of SI and was able to set at least some impulses for further lines of 
theorisation and empirical research, then the goals of this article have been more than 
achieved.  
It is an an exciting time to conduct research in the field of SI! 
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Systems Intelligence as a trait: A meta-model 
for a systemic understanding of personality 
John F. Rauthmann 
The construct of systems intelligence (SI) by Hämäläinen and Saarinen (2004, 
2007, 2008) can be seen as either an ability (Ability-SI) or a trait (Trait-SI). 
When studying SI as a trait, traditional psychological understanding of 
“personality”, “dispositions”, “traits”, and “states” might not be sufficient to 
grasp the dynamic and systemic character that the construct entails. Systems 
intelligent people exhibit intelligent action within complex and dynamic systems 
with feedback processes. Therefore, it is necessary to understand structures, 
processes, and dynamics of situations (contexts), dispositions (traits) and 
personality, as well as behaviour. Building up on crucial controversies in 
personality psychology, integrative meta-models for situations and dispositions 
are presented. Further, the disposition model is transduced into a systemic-
synergetic model, and a systemic-synergetic conceptualisation of personality is 
outlined. The theorisations in this chapter serve to provide a framework for the 
study of Trait-SI that integrates a structural and process-focused view, and also 
allows for systemic-synergetic conceptualisations. 
Introduction 
Although systems intelligence (SI) relates to abilities (e.g., intelligent performance 
within complex systems), there are also trait-aspects. Analogous to emotional intelligence, 
we can distinguish ability-, trait-, and mixed-models (Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade, 2008). 
Trait-SI might be a fruitful area in the study of SI. In conceptualising SI as a trait, however, 
we should do two things: (a) outline crucial controversies concerning traits to get a picture 
of trait concepts and some of their problems (which can and have been resolved to a great 
extent) and (b) propose an integrative model of situations and dispositions which will serve 
as a meta-theoretical underpinning for trait-based SI concepts which can be also seen in a 
systemic-synergetical manner. 
Crucial debates in personality psychology
There are crucial controversies of personality psychology listed in Table 1. These all do 
affect how SI is conceptualised as a trait. As can be seen, these controversies are obviously 
interrelated and taking one position on a rather dichotomous controversy affects also others. 
For example, if we take the position of “traits” in the state vs. trait controversy, we are very 
likely to take position for “person” in the person vs. situation controversy, “structure” in the 
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structure vs. process controversy, and “nomothetic” in the nomothetic vs. idiographic 
approaches debate. This would then reflect the notion that people can be categorised 
concerning rather structural and aplastic trait dimensions (enduring cognitive, emotional, 
motivational, and behavioural characteristics or tendencies) that are believed to be stable 
over many situations and time (consistency). Even though this sounds plausible, reality is 
not that simple. These positions are not as dichotomous and incompatible as the may seem 
at first sight; many psychologists (e.g., Fleeson, 2001, 2004, 2007; Fleeson and Noftle, 
2008a, 2008b; Funder, 2006; Mischel and Shoda, 1995) have proposed integrative thoughts 
on how these controversies can be dissolved and combined into an integrative (and modern) 
personality psychology. 
Especially the person-situation debate was very prominent in personality psychology as 
it affects the core issue of variant (inconsistent) and invariant (consistent) aspects of us: If 
only situations determine our actions (thoughts, feelings, 
desires, intentions, and behaviours), then there is no 
consistency in how we act – except when situations are very 
similar to each other. Therefore, we need no traits or 
personality system generating mental and behavioural patterns 
as all stability and variability can be explained by external 
influences. As a result, we would not need any personality 
psychology. Of course, this is a relatively radical position; it is 
referred to as situationism. It was especially favoured among 
social and learning (behaviourist) psychologists and is, 
philosophically, near to external determinism. Opposed to this view is personism: Traits 
and personality are existent and meaningful. They are expressed in mental processes and 
behaviour patterns and are mostly due to internal, innate factors (which reminds of internal 
determinism).   
The concept of so-called if-then patterns of contexts and thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviour was a concept to dissolve some problems of the person–situation debate (e.g., 
Mischel and Shoda, 1995; Wright and Mischel, 1987): if context X, then (re-)action Y. 
Amelang and colleagues (2006) give the example of glass: glass is potentially breakable 
(disposition). If it falls (situation), then it breaks (reaction). The disposition “breakable” is 
only manifested in the reaction “broken” (then-part) under the specific circumstance 
“(somehow) fell” (if-part). “Fell” would be an abstract functionally homogeneous situation 
or context class; the glass may fall differently and due to various external reasons but the 
outcome (being broken after the fall and thus exhibiting the disposition “breakable”) will 
always be (functionally) the same. This view describes dispositions as latent variables that 
are only manifested under certain circumstances (which is the if-part) and need not be 
exhibited at all times or in a general fashion. For example, an individual scoring high on 
neuroticism (emotional instability) does not necessarily have to be all the time more 
anxious but tends to be more anxious than other people when confronted with threatful 
stimuli. This means that individuals high in neuroticism “reveal” their disposition 
(anxiousness) only and/or more intense if the “right” triggering circumstances (threat- or 
harmful stimuli) are given. The if-then conceptualisation of dispositions strives to integrate 
situational triggers, which account for behavioural variability, and remarkable 
intraindividual stability in one’s behavioural patterns. 
The person-situation 
debate was very 
prominent in personality 
psychology as it affects 
the core issues of 
variant and invariant 
aspects of us 
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Table 1. Crucial controversies in personality psychology 
 
Controversy Positions 
Trait vs. State  
Trait:  
 
 stable, long-term, enduring characteristics that describe people in general 
 





 unstable, short-term, momentary conditions of people that can also be 
atypical for them  
 
 mostly seen as (more or less random) fluctuations 
Person vs. Situation 
Person:  
 
 exsistence and meaningfulness of traits and personality 
 
 behavioural consistency (stability) 
 





 non-existence and non-meaningfulness of traits and personality 
 
 behavioural inconsistency (instability) 
 
 dominance of situations in behaviour (external determinism) 
Structure vs. Process 
Structure:  
 
 traits as descriptive elements or fixed dimensions that are an accumulation of 
the reliable elements of states or within-person variability 
 
 states as capricious or error and thus neglected (or avaraged out) 
 
 
Process / Dynamics:  
 
 traits as dynamic processes that also integrate states and within-person 
variability over different situations and time  
 
 states as part of a dispositional density distribution of a trait dimension (with 





 general approach to individuals differing in certain parameters 
 
 interindividual viewing point                                                                                 




 person-centred approach to a unique individual 
 
 intraindividual viewing point                                                                                 
→ within-person variability and stability  
 
Psychological dispositions are seen as certain groups of if-then relations which contain 
contingencies between antecedent situational cues (environmental stimuli) and (triggered) 
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behaviour forms and mental processes (Amelang et al., 2006, p. 76; see Wright and 
Mischel, 1987). Intraindividual situation-behaviour7 relations s → b are explained, given a 
certain situation sj: Only the group J of s → b relations to which sj is functionally 
equivalent8 is relevant. This leads to following formula (see Amelang et al., 2006, p. 76): bij 
= f ([sJ → bJ], sj) = f (pij, sj). A disposition would then be a “relation” or contingency of a 
situation class (comprising functionally equivalent or subjectively homogeneous and 
similar situations) and a behaviour class (comprising functionally equivalent but not 
necessarily morphologically similar behaviour forms) which both together form a certain 
functional link in their relation.  
This model of dispositions uses an intraindividual perspective opposed to the 
commonly interin-dividual one. Further, the model holds implications for consistencies: An 
individual will be more likely cross-situationally consistent in its behaviour in a 
homogeneous situation class (a class of subjectively equivalent or similar situations) while 
cross-situational consistency should be rather low over heterogeneous situation classes. 
This fact accounts for low cross-situational consistencies of dispositions and specific 
behavioural reaction forms (which may still be functionally equivalent, though). Further, 
there is obvious (situational) plasticity, adaptability, and variability of behaviour as well as 
inherent stability and coherence (within homogeneous situation classes but not in 
heterogeneous ones). Even within a situation class the morphology and intensity of 
behaviours might vary, giving rise to within-person variability and intraindividual 
differences (see also density distributions by Fleeson, 2001, 2007). However, behaviour 
forms might still be functionally equivalent or serve a higher goal: for example, an 
individual high in conscientiousness might have a messy working place but is still very tidy 
and accurate when it comes to designing and sorting documents. Indeed, the individual has 
sometimes a really messy desk and at other times the neatest and tidiest one. At first, this 
may seem as the person cannot be adequately described by a single trait as he or she seems 
not to follow a certain stable pattern that would denote him or her as “conscientious” or 
“tidy”. However, this conclusion might be mistaken: the person can indeed be 
conscientious. Although neglecting the desk at certain times (e.g., when having a lot to do, 
being under stress, etc.), the person is very tidy when it comes to his or her documents and 
work. To tidy them up, the person apparently does not care about leaving his or her desk 
messy – the work has simply got to be done (which is a specific goal of the individual and 
high in subjective value). Yet, when having the time he or she will clean up the desk. 
Hence, there would also be a certain pattern in the variability of “keeping the desk messy 
(when a lot to do) vs. tidy (when not much to do)” (or, to put it in words of a if-then 
conceptualisation: “if a lot do, then keep desk untidy vs. if not much to do, then keep desk 
                                                 
7 “Behaviour” is used here as a subsuming term for actual, manifested behaviour and mental processes (see e.g., Fleeson 
and Noftle, 2008a; Mischel and Shoda, 1995). 
8 Note that the functional equivalence and homogeneity of situations is not so much based on objective situation criteria 
but rather on subjective ones, the “psychologically active situation characteristics” (Fleeson, 2007). These, in turn, are 
perceived and constructed by personal and subjective “maps” that function as situation filtering perceptional units (see 
also Mischel and Shoda, 1995). Situation classes should therefore be in their content and overall effects rather 
homogeneous: A certain disposition may hence only be displayed within a certain situation class (that is subjectively 
homogeneous in its contextual features) but not in other situation classes as their situational aspects are not triggering in 
the subjective perception of an individual. 
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tidy”) but also the long-term tendency of being tidy (as seen in the documents and general 
working style of the individual). Being messy thus serves the purpose or goal of tidying up 
the documents under certain circumstances (see also Fleeson and Noftle, 2008b, p. 1361; 
Bem and Allen, 1974). The individual would still be coherent although manifesting obvious 
within-person variability. The integration of consistency with intraindividual variability is 
one of the most fascinating things personality psychology has to offer. 
Fleeson and Noftle (2008a) “end” the debate on person vs. situation by concluding that 
there are multiple types of consistencies (Fleeson and Noftle, 2008b) and that behaviour 
might be “consistent” for some types, but not for others9. Not only should the consistency 
concepts be applied to the scientific investigation of trait-SI but also the lines of research 
proposed by the authors seem particularly interesting for future SI research in general. 
Even though the previously described trait conceptualisation has its flaws and 
limitations (which cannot be explicated further here), it would serve as a good basis for 
conceptualising SI as a trait. All further theorisation of Trait-SI in this work partly relies on 
notions of process-focused trait concepts but also modifies certain aspects. Therefore, it 
becomes necessary to also take a closer look at situations since they are intertwined with 
mental processes and behaviour. To understand Trait-SI, we must understand the properties 
of situations and behaviours. 
Situations 
There are quite different conceptualisations of “situations” or “contexts”10: there is 
dispute on what they are, how they may be seen, what influences they have, and how they 
may be categorised. Even though some social psychologists might tend to operationalise 
situations merely as certain external, objectively existing stimuli that somehow impose 
influences on an individual, this is a very narrow definition of a “situation”, leading to 
various problems with traits and consistencies. 
 
‐ First of all, a situation can consist of several external stimuli but it should not be 
limited to them. In the study of personality psychology and especially SI it is crucial 
to emphasise the subjective aspects of situations, meaning psychologically active 
situation characteristics (Fleeson, 2007). Situations are always subjectively 
perceived by mediating cognitive-affective-motivational units as “situation filters” 
(see also the conception of cognitive-affective units in a cognitive-affective 
personality system by Mischel and Shoda, 1995), and the question whether 
something can at all be perceived objectively by us humans is rather a matter of 
philosophy. Therefore, it will be fruitful to explore the cognitive-affective 
interpretations of situations (while not neglecting the objectively existing situation 
features, though). Moreover, many homogeneous or functionally equivalent 
situations (or rather their subjectively perceived characteristics) can also be 
aggregated to situation classes. The important point is that situations need not be 
                                                 
9 Fleeson and Noftle (2008b) propose a super-matrix of 36 different consistency concepts. Most have not been explored 
thus far. 
10 The terms “situation” and “context” are used interchangeably here. 
Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 66
objective. Yet, there is still the question which aspects, besides subjective mediating 
units and schemata, allow us to form certain “situation classes” (and how and why). 
 
‐ Second, situations are not just external matters but also internal ones. Current 
moods and other cognitive-affective variables serve as a certain “frame” (internal 
situation or momentary condition) within each external situation occurs. A genuine, 
truly existing situation, as we humans experience it, is always an interaction of 
objective external situation variables, subjectively perceived situation variables, and 
internal situation variables (see Figure 1), although in some instances some 
variables might be stronger. This complex concatenation makes it difficult for both 
social and personality psychologists to grasp interaction effects between 
person(ality), situations, and behaviour (including mental processes). In a systemic-
synergetic point of view (e.g., Haken and Schiepek, 2006) it is quite usual to see 
situations as the function of external and internal factors. This notion should also be 
applied to other fields of psychology. In particular, research in the field of SI will 
benefit from such a view that integrates different aspects of situations and persons 
along with their behaviour.  
 
‐ Third, the “influences” of (“strong” and “weak”) situations (however they may be 
defined) are quite difficult to determine. In general, this is a point where social and 
personality psychologists divide quite strongly, the former claiming that situations 
influence behaviour (and often denying the existence of traits), the latter claiming 
that traits influence behaviour (and confirming that traits do exist). 
 
To summarise the preceding points, “situations” are understood in this work in 
accordance with Mischel and Shoda (1995) not just as external stimuli affecting us (such as 
early behaviourism posits it); rather, only certain aspects or situational cues that draw our 
attention affect us. Moreover, the psychological characteristics of a situation seem more 
important than their objectively existing ones. Also, one must take into account that persons 
actively construct and generate their own situations, for example “in thought, planning, 
fantasy, and imagination” (Mischel and Shoda, 1995, p. 251). Situations can thus be social 
and interpersonal or intrapsychical (e.g., thoughts, moods, states, etc.). Therefore, when we 
speak about cognitive-affective-motivational tendencies in relation to certain situations, 
there might only be certain aspects of situations “of interest” to an individual (depending on 
its learning history, autobiography, mood, current “state”, goals, self-concepts, etc.) which 
trigger cognitive-affective-motivational tendencies. The “psychological situation” is a 
mixture of objectively existing aspects of a situation and the interpretation or meaning-
giving to those aspects through the individual’s personal constructs, concepts, and 
subjective maps (see also Kelly, 1955; Mischel, 1973; Mischel and Shoda, 1995). 
According to Mischel and Shoda (1995, p. 252), “individuals differ in how they selectively 
focus on different features of situations, how they categorize and encode them cognitively 
and emotionally, and how those encodings activate and interact with other cognitions and 
affects in the personality system.”  
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Also, we ought to take into account the occuring frequency of situations because 
certain situations might be over- or underrepresented in the daily life of a person. People 
can choose to a certain extent which situations they seek, avoid, bear, modify, or generate. 
This makes some situations more or less representative and relevant for the cognitive-
affective-motivational reactions and behaviour of an individual: a certain latent disposition 
might be given, but the then-part (actual, observable, overt behaviour) is not activated very 
often because the if-part (contextual aspects) is quite seldom. 
Many of the preceding points pose an important question to trait assessment: Should we 
offer contextualised or decontextualised information (item material) when assessing traits? 
This question may be best answered by the research purpose and viewing point(s), that is 
what one wants to measure. Maybe decontextualised material, as often used in nomothetic 
approaches, accounts best for broad traits (traits with high bandwidth) and tendencies over 
time (offering better long-term predictive validity), whereas contextualised material will 
account better for within-person variability in a short spectrum of time (offering better 
concurrent and short-term predictive validity) for more narrow traits and thus is more of 
interest for person-centred and more idiographic measures. This should be taken into 
consideration when constructing scales for Trait-SI. The question will then be how broad or 
narrow we want to measure SI and which aspects of it. 
The consideration of situations and contexts is indeed essential to SI as systems 
intelligent people perform intelligently within systems. The concept of “systems” (as 
interrelated and interacting elements) implies some sort of surroundings or environment. 
Thus, SI can hardly be studied without any concepts of “contexts” and how they are related 
to traits.  
Behaviour 
The default interpretation of “behaviour” is that of a classical behaviourist: a behaviour 
is any overt and externally observable movement that can be objectively measured by 
certain devices. In the following, this limited view of behaviour will be expanded by some 
other aspects that should also be considered as “behaviour”. 
 
‐ First, behaviour need not be observed nor (objectively) measured and may still 
occur (this is, however, a rather philosophical question and shall not be discussed 
further here). Also, one could discuss the extent to which a certain behaviour can be 
objectively measured and by which methods this can be achieved (which is a 
methodological problem that we cannot delve into here).  
 
‐ Second, there is uncertainty as to which levels of behaviour to approach, which 
levels there are (e.g., molecular vs. molar), if it makes at all sense to distinguish 
different levels, which implications different levels of behaviour bear, and how they 
may be manifested.  
 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. A process-focused situation model 
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‐ Third, the conceptualisation of “behaviour” is a vital point. Is any externally 
observable movement a behaviour? Yes, it is. Yet, this definition disregards another 
aspect of behaviour that cannot be separated from it as easily we would sometimes 
wish: mental processes. Not only the systems psychological position (e.g., Haken 
and Schiepek, 2006; Strunk and Schiepek, 2006) but also other psychologists (see, 
for instance, Fleeson and Noftle, 2008a, 2008b; Mischel and Shoda, 1995) explicitly 
use the term “behaviour” in the sense of behaviour and mental processes. This is a 
broader view on “behaviour” and comes far more nearer to the “real” phenomenon 
than the default behaviourist definition (although it complicates things). Though 
many might agree on conceptualising “behaviour” as seen above, there is great 
divergence on the rather problematic aspects of this conceptualisation: how are 
behaviour and mental processes interrelated? Can we presume causal priority for 
one of the dimensions? Without delving too deep in this complex problem, we 
should take to notice that in most cases it will not be sensible to ask what came first 
(as with asking if the hen or the egg came first) because there is a dynamic flow of 
person-situation inter-/transaction. In special cases it might be sensible, though. 
Mental processes and behaviour are interrelated in a dynamic and interactionist way 
and may seldom be separated from each other without omitting important aspects of 
one another. 
 
‐ Fourth, the “channels” of behaviour must be distinguished as they may vary and 
pose morphological differences in behaviour (enactment) but not in functional ways 
(e.g., expressing aggression by kicking, hitting, biting, spitting, insulting, etc.). 
Rather, functional (dis)similarities of behaviour can be important. 
 
‐ Fifth, the “relationship” between behaviour and situation (or stimuli of situations) 
should be investigated closely. Some psychologists see in the (functional) linkage of 
behaviour and situation the chance to infer (underlying) mental processes and/or 
relatively stable characteristics (traits) should these situation-behaviour patterns 
occur more often and be intraindividually stable. Mischel and Shoda (1995) term 
these “linkages” or contingencies if-then patterns: if situation X, then behaviour Y. 
This sentence can be extended to a more complex formulation (taking into account 
the preceding remarks on situations and behaviour): IF the in subjective (and 
objective) situation content homogeneous / functionally similar context class X 
(which is perceived by mediating cognitive-affective-motivational schemata), THEN 
the in content and morphology differing and variable but yet functionally similar 




                                                 
11 Note that this is not meant as a behaviourist term in the sense that “if stimulus X, then response Y” but that these two 
dimensions, that is the “if” (context) and the “then” (mental processes, behaviour), are somehow associated and occur 
together which, on the other hand, does not exclude contexts triggering mental processes and behaviour (and even vice 
versa!). 
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Closely associated to this is that situations may not just “cause”, “influence”, or 
“affect” us but that we can (a) imagine, construct, and generate certain situations ourselves 
(which may be labeled as “internal situations”), and (b) remain, seek, avoid, modify, and 
generate external circumstances or situations. The last part is concerned with passive, 
reactive, evocative, active, and proactive acting which may be seen as the (functional) 
“quality” of the if-then patterns. To illustrate this: The if-then pattern “making experiences 
with people” (people: if- or situational part; making experiences: then- or behavioural part) 
can imply different linkage qualities of the abstract behaviour class “making experiences” 
(which encompasses several different forms of making experiences that need not be 
morphologically equivalent but are all functionally equivalent in terms of serving the same 
goal of gaining experience with something or someone) and the abstract context class 
“people” (subsuming any kind of “people” and being on a considerably high abstraction 
level). One can passively make experiences with people by just sitting in a room such as the 
doctor’s waiting room with other people; however, this would most likely not be seen as a 
specific (interpersonal, interactional) experience with people. A teacher can reactively 
make experiences with people when a crowd of pupils bursts suddenly into his or her room 
and he or she has to react to their wishes and needs. Evocative experiencing with people 
would emphasise the aspect of bringing forth certain reactions of others (e.g., when 
flirting). Active and also proactive experiencing with people would be really going out and 
seeking people to actively make experiences with them.  
Different levels of behaviour 
Roughly, micro-, meso-, and macro-behaviour as well as implicit and explicit 
behaviour can be distinguished (see Figure 2).  
 
Micro-behaviour refers to mostly implicit behaviour on a “molecular” level of behaviour 
which is particularly reactive, automatic, rapid (i.e., rapidly occurring), and barely 
noticeable (e.g., eye movements, muscle twitches, sweaty hands, etc.). This micro-form 
of behaviour is seldom consciously used as the (attentional and intentional) access to 
such molecular levels is either slim, completely denied, or just not very often used. Even 
the observer tends to not put conscious attention on micro-behaviour as it is processed 
implicitly (if at all). Micro-behaviour is closely related to physiological variables, which 
implies that it can be best measured by objective (physiological) tests (T-data). Q-data 
cannot be obtained from this level of behaviour (one cannot ask a person how his or her 
eye movements will be when seeing a certain picture); L-data, in the sense of 
behavioural data (B-data), may be very difficult to obtain as the observers would have to 
be trained in recognising and (correctly) analysing micro-behaviour forms. Furthermore, 
most micro-behaviours are universal and general in the sense that there should be only 
slight inter(-socio-)cultural differences and that they are largely genetically (and 
temperamentally) determined.  
 
Meso-behaviour basically refers to a wide range of verbal and averbal (para-, non-, extra-
verbal) channels of behaviour. These can be used willfully (i.e., consciously or 
explicitly) but are mostly exhibited in a more implicit fashion (e.g., by gestics, posture, 
etc.). Meso-behaviour occurs for verbal output most of the time explicitly and for its 
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averbal output rather implicitly. However, when laying attention upon one’s (re-)actions, 
one can moderate, control, or generate certain cues of meso-behaviour. This level of 
behaviour can be recognised by the exhibitor at will and can be perceived by others at all 
times (if they pay attention). It is also accessible to reflection: One can think about his or 
her own words and body language (but it is a prerequisite that one starts thinking about 
it and puts attention to it). From meso-behaviour, we may thus obtain Q-data und L-data. 
T-data could also be obtained if it does not focus on the micro-behaviour associated with 
the meso-behaviour (such as muscle movements while exhibiting a phoney smile) but 
rather on objective measurement of meso-level behaviour. Moreover, meso-behaviour is 
heavily affected by socio-cultural determinants.  
 
Macro-behaviour, as a more abstract form of behaviour, represents all (re-)actions that 
somehow concern “doing” (in the broadest sense) something with a “situation” (in the 
broadest sense), for instance, when a person seeks, avoids, modifies, (mentally) 
construes and/or generates certain situations. This class would therefore not really fit 
into the meso-class as meso-level behaviour forms may only be the (instrumental) basis 
for altering a situation or constituting it. For example, when emigrating to Canada, 
working and starting a family there (i.e., arranging and building one’s own environment 
and life), this would be macro-behaviour that consists of “conjunctions” of many various 
meso-level behaviour forms adding up to a bigger whole12. Macro-behaviour usually 
refers to more explicit actions than implicit ones and involves a great deal of cognition, 
emotion, and motivation as well as volition, intention and regulation. Quite seldom 
macro-behaviour can be explored without socio-cultural context factors (e.g., display 
rules for affect) and meso-level behaviour forms. Micro-behaviour forms usually play no 
significant role in macro-behaviour. Q-data and L-data may be obtained best when 
dealing with macro-behaviour (e.g., narrative methods). B-data from friends, peers, 
relatives, significant others, etc. can also bring interesting aspects into light. T-data is not 
very appropriate here. The macro-behaviour level could be of most interest when 
studying systems intelligent acting in everyday life. 
 
It is important to note that micro-, meso-, and macro-behaviour as well as its implicit 
and explicit forms usually occur simultaneously and are not distinguished as three separate 
forms of behaviour: There is a continuum from micro to meso to macro. This continuum 
particularly makes it difficult to assess the level of behaviour that is of interest.  
Yet, all these behaviour forms have in common that they constitute a certain “link” 
between the individual and the environment. This link has certain qualities which may be 
described as the “functional quality of behaviour”: behaviour can be passive, reactive, 
evocative, active, and proactive. In the stream of behaviour with dynamic interactions and 
fluctuations of different levels of behaviour, there can be multiple functional behaviour 
qualities at once. For example, when flirting with someone, one is reactive on the micro-
level (the feedback through mimics and oculesics of the other person cause own mimic 
reactions that may not be conscious and are not willingly expressed, such as smiling back), 
                                                 
12 This may also hold true for SI: Although SI-related behaviours may occur on the meso-level, the effects of SI manifest 
on a macro-level and can be studied there. 
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active on the meso-level (intentionally making and holding eye-contact with the other 
person, smiling more), and evocative on the macro-level (“sexifying” the situation with 
various flirt-signals and leading to interest from the other person). Even though each level 
could potentially constitute all five links, there seem to be certain affinities: Micro-level 
behaviours tend to be more reactive and at best evocative (only if other people recognise 
the behaviour, though, and react to it themselves). Meso-level behaviour can be reactive, 
evocative, active, and/or proactive. Macro-level behaviour can be all five but tends to be 
evocative and/or (pro-)active (see also Figure 2). 
A Disposition Model for Systems Intelligence Integrating Structures and 
Processes 
If we want to conceptualise SI as a trait or disposition, an integration of process- and 
structure-focused disposition models instead of merely structure-based ones should be 
considered. In the following, an integrative disposition model (see Figure 3) as a meta-
model that aims at unifying the different controversies and especially integrating the view 
of structure- and process-focused trait concepts is described. The model can be used as a 
meta-model that depicts dispositional structures as well as processes and dynamics in 
general. This model can be greatly applied to systems intellect – the Trait-SI. The previous 
remarks on situations and behaviours serve as a basis for this meta-model.  
The highly complex, multifaceted, and dynamic “personality system” is conceptualised 
as a latent, mental as well as behavioural (re-)actions generating, and heterogeneous macro-
variable that represents a “reservoir” of different structures and processes: There are certain 
information processing modes that can be triggered (e.g., cognition, affect or emotion, 
motivation, etc.) and chronified structures (obtained, for example, through one’s learning 
history and autobiography, stable environment, genome, etc.) such as self-related variables 
(e.g., social and non-social schemata, scripts, self-concepts, social roles, identity or 
identities, etc.). Certain chronified structures can be triggered or activated by environmental 
stimuli and then represent momentarily activated and salient cognitive-affective-
motivational schemata (CAMS) which in turn “filter” the objective situation characteristics. 
These CAMS generate through subjective perception mechanisms psychologically active 
situation characteristics which need not be equivalent with the objectively triggering ones. 
CAMS are actually constantly activated as long as we are awake but their content and filter 
mechanisms vary in relation to the contexts (internal and external ones) we are in. The 
subjectively filtered, psychologically active situation aspects are then processed within the 
personality system. Depending on the “state” of the system and the incoming situational 
information, different modes of information processing occur. Also, different other 
chronified structures can be activated and add to the momentarily occurring processing 
(e.g., activated memories, needs, desires, etc.). In this state, certain structures are salient 
(which, in turn, might contribute to the situation filtering) and different processes with 
these structures are established. There are intrapsychic (i.e., psychic, mental) processes 
(cognition, emotion, motivation, volition, etc.) and extrapsychic (behavioural) dynamics 
that emerge. The intrapsychic ones stem directly from the information processing processes 
and can contribute to subjective perception mechanisms of the CAMS by adding new  
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Figure 2. Different levels of 
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salient aspects to the situation filtering (e.g, thoughts, feelings, etc.) or modifying the active 
ones. Then, different situation components are explicitly and/or implicitly appraised and 
filtered. The behavioural output can occur on various levels (micro, meso, macro) and is 
exhibited explicitly and/or implicitly in verbal and averbal (non-, para-, extra-verbal) 
channels. This constitutes a certain “linkage” (passive, reactive, evocative, active, 
proactive) to the person’s socio-ecological surroundings (niche). By this, the person “(re-) 
acts” to the situation and his or her surroundings (environment) as he or she can seek, 
avoid, bear, modify, and/or generate contexts. 
Momentarily activated CAMS and behavioural (re)actions are part of the “personality” 
but are still rather momentarily occurring states within a dynamic flow of person–
environment transaction. The latent system behind all of this provides with its chronified 
structures the basis or repertoire for these transactional processes. If these dynamic 
transactions occur with increased frequency (and in a similar manner), then emergent 
patterns of thoughts, feelings, desires, and behaviours may arise which are chronified step 
by step. States can then be transient to traits although this conceptualisation does not aim at 
specifically distinguishing these two concepts. All of these structures and processes can, 
however, only be established if the biological basis of the personality system is intact. 
Environmental stimuli (e.g., intoxication, car crash, radiation, etc.) can also have a bearing 
on (neuro-) physiological structures. 
In summary, person and environment are interlocked in the following way (without the 
intention to give causal prioritisation to any process): 
. . . →  objective environmental stimuli →  different momentarily active and 
salient CAMS are triggered → CAMS filter objective environmental stimuli 
through subjective perception mechanisms relying on situation-specific 
information processing →  subjectively perceived, psychologically active 
situation characteristics emerge (from the former objective environmental 
stimuli which were filtered and subjectified by the CAMS) →  structures and 
processes within the personality system are momentarily highly activated and 
salient → subjective stimuli are processed in different modes of implicit and/or 
explicit information processing within the personality system →  implicit 
and/or explicit intra- and/or extrapsychical (re)actions (passive, reactive, 
evocative, active, proactive; verbal and/or averbal; micro, meso, macro) emerge 
→  different objective and/or subjective “influences” on oneself and one’s 
surroundings (environment in socio-ecological niche; current situation or 
context) →  . . . 
A Systemic-Synergetic Personality Paradigm for SI Research 
Having proposed a meta-model for dispositions which can be used to describe Trait-SI, 
I move forward to a systemic-synergetic conceptualisation of “personality”. Trait-SI (with 
its behavioural manifestations from which we infer Trait-SI) is constituted by an underlying 
personality system. Personality should also be looked at to grasp SI within a trait-
theoretical approach. SI needs to be integrated into a personality theory in order to proceed 
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with its trait-conceptualisation. It will be my hope that other theorists will refine the basic 
thoughts I propose here and that researchers will rigorously evaluate their usefulness in 
empirical studies of SI. 
Remarks on the term “Personality”. “Personality” has seen many interpretations 
throughout the history of its etymology. But where does the word “person” come from? 
Widely, the word is derived from the Latin word persōna, -ae “mask (of an actor), role, 
character; personality, person” (Kluge, 2002; Stowasser, 2004). In turn, Stützer (1975, pp. 
87 et seq.) deduces persōna, -ae from the Etruscan Phersu, which is a masked figure on a 
mural painting dated back to about 550 BC. (Indeed, there are many loanwords from the 
Etruscan language in Latin.) Notwithstanding, there are also other more or less plausible 
derivations: for instance, lat. persŏnare “to sound through“ (e.g., the voice of an actor 
sounds through his mask); lat. per se sonare “to sound through onself” (again, maybe a 
reference to sounding through from a mask?); lat. per se una “being one through oneself”; 
lat. per-sōnare < per-zōnare “to disguise“ from the ancient Greek word περίζωμα 
[perídsōma] “that what has been begirded / cinctured“; ancient Greek πρόσωπον 
[prósōpon] “visage, face, mien“, which obtained the connotation of “mask, role” in the 
New Testament. Eventually, Phersu seems the most likely derivation for „person“. 
Interestingly, the ancient Greeks would have translated “personality” with ψυχή [psukhē], 
from which we have “psyche” today. This is mainly due to its holistic grasping as it could 
mean “breath; vital energy, life; soul, mind, spirit; intellectual power (~ lat. ratio), reason, 
sense; temper; heartiness; place of passions and lust; characterisation of the entire person” 
(Gemoll, 1965, p. 815). Seemingly, the topics “living” (breath, vital energy, life), 
“cognition” (intellectual power, reason, sense), and “emotion” (temper, heartiness, 
passions, lust) are covered13. Interestingly, ancient Greeks about 2,500–3,000 years ago 
might have had a holistic meaning of “psyche = person and his or her cognitive and 
emotional characteristics”. In a modern systemic-synergetic approach to personality, the 
holistic understanding of the “psyche” is revived by conceptualising “personality” as an 
information processing system, consisting of many macro-modules such as cognition and 
emotion. This exciting conceptualisation makes it easier to see SI as a trait within a 
personality system. After all, SI requires a more “systemic” view on personality and 
individual differences in order to fully integrate it and understand how it may operate. 
Systems psychology. Systems psychology, systemic psychology, or systems-based 
psychology is a relatively young branch of psychology which aims at explaining such 
phenomena as perception, memory, cognition, affect and emotion, motor control, identity, 
self, consciousness, neural networks, etc. by use of systemics (i.e., systems theory, chaos 
theory, and synergetics). The field of systems psychology offers many new and innovative 
approaches to old phenomena and also a vast set of methodical strategies (see, for example, 
Haken and Schiepek, 2006; Schiepek and Strunk, 1994; Strunk and Schiepek, 2006). Little 
has personality psychology been influenced by systemics so far, though. However, there are 
exceptions such as Haken and Schiepek (2006), Kuhl (2001; PSI-theory – personality-
system-interactions), Mayer (1993-1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1998, 2005; system-topics 
framework), and Mischel and Shoda (1995; CAPS – cognitive-affective personality 
                                                 
13 These are all  topics that are also covered by SI (see Figure 2, for instance). 
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structural and dynamic personality system: multifaceted and interactive information processing 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. A disposition meta-model integrating structures, processes, and dynamics 
Chapter 3: Systems Intelligence as a Trait 
 77
system) who all conceptualise “personality” as a system. A systemic-synergetic personality 
paradigm should use theoretical conceptualisations, terminology, and methodological 
implications of systemics. Hence, the theoretical framework will be more abstract, 
formalised, and should allow certain properties of a personality system to be mathematised, 
modelled, and eventually simulated (see also Mischel and Shoda, 1995; Shoda, 2007). The 
“theoretical and methodological kit” of systemics can supply new powerful means and tools 
for research. 
Conceptualising personality systemic-synergetically. SI could be nicely integrated 
into a systemic-synergetic conceptualisation of personality. In the following, basic 
properties of a systemic-synergetic conceptualisation of a personality system and 
dispositions are outlined (see also Figures 7 and 8). These should serve as a – skeletal, yet 
first – theoretical underpinning for a systemic view on trait-SI and its integration into a 
personality system. 
The system of personality is defined as follows (in one long sentence):  
A person has a “personality” (in its broadest sense) – on a biological basis 
(genetic, anatomical, neuro-physiological, biochemical, endocrinological) and 
in constant reciprocal interchange (physical-material, energetic, informational) 
with its animate and inanimate surroundings –, which is a highly complex 
information processing system (functionally closed, dissipative, 
multidimensional, adaptive, non-linear, dynamic) and constitutes a systemic 
bio-psycho-environmental network in (a) varying configurational structures, (b) 
complex macro-, meso- and micro-organisations, and (c) multi-level interaction 
of explicit and implicit intra- and extrapsychical factors (mental processes and 
behaviours) with self-organisation as well as emergence of order parameters 
and attractors. 
Basically, any system is a set of interrelating parts (e.g., Haken and Schiepek, 2006; 
Strunk and Schiepek, 2006). A pile of sand would therefore be no system: the grains of 
sand do not interact. When examining a system like personality we at first should analyse 
„1) its components, 2) how these components are organized, and 3) how the components 
and organization change over time” (Mayer, 1993-94, S. 106). By doing so, we can zoom in 
on various degrees of detail; for example, we can focus more on the macro-structure and 
the overall-properties or analyse the micro-structure and its characteristics.  
Following core aspects characterise the systemic-synergetic view on personality: 
 
 
‐ Systemic-synergetic: personality is a complex and holistic system, consisting of 
many interrelating and interacting parts on multiple levels.  
 
‐ Informational: information is permanently fluctuated and processed throughout the 
personality system as well as internalised and externalised while person–
environment inter-/transactions. 
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‐ Highly complex: the personality system consists of many and heterogeneous 
variables thatare intertwined and interacting with each other at various hierarchical 
and heterarchical levels. 
 
‐ Functionally closed: the personality system can be seen as an “entity” separate from 
its environment; however, it can interact (transact) with it (being dissipative or 
permeable). 
 
‐ Dissipative: the personality system is permeable for (informational) interexchanges 
and interactions with the environment. 
 
‐ Multidimensional: the personality system can be studied on multiple levels of 
abstraction. 
 
‐ Adaptive: people can adapt to certain situations and therefore exhibit adaptivity and 
plasticity of behaviour. As the personality system is dissipative for certain external 
parameters and shows self-organisational patterns, it can adapt to both internal 
(intrasystemical) and external (extrasystemical) parameters. Maladaptations could 
indicate tendencies to psychopathologies.  
 
‐ Non-linear: a personality system cannot be analytically seen as a linear sum of its 
single elements. The personality system parts are dynamic and interrelated: A 
change in one part of the system can lead to various changes and complex effects in 
other parts (which can give rise to the phenomenon chaos). Even though the 
personality system may be potentially non-linear, this does not mean that the whole 
system behaviour per se is unpredictable and chaotic. Indeed, there are periodic 
phases and, due to the self-organisation and auto-regulation mechanisms of order 
parameters and attractor emergences, there is a certain stability, consistence, and 
coherence within the system – in relation to external and internal control 
parameters. Hence, the system behaviour becomes more predictable. In fact, many 
natural phenomena are non-linear such as the weather, for example; still, the 
weather can be forecast to a certain exent (knowing the deterministic processes and 
core variables interacting). 
 
‐ Dynamic: personality and its factors are seen as complex interactive processes, not 
as static structures. The dynamicity may give rise to certain structures but these can 
“oscillate” and vary to a certain degree. Still, there are “preferred” intraindividual 
structures that occur most of the time. Every structure emerges from dynamic 
processes, though. For example, an emotion (with accompanying appraisals) that is 
exhibited by expressive behavioural patterns is a multi-level process because the 
information processing underlying this “emotional structure” is a dynamic process 
of intra- and extrasystemical information fluctuation. 
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‐ Self-organised: periodical and aperiodical – chaotic and stable, consistent, 
coherent (in relation to internal and external control parameters as well as order and 
attractor emergence)  
 
An individual’s unique personality pattern can be referred to as its “system gestalt” or 
“system configuration”. Different system elements are functionally interwoven in a 
hierarchical and heterarchical manner, which characterises the system as multifactorial, 
multidimensional, multidirectional, multifunctional, and multicausal or multidetermined. 
These strongly interrelated system parts can be deemed as “personality domains”. On an 
abstract level, there is a systemic informational personality network with diverse 
information fluctuations. Connections and pathways between subsystems (e.g., personality 
domains) may vary due to internal and/or external stimuli and are thus not stable under all 
circumstances. Hence, short-, middle-, and long term configurational patterns can be 
detected. Within the complex personality system, which can display periodic as well as 
chaotic patterns, there are also processes of self-organisation and -regulation, which makes 
it necessary to assume emergent characteristics from the interplay of different system 
compounds (see Haken and Schiepek, 2006). Basic elements of this system are 
intrapsychical (e.g., perception, cognition, affect or emotion, volition, motivation, intention, 
regulation, etc.) and extrapsychical (i.e., all forms of behaviour) processes of information 
fluctuation and processing (upon adopting a macroscopic view). Considering the permanent 
interexchange of energy (e.g., when eating proteins and carbohydrates, gaining ATP from 
them, and using the provided energy for activities) and especially information (cf. 
information theory; e.g., Shannon and Weaver, 1949; Haken, 2006), the ancient Greek 
phrase ΠΑΝΤΑ ΡΕΙ [pánta reĩ] “everything is in stream” (by Simplikios modified from 
Herakleitos) attains indeed new honours. 
When speaking of personality as a systemic network, one might like the analogy of the 
human brain to illustrate its basic structure(s): there are certain functional modules, such as 
traits (stable configurations), states (transient configurations), habits, needs, motives, skills, 
actions, physics, etc., but these modules are cross-linked with each other to vast networks 
of dynamic information processing systems in which one compound influences another. 
These modules may be distributed throughout the entire systemic network but they still 
have functional focal points. The processes of intra-, inter-, and transsystemical information 
fluctuation and processing are an essential part to the understanding of a human being with 
a unique personality in his or her surroundings.  
Traits are conceptualised as stable, for the system “attractive” states of information 
fluctuation and processing, which constitute “pathway activations” or patterns. This 
generates the characteristic system configuration for a specific trait in the personality 
system (such as Trait-SI). The personality system with its emergent characteristics and self-
organisational patterns is prone to procure an “attractive state” in the course of time (i.e., 
system time), causing stability of information processing patterns and system-surroundings-
connections. Therefore, traits can be operationalised as attractors and states as transient 
(meaningful and non-meaningful) fluctuations within such attractors or as ephemeral bio-
psycho-social patterns. Both forms as well as the resulting dynamics and system behaviour 
may be mathematically computed, to a certain extent predicted, and illustrated (e.g., an der  










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4. A systemic-synergetic conceptualisation of personality 
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Heiden, 1997; Ciompi, 1997; Haken and Schiepek, 2006; Kelso, 1995; Schiepek, 1999; 
Schiepek and Strunk, 1994). 
Basic description of personality qualities in a systemic-synergetic conceptualisation: 
 
‐ The personality system constitutes a wide-spreading bio-psycho-environmental 
network. 
 
‐ The personality system is biologically based on anatomical, neurophysiological, 
biochemical, and endocrinological structures, expressed by genes evolved in an 
evolutionary process. Together, these factors are the biological “constraint” of the 
the personality system: any information fluctuation and processing can only be 
established within a functioning biological system with unique characteristics 
(temperamental aspects). Biological constraints may be influenced somewhat 
through environmental causes (e.g., ecological niche); for instance, the neuro-
physiological structures can be damaged. 
 
‐ Being functionally closed but dissipative, the personality system is in permanent 
reciprocative interplay with its objectively existing as well as internally generated 
surroundings (animate and inanimate). An individual also interacts with its 
“subjective surroundings,” that is, the surrounding it perceives through its 
cognitive-affective-motivational schemata (CAMS). 
 
‐ A constant physical-material (by the body of the person), energetic, and 
informational interexchange takes place intra-, inter-, and transsystemically (person 
systems × ecological surroundings systems). 
 
‐ An interexchange constitutes passive, reactive, evocative, active, and/or proactive 
behavioural connections (“links”) between the individual and its surroundings. 
These can be expressed in verbal (words, phrases, etc.) as well as in paraverbal 
(voice and its qualities), nonverbal (“body language”: kinesics, mimics, gestics, 
oculesics, etc.), and/or extraverbal (physics, clothes, hair style, status, etc.) 
interaction patterns. 
 
‐ Both serial and parallel information processing processes with various positive and 
negative feedback loops can be viewed from a biophysiological-chemical (e.g., gene 
codes, neurotransmitters, etc.), mental-psychical (e.g., cognitive and affective 
information processing), or environmental-social (e.g., communication, interaction) 
perspective. 
 
‐ Multifactoriality, multidimensionality, multidirectionality, multifunctionality, and 
multicausality / -determination are established within the personality system. 
 
‐ Intra- and extrapsychical processes merging into each other take place due to the 
continual interiorisation and exteriorisation of fluctuating information. 
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‐ A systemic informational personality network is constituted with specific attractive 
system configurations (attractors) and order parameters which will exhibit mostly 
stable and coherent intraindividual behavioural patterns (that only vary within a 
given spectrum). Also, there are transient, momentary (fluctuating) states. 
 
‐ The system configuration (“system gestalt”) may possess besides periodic and 
stable (attractive) states also chaotic and variable-transient compounds. However, 
dynamical processes of self-organisation and -regulation take place and constitute a 
certain stability, consistency, and coherence of the system, its structures, processes, 
and dynamics. 
 
‐ The system is more or less than the sum of all its “ingredients” as the dynamic 
interaction between these also has the system exhibit emergent patterns as well as 
some unexpected behavioural outputs (chaoticity and non-linearity). 
 
‐ Short-, middle-, and long-term system configurations (as connections between 
different elements or domains of the personality system) can be distinguished, 
which all together add to the development, dynamics, stability / consistency / 
coherence, adaptability, variability, and plasticity or flexibility of personality. 
 
‐ A specific system configuration at a given time is influenced by many internal and 
external factors (control parameters) such as solidified system history, preceding 
configurations, attractors, transient states (as quasi-attractors), situational and 
contextual aspects, and internal and external constraints. 
 
To summarise the preceding remarks (see also Figure 8 for an illustration): 
The bio-psycho-environmental systemic and informational personality network, 
resembling the “psyche” of an individual, consists of dynamic structures and 
interrelated configurations as well as interacting intra- and extrapsychical 
informational processes (explicit and implicit) in their complex and to a certain 
degree varying organisation. 
A Systemic-Synergetic Disposition Model 
Specific interpretation patterns of situations, arising from personal schemata, concepts, 
constructs, needs, expectations, cognitions, emotions, etc., could be understood as 
macroscopic order-parameters governing (or “enslaving”) cognitive-affective attractors. All 
stimuli exhibited by external control parameters would be filtered to some extent by 
perceptional units of the personality system (being enslaved by their macroscopic orders). 
Then, specific cognitive-affective units would be triggered, thereby “activating” certain 
attractors or at least making them salient in relation to the contextual (subjectively) 
psychologically perceived external control parameter stimuli. These attractive “reaction 
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norms” would produce certain motor outputs, defined as “behaviour”. Behavioural 
variability could be understood by the concept of stable individual attractors: in reaction to 
internal and/or external control parameters, the excursion and pond of a cognitive-affective 
attractor would vary from time to time (normally only within the attractive state) and thus 
always constitute different kinds (morphologies and intensities) of behaviour forms, which 
are similar (and quite often functionally equivalent) but not identical. However, the 
attractor could come to a bifurcation point and then could be given up for a certain amount 
of time, having the system show unusual transient states (that are not mere fluctuations 
within the pond of an attractor) and thus exhibiting behaviour forms that are not usual for it 
when being in the “attractive state”. This would show how consistency and inconsistency 
may co-exist besides each other and even emerge from each other (and also keep the idea of 
multiple types of consistencies): depending on the specific system and attractor time, the 
transient state will recur after some time into the attractive state and thus reestablish the 
“normal” or “regular” system behaviour again.  
Of course, all of this can only take place if we presume that the system (i.e., 
personality) is in its basic characteristics multidimensional, non-linear, adaptive, and 
dissipative. In short, the concept of order parameters can provide the mediating cognitive-
affective-motivational interpretation units of “triggering situations” and “reactions to 
triggering situations”. Traits as attractors can be highly variable. A complex macro-order 
can be defined as the emergent pattern of situational aspects perceived through mediating 
cognitive-affective-motivational order parameters that interpret situations and behavioural 
output in relation to the context, together with the underlying dynamic information 
processing attractors (e.g., cognitive, affective, etc.). Figure 5 summarises all the preceding 
points. 
Trait-SI in a Systemic-Synergetic View on Personality and Dispositions  
The question is: why study trait-SI (or even other forms of SI) in a systemic-synergetic 
view on personality, dispositions, and individual differences?  
First, the previously outlined systemic-synergetic conceptualisations could serve very 
well for trait-SI concepts. Although my conceptualisations are far from being fleshed out, 
they might provide a fruitful ground for researchers. I invite other researchers to criticise, 
modify, and/or amend the concepts proposed here – in the hope that they might become 
some day a viable paradigm of studying SI within a dynamic personality system. Second, 
the methodology of systemics allows the conceptualisations to be modelled, and certain 
properties of a system can be simulated. However, it is essential to first conceptualise the 
constructs that should be modelled in systemic-synergetical terms. SI thus needs to be 
conceptualised systemic-synergetically and integrated into a systemic-synergetically 
conceptualised personality system. The high level of abstraction and formalisation of those 
models will then allow mathematisation. This in turn would yield specific predictions 
concerning the different models. Simulations could then be programmed to explore the 
properties of the models. Also, these models and simulations should always be compared to 
real-life empirical studies. Hence, theory – empirical studies – modelling and simulating – 
practice should be interlocked in the study of SI. Of course, all of this will take its time and 
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an extensive load of further research on SI, but it is exciting to think of what could be 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5. A systemic-synergetic conceptualisation of dispositions or traits and states 
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Measuring Trait Systems Intelligence:  
First steps towards a Trait-SI scale (TSIS) 
John F. Rauthmann 
This research article reports first steps towards a scale that aims at measuring 
systems intelligence as a trait-like construct (Trait-SI, Systems Intellect). After 
describing the process of item generation and the item content of the Trait-SI 
Scale (TSIS), psychometric properties of the scale are investigated. Students  
(N = 408) provided self-reports on socio-emotional skills (Riggio, 1989), self-
monitoring (Laux and Renner, 2002), self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), and the 
Big Five (Schupp and Gerlitz, 2008), as well as on a German 30-item version of 
the TSIS in an online-study. The scale’s reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) and 
construct validity are investigated. Further, the scale’s factor structure is 
explored. Results show good psychometric properties of the TSIS and its four 
retained factors. SI factors are mostly positively related to the other scales. 
Relationships are discussed with respect to how Trait-SI might be linked to 
other constructs in a nomological network. Future lines of research, especially 
concerning improvement of the TSIS as well as measurement of (Trait-)SI in 
general, are discussed. 
Introduction 
In this book (Chapter 2), I have proposed Trait Systems Intelligence, or systems intel-
lect, as opposed to Ability Systems Intelligence. Trait-SI refers to enduring mental and be-
havioral characteristics that individuals would attribute themselves, whereas Ability-SI 
refers to the abilities in the SI domain. Ability-SI is hard to capture with self-report data (Q-
data), but Trait-SI can very well be measured with self-reports of people, and this chapter 
provides first steps towards a reliable and valid measure of Trait-SI.  
First, theoretical assumptions underlying the item content are discussed, and then 
empirical findings concerning basic psychometric properties (e.g., descriptive statistics, 
item statistics, internal consistency, scale structure, etc.) are presented. The preliminary and 
yet to be improved Trait-SI Scale (TSIS) will also be linked to other psychological con-
structs (social and emotional intelligence, self-monitoring, self-esteem, Big Five). Finally, 
suggestions for improvements of the TSIS are given, and limitations of the study and its 
findings are discussed. 
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Theoretical Background 
Regardless whether a nomothetic or idiographic (or even “idiothetic”) approach is used, 
there are commonly three ways to measure a certain phenomenon or construct (cf. Cattell 
and Kline, 1977; see Table 1): L-data (“Life”) and B-data (“Behaviour”), Q-Data (“Ques-
tionnaire”), and T-data (“Test”).  
L-data refers to any information obtained from or about the life of an individual (e.g., 
letters, emails, school grades, curriculum vitae, observed behaviour patterns, etc.) and is 
gathered by “external” information. A subgroup of L-data is B-data which refers to any 
data that is concerned with behaviour of a target individual. Q-data is any self-evaluation 
data gained from (standardised) questionnaires and thus taps into internal or introspectional 
information. T-data refers to data gained from standardised testing situations (e.g., experi-
ments) or when obtaining objectively quantifiable data (opposed to interview data) in per-
formance tasks. 
A certain type of data or a certain assessment method should not be a priori favoured; 
rather, the three types have each their advantages and shortcomings and can be useful or 
inconvenient for certain research aims – hence, they should be treated as equal. Thus, the 
researcher will have to decide which kind of data he or she wants or needs to assess, and 
which suits best for his or her study, questions, and hypotheses. 
Q-data will probably work best for Need- and Trait-SI, but most certainly not for Abili-
ty-SI as self-evaluations of abilities do not tend to be very accurate.14 
 
Table 1. Overview of different types of data 
 
Type Data Examples Best for 
L-data assessment through others  
– peer-ratings  
– behavioural observation (B-data) 
– videotaping and audio recording 





Q-data subjective self-report and self-evaluation questionnaires Trait-SI 
T-data objectives measures 
– physiological tests 
– intelligence tests 
– performance tests 
Ability-SI 
                                                 
14 This is another point why we should at least distinguish Ability-SI and Trait-SI. “Systems Intelligence” has been con-
ceptualised both as a disposition or trait and an ability. However, these two conceptualisations have different implications 
for assessment and for the research or diagnostic methods used. Usually, abilities do not correlate highly with self-eva-
luations of one’s abilities, suggesting that we are not measuring the same constructs, but (at best) rather different aspects 
of it. 
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The Present Study 
The present study aimed at assessing the psychometric properties (reliability and vali-
dity) of the TSIS items and scales. Reliability in the sense of internal consistency will be in-
dexed by Cronbach’s alpha. Validity will be assessed in terms of construct validity by em-
bedding Trait-SI into a nomological network. For this purpose, a priori hypotheses on the 
associations between Trait-SI and other (related) constructs (socio-emotional skills, acquisi-
tive self-monitoring, self-esteem, Big Five) were generated.  
Specifically, all constructs should show positive relationships with Trait-SI. Systems 
intelligent individuals should be able to act intelligently also in interpersonal systems which 
would make them socio-emotionally intelligent. They may possess heightened levels of 
perceptional sensitivity to others’ and also own states. This includes thoughts, feelings, de-
sires, and behaviours. Also, systems intelligent people would need to adapt to varying cir-
cumstances within complex and dynamic systems, and if these are interpersonal or social in 
nature, then there should be tendencies to impression management (and lower behavioural 
consistency given that situational or contextual circumstances vary) in the sense of altering 
one’s demeanour in a situation-appropriate manner to maximise (social) adaptivity. Being 
efficient and productive in systems should come along with self-efficacy and self-esteem 
(whereas it is not specified whether Trait-SI breeds self-esteem or vice versa). In terms of 
central personality traits, systems intelligent individuals should be rather emotionally stable 
(although possessing a certain sensitivity), outgoing and communicative (Extraversion), 
open-minded (Openness for experiences, Intellect, Culture, Fantasy), socially adjusted and 
warm (Agreeableness), as well as productive and persistent (Conscientiousness). 
Item Generation 
Item content of a trait-SI scale 
Systems intelligence as the “behavioural intelligence of human agents in systemic envi-
ronments” (Luoma, Hämäläinen, and Saarinen, 2008, p. 757) is a heterogeneous construct 
and comprises different levels (see Table 2): there are perceptional (perceiving oneself and 
reciprocal influences in systems), cognitive and meta-cognitive (thinking and reflecting 
within systems), emotional and motivational (intuitively guided actions, empathical expe-
riences, motivation to persevere and exact productive action patterns, etc.), and behavioural 
(productive behaviours) components. An SI-scale should therefore be able to account for all 
these components and capture core elements of what is referred to as systems intelligent 
thinking and acting. Of course, one needs to take into account that the scale might turn out 
heterogeneous due to the theoretical assumptions of very different SI components although 
there should be a positive manifold among the factors of the scale as they ought to be tied 
together by an underlying super-factor, (global or general) Trait-SI. 
Item generation 
Based on the five stages of SI (Hämäläinen and Saarinen, 2007, p. 50) and other de-
scriptions of what SI might comprise (Hämäläinen and Saarinen, 2004, 2008), preliminary 
items were generated based solely on theoretical grounds. Specifically, there were three 
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core areas of SI into which ten items each were fitted (see also Table 2): perception, cog-
nition, and action. Due to the heterogeneity of the item content and also its overlap, no spe-
cific factor structure was expected except that there should be lower-order and hierarchi-
cally higher factors.  
 
Table 2. Different core components of systems intelligence 
 
Perception-SI: seeing oneself in the system 
– seeing oneself, one’s roles, and one’s behaviour in a system 
– seeing through the eyes of others  
– contextual awareness 
Cognition-SI: thinking systems intelligently 
– identifying and envisioning productive ways of behaviour for oneself in a system  
– self- and meta-reflection 
– deep thoughts 
Action-SI: managing and sustaining systems intelligent behaviour  
– exercising productive ways of behaviour in a system 
– continuing and fostering systems intelligent behaviour in the long run 
 
 
As there would be too much overlap in item content between SI and forms of leader-
ship, the fifth dimension (leadership with systems intelligence) was omitted. It could be ex-
pected that the fifth dimension of SI is highly similar to transformational leadership and 
self-leadership. Also, the third (managing systems intelligence) and fourth dimension (sus-
taining systems intelligence) were both slightly modified and combined to one dimension 
(action). The second (thinking about systems intelligence) and first dimension (seeing one-
self in the system) were left as separate dimensions, but were slightly modified and now 
comprise some additional aspects. 
Answers should be given on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “0 – I totally disagree” 
to “4 – I totally agree”. Some items need to be reversed. Items can be found in Table 4 and 
Appendix B. 
In particular, descriptions such as “I like . . .” or “I am motivated / try to . . .” were 
avoided as they would rather tap into need-like constructs. The measure is not designed to 
assess Need-SI nor will it account for Ability-SI. However, Trait-SI and Style-SI are pro-
bably confounded here. This scale can at no means be considered a valid and reliable way 
of assessing Ability-SI. It only aims at capturing some important aspects of self-perceived 
trait-like SI. It will assess self-evaluations of SI (being a measure of Trait-SI). Future re-
search will have to demonstrate what the scale actually measures. There has got to be an 
extensive and rigorous validation process of the scale to make it useful for further research 
in the field of SI. 
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Methods 
Procedure. Participants completed all scales online on a platform for online-studies 
founded by the author. The TSIS was administered intermingled with many other scales 
(some of which are not relevant to the present study and are thus not reported here). On 
average, participants took 30 – 40 minutes for the entire study. 
Participants. Scales were adminitered online to N = 408 students from the University 
of Innsbruck. Their native language was mostly German, so German versions of all scales 
were used. The participants’ mean age was 22.81 years (SD = 4.91; median: 21 years; 
range: 18 – 65 years). There were 316 women (77.50%) and 93 men (22.50%) in this 
sample. The online-study was conducted as part of a psychology course, and participants 
obtained credt points for participating.  
Measures. Several measures were used to explore associations among Trait-SI and 
other constructs. The measures are listed in their order of administration in the online-stu-
dy, but were interspersed with other measures too. The means, standard deviations, and in-
ternal consistencies (Cronbach’s alphas) of all scales can be found in Table 6 (along with 
intercorrelations of the constructs). 
Social skills inventory (SSI) by Riggio (1989). This self-report instrument, with 90 
items to be answered on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all like me) to 5 (exactly 
like me), is to assess basic social communication skills in non-verbal and verbal areas. The 
SSI consists of six subscales, emotional expressivity (EE; e.g., “I have been told that I have 
expressive eyes”), emotional sensitivity (ES; e.g., “I am often told that I am a sensitive, un-
derstanding person”), emotional control (EC; e.g., “I am very good at maintaining a calm 
exterior even if I am upset”), social expressivity (SE; “When telling a story, I usually use a 
lot of gestures to help get the point across”), social sensitivity (SS; e.g., “I’m generally con-
cerned about the impression I’m making on others”), and social control (SC; e.g., “I am 
usually very good at leading group discussions”). The emotional skills are associated with 
the non-verbal, and the social skills with the verbal domain. Expressivity skills refer to en-
coding (communicating, sending), sensitivity skills to decoding (receiving, interpreting), 
and control skills to regulating and managing emotional and/or social information. 
Different scales can be assessed with the SSI: Socio-emotional intelligence (SEI) as a glo-
bal scale consisting of all 90 items; social intelligence (SI) consisting of all items relating to 
the social/verbal domain (i.e., SE + SS + SC), SE, SS, SC; emotional intelligence (EI) 
consisting of all items relating to the emotional/non-verbal domain (i.e., EE + ES + EC), 
EE, ES, EC; expressivity (E), sensitivity (S), and control (C) (incorporating social and emo-
tional facets each). Sum scores for all possible scales were computed. 
Revised Self-Monitoring Scale by Laux and Renner (2002). Acquisitive self-monitoring 
was measured with two scales: “sensitivity to behaviours of others” (labelled here as per-
ceptiveness; e.g., “In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in the facial 
expression of the person I am conversing with”) and “ability to modify self-presentation” 
(labelled here as impression management; e.g. “I have the ability to control the way I come 
across to people, depending on the impression I wish to give them”). Both scales contained 
six items each to be answered on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (totally disagree) 
to 4 (totally agree). For further readings on self-monitoring, see, for instance, Laux and 
Renner (2002) as well as Snyder (1987). 
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Big Five Inventory – SOEP (BFI-S) by Schupp and Gerlitz (2008). The Big Five, 
Neuroticism or Emotional Stability (e.g., “I am someone who becomes easily anxious”), 
Extraversion (e.g., “I am someone who is communicative”), Openness to experiences (e.g., 
“I am someone who has a vivid phantasy”), Agreeableness (e.g., “I am someone who can 
forgive”), and Conscientiousness (e.g., “I am someone who works thoroughly”), were mea-
sured with a 15-item inventory, using three items per Big Five dimension to be answered 
on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagee – not at all like me) to 7 (strongly 
agree – totally like me). For further readings on the Big Five, see Costa and McCrae (1992) 
and also John and Srivastava (1999). 
Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem Scale. This scale aims at measuring global self-esteem 
with ten items in a self-report format. People are to indicate on a four-point Likert scale 
(coded 0 – 3) whether they strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree with the gi-
ven statements about their self-esteem (e.g., “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”). 
For further readings on self-esteem and its measurement, see Rosenberg (1965) and Wylie 
(1974).  
Trait-SI Scale (TSIS). This preliminary scale was developed by the author and com-
prised 30 items related to Trait-SI aspects (e.g., “I exercise productive ways of influence 
within my surroundings”, “I perceive myself as part of a whole”) to be answered on a five-
point Likert scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). 
Statistical analyses. Reliability of the TSIS will be evaluated by internal consistency 
indexed by Cronbach’s alpha. For purposes of item and scale refinement, also item diffi-
culties, item-(total-)scale correlations, and alpha-if-item deleted statistics are reported. Va-
lidity of the TSIS will be assessed twofold: first, its structure will be investigated by explo-
ratory factor analyses (principal component analysis; oblique: direct-oblimin rotation with δ 
= 0) and Horn’s parallel analysis (Horn, 1965) to evaluate the number of factors to be re-
tained. Second, bivariate zero-order Pearson correlations will be used to explore the inter-
relationships of the TSIS scales (retained factors, global factor) with other scales (socio-
emotional skills, acquisitive self-monitoring scales, self-esteem, Big Five factors). The pre-
sented results on associations can be interpreted as indications of construct validity. 
Results 
Descriptive and item statistics. Means, standard deviations, skewnesses, kurtoses, mi-
nimum and maximum values, dfficulties (Pi)15, and item-(total-)scale correlations can be 
found in Table 3. The interested reader and researcher aiming at revising the TSIS might 
want to compare the items with each other. 
Internal consistency. The global Trait-SI score obtained α = .89, which is very good 
considering the heterogeneity of the item content. Cronbach’s alpha could also not be opti-
mized by excluding items (see Table 3). Even in the retained factors of the scale (see be-
low) no item had to be excluded (see Table 4). 
                                                 
15 Formula used: 100
4
⋅=
MPi . Values around 50 are deemed as opimal. 
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Factor structure. To investigate the factor structure, an exploratory factor analysis 
(principal components analysis; direct-oblimin rotation with δ = 0, due to hypothesized un-
orthogonality of factors) was conducted. An initial solution yielded a seven-factor structure 
that accounted for 57.03% of variance. As Kaiser’s rule to retain factors that show eigen-
values above one (cf. Kaiser, 1970) tends to overestimate the number of factors to be re-
tained (e.g., Zwick and Velicer, 1986) and Cattell’s scree-plot turns out ambiguous at times, 
Horn’s parallel analysis (1965) was performed (which, however, still slightly overestimates 
the number of retained factors; see Glorfeld, 1995). By comparing the eigenvalues of fac-
tors retained from the original correlation matrix (of items) and the random ones from 
Horn’s parallel analysis (number of variables: 30; number of participants: 408; number of 
replications: 1,000), results indicate that four factors (accounting for 46.31% of variance) 
should be retained (see Table 4). Underestimating the number of factors to be retained ge-
nerally leads to more problems than overestimating factor numbers although this also 
comes along with a set of problems (cf. Mumford, Ferron, Hines, Hogarty, and Kromrey, 
2003). 
The four retained factors are labelled “effective systems handling” (12 items), “syste-
mic reflection” (6 items), “holistic systems perception” (5 items), and “systemic perspec-
tive-taking” (7 items). Due to the positive manifold of SI factors, a higher-order structure 
was postulated and secondary (exploratory) factor anlysis was conducted. A general factor, 
accounting for 53.51% of total variance, was extracted (factor loadings: systemic perspec-
tive taking: .81; effective systems handling: .80; holistic systems perception: .71; systemic 
reflection: .58). This g-factor can be interpreted as the general Trait-SI factor underlying 
the four SI factors. It is virtually identical with the total score obtained from all TSIS items. 
Thus, the TSIS is able to capture a broad, more complex, and abstract general Trait-SI 
factor (SI global factor) as well as more specified lower-order factors. 
 
Table 3 A and B. Item statistics of the TSIS 
 
A M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
I perceive myself as part of a whole. 2.56 0.99 –0.34 –0.52 
I am usually aware of my surroundings and its influences on me. 2.92 0.70 –0.64 1.14 
I have an intuitive feeling for unspoken things. 3.02 0.80 –0.73 0.68 
I am usually not quite aware of the impact of my actions on my surroundings. 2.65 0.92 –0.79 0.50 
I feel as part of a bigger system. 2.31 1.04 –0.16 –0.56 
I observe my own interdependence within my surroundings. 2.52 0.91 –0.16 –0.42 
I have difficulties seeing things from different perspectives. 3.18 0.81 –0.96 1.12 
I am very well aware that I live and interact within a complex and dynamic 
system. 
2.75 0.91 –0.43 –0.12 
I can easily adopt the perspective of other people and “feel” what they are 
thinking and feeling. 
3.04 0.85 –0.95 1.19 
I perceive myself as part of a whole, the influence of the whole upon myself, 
as well as my own influence upon the whole. 
2.47 0.96 –0.31 –0.23 
I would not describe my thinking as “holistic” and “intuitive”. 2.69 0.96 –0.37 –0.49 
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I often ponder on my thoughts, feelings, intentions, and actions. 3.35 0.72 –0.96 0.68 
I would describe my thinking as quite “complex” and “interwoven”. 
 
2.80 0.97 –0.55 –0.35 
I usually have no problems dealing with difficult and complex problems 
when going them through step by    step in my mind. 
2.60 0.95 –0.33 –0.51 
I am not a very self-reflexive and thoughtful person. 3.22 1.06 –1.5 1.55 
I often ponder on others’ thoughts, feelings, intentions, and actions. 3.20 0.77 –0.90 1.09 
I often think about my role in my surroundings. 2.96 0.88 –0.76 0.57 
I envision and identify productive ways of behaviour in my mind if 
confronted with complex problems. 
2.60 0.84 –0.16 –0.15 
My thinking is very action-oriented. 2.25 0.81 0.13 -0.14 
I am a very reflexive person. 2.89 0.86 –0.38 –0.32 
I am able to manage most of my everyday activities successfully. 3.10 0.79 –0.79 0.68 
I can adapt to varying situations quite flexibly. 2.68 0.83 –0.49 0.27 
I can influence my surroundings, be they living or not. 2.43 0.81 –0.04 0.03 
When confronted with complexity, I persevere until I have found a 
productive solution. 
2.71 0.87 –0.50 0.09 
I exercise productive ways of influence within my surroundings. 2.51 0.78 –0.06 0.23 
I have difficulties adjusting my thoughts, feelings, and actions to my 
surroundings and situations. 
2.80 0.77 –0.69 1.07 
I usually cannot influence much in my surroundings. 2.68 0.84 –0.39 –0.22 
I tend to just do things right. 2.24 0.79 –0.16 –0.13 
I do not give up until I have achieved my goal. 2.63 0.89 –0.61 0.40 
I sometimes have the feeling that there is not much what I can influence by 
my own actions. 
 
























B Range  (min. – max.) Pi 
Corrected Item-
Total correlation 
Cronbach's α  
if item deleted 
I perceive myself as part of a whole. 0 – 4  64.00 .437 .882 
I am usually aware of my surroundings and its influences 
on me. 
0 – 4  73.00 .525 .880 
I have an intuitive feeling for unspoken things. 0 – 4  75.50 .433 .882 
I am usually not quite aware of the impact of my actions 
on my surroundings. 
0 – 4  66.25 .229 .886 
I feel as part of a bigger system. 0 – 4  57.75 .436 .882 
I observe my own interdependence within my 
surroundings. 
0 – 4  63.00 .440 .882 
I have difficulties seeing things from different 
perspectives. 
0 – 4  79.50 .451 .882 
I am very well aware that I live and interact within a 
complex and dynamic system. 
0 – 4  68.75 .588 .878 
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I can easily adopt the perspective of other people and 
“feel” what they are thinking and feeling. 
0 – 4  76.00 .414 .882 
I perceive myself as part of a whole, the influence of the 
whole upon myself, as well as my own influence upon the 
whole. 
0 – 4  61.75 .607 .878 
I would not describe my thinking as “holistic” and 
“intuitive”. 
0 – 4  67.25 .419 .882 
I often ponder on my thoughts, feelings, intentions, and 
actions. 
1 – 4  83.75 .393 .883 
I would describe my thinking as quite “complex” and 
“interwoven”. 
0 – 4  70.00 .274 .886 
I usually have no problems dealing with difficult and 
complex problems when going them through step by step 
in my mind. 
0 – 4  65.00 .424 .882 
I am not a very self-reflexive and thoughtful person. 0 – 4  80.50 .221 .887 
I often ponder on others’ thoughts, feelings, intentions, 
and actions. 
0 – 4  80.00 .283 .885 
I often think about my role in my surroundings. 0 – 4  74.00 .341 .884 
I envision and identify productive ways of behaviour in 
my mind if confronted with complex problems. 
0 – 4  65.00 .527 .880 
My thinking is very action-oriented. 0 – 4  56.25 .251 .885 
I am a very reflexive person. 0 – 4  72.25 .408 .882 
I am able to manage most of my everyday activities 
successfully. 
0 – 4  77.50 .468 .881 
I can adapt to varying situations quite flexibly. 0 – 4  67.00 .471 .881 
I can influence my surroundings, be they living or not. 0 – 4  60.75 .545 .880 
When confronted with complexity, I persevere until I 
have found a productive solution. 
0 – 4  67.75 .495 .880 
I exercise productive ways of influence within my 
surroundings. 
0 – 4  62.75 .586 .879 
I have difficulties adjusting my thoughts, feelings, and 
actions to my surroundings and situations. 
0 – 4  70.00 .370 .883 
I usually cannot influence much in my surroundings. 0 – 4  67.00 .509 .880 
I tend to just do things right. 0 – 4  56.00 .466 .881 
I do not give up until I have achieved my goal. 0 – 4  65.75 .420 .882 
I sometimes have the feeling that there is not much what I 
can influence by my own actions. 
0 – 4  65.25 .480 .881 
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Cronbach’s alpha  
if item deleted 
Effective systems handling (α = .85)   
When confronted with complexity, I persevere until I have found a 
productive solution. 
.597 .828 
I do not give up until I have achieved my goal. .503 .836 
I exercise productive ways of influence within my surroundings. .640 .826 
I am able to manage most of my everyday activities successfully. .558 .832 
I can influence my surroundings, be they living or not. .581 .830 
I usually have no problems dealing with difficult and complex problems 
when going them through step by step in my mind. 
.527 .834 
I tend to just do things right. .498 .836 
I usually cannot influence much in my surroundings. .559 .831 
My thinking is very action-oriented. .295 .850 
I sometimes have the feeling that there is not much what I can influence by 
my own actions. 
.486 .837 
I can adapt to varying situations quite flexibly. .468 .838 
I envision and identify productive ways of behaviour in my mind if 
confronted with complex problems. 
.466 .838 
Systemic reflection (α = .72)   
I often ponder on my thoughts, feelings, intentions, and actions. .606 .652 
I would describe my thinking as quite “complex” and “interwoven”. .476 .680 
I am not a very self-reflexive and thoughtful person. .254 .758 
I often ponder on others’ thoughts, feelings, intentions, and actions. .475 .682 
I often think about my role in my surroundings. .479 .679 
I am a very reflexive person. .550 .658 
Holistic systems perception (α = .86)   
I perceive myself as part of a whole, the influence of the whole upon myself, 
as well as my own influence upon the whole. 
.766 .809 
I am very well aware that I live and interact within a complex and dynamic 
system. 
.616 .847 
I observe my own interdependence within my surroundings. .550 .862 
 I feel as part of a bigger system. .748 .813 
I perceive myself as part of a whole. .718 .821 
Systemic flexibility (α = .69)   
I have difficulties seeing things from different perspectives. .480 .640 
I can easily adopt the perspective of other people and “feel” what they are 
thinking and feeling. 
.493 .636 
I have difficulties adjusting my thoughts, feelings, and actions to my 
surroundings and situations. 
.360 .671 
I would not describe my thinking as “holistic” and “intuitive”. .361 .675 
I am usually aware of my surroundings and its influences on me. .474 .647 
I have an intuitive feeling for unspoken things. .428 .654 
I am usually not quite aware of the impact of my actions on my 
surroundings. 
.272 .699 
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Table 5. Factor structure of the TSIS 
 
 Factors    h2 
 I II III IV  
Effective systems handling      
When confronted with complexity, I persevere until I have found a 
productive solution. 
.77 .14 –.08 –.08 .573 
I do not give up until I have achieved my goal. .70 .02 .03 –.14 .458 
I exercise productive ways of influence within my surroundings. .67 .06 .21 –.06 .568 
I am able to manage most of my everyday activities successfully. .65 –.06 –.07 .14 .460 
I usually have no problems dealing with difficult and complex problems 
when going them through step by step in my mind. 
.62 .05 –.22 .21 .467 
I can influence my surroundings, be they living or not. .52 .03 .09 .22 .443 
I tend to just do things right. .49 –.08 .13 .14 .361 
I usually cannot influence much in my surroundings. .46 –.20 .15 .33 .485 
My thinking is very action-oriented. .46 .09 .06 –.21 .217 
I sometimes have the feeling that there is not much what I can influence 
by my own actions. 
.40 –.16 .24 .21 .393 
I envision and identify productive ways of behaviour in my mind if 
confronted with complex problems. 
.40 .37 .07 .10 .415 
I can adapt to varying situations quite flexibly. .40 –.03 .03 .34 .368 
Systemic reflection      
I often ponder on my thoughts, feelings, intentions, and actions. .08 .72 .07 –.02 .558 
I would describe my thinking as quite “complex” and “interwoven”. .13 .68 –.11 –.02 .476 
I am a very reflexive person. .13 .67 –.02 .09 .521 
I often think about my role in my surroundings. .00 .67 .19 –.08 .496 
I often ponder on others’ thoughts, feelings, intentions, and actions. –.14 .66 –.01 .20 .495 
I am not a very self-reflexive and thoughtful person. –.06 .27 .07 .19 .136 
Holistic systems perception      
I feel as part of a bigger system. –.01 –.04 .89 –.11 .748 
I perceive myself as part of a whole. –.02 –.09 .87 –.05 .726 
I perceive myself as part of a whole, the influence of the whole upon 
myself, as well as my own influence upon the whole. 
.05 .03 .80 .13 .737 
I observe my own interdependence within my surroundings. .03 .17 .67 –.07 .495 
I am very well aware that I live and interact within a complex and 
dynamic system. 
.07 .21 .62 .12 .564 
Systemic flexibility      
I can easily adopt the perspective of other people and “feel” what they 
are thinking and feeling. 
.02 .18 –.11 .68 .514
I have difficulties seeing things from different perspectives. –.01 .07 .07 .67 .488
I have difficulties adjusting my thoughts, feelings, and actions to my 
surroundings and situations. 
.21 –.26 .08 .51 .408
I have an intuitive feeling for unspoken things. .02 .21 .09 .49 .366
I am usually aware of my surroundings and its influences on me. .10 .03 .28 .48 .432
I am usually not quite aware of the impact of my actions on my 
surroundings. 
.01 .09 –.08 .42 .193
I would not describe my thinking as “holistic” and “intuitive”. .00 –.02 .36 .38 .333
Eigenvalues 7.40 2.58 2.34 1.58  
% of variance 24.66 8.59 7.80 5.25  
 
Note. N = 408. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Direct-Oblimin (δ = 0) with Kaiser 
Normalization. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
Highest factor loadings on a factor are indicated bold. h2 = communalities. Interpretation of factors: I = Effective systems 
handling; II = Systemic reflection; III = Holistic systems perception; IV = Systemic flexibility. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .882 (meritorious: .80, marvellous: .90; cf. Dziuban and Shirky, 1974); Bartlett’s Test 
of Sphericity: Approx. χ2(435) = 4,213.27, p < .001.  
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Intercorrelations. All four factors of Trait-SI were moderately positively intercorre-
lated ( r  = .38, range: rs = .24 – .56). The four SI factors and the SI global factor were also 
correlated with socio-emotional skills, acquisitive self-monitoring, self-esteem, and the Big 
Five (see Table 6) to further investigate which (psychological) meaning each SI factor 
might have. 
In general, there were positive association patterns among socio-emotional skills and SI 
factors, with the highest correlations mostly for effective systems handling. Only social 
sensitivity was negatively correlated with SI factors. The global SI score even correlated at 
r = .53 (p < .001) with socio-emotional intelligence (the global score from all social and 
emotional skills). Further, emotional sensitivity (facet score) and systemic perspective-
taking (r = .51, p < .001), control (domain score) and effective systems handling (r = .51, p 
< .001), emotional intelligence (score from all emotional facets) and global SI (r = .53, p < 
.001), emotional intelligence and effective systems handling (r = .53, p < .001), and socio-
emotional intelligence (r = .51, p < .001) and effective systems handling reached significant 
correlation coefficients at r > .50. Generally, the factor systemic reflection correlated the 
least with socio-emotional skills; from the socio-emotional skills facet scales, it was only 
positively associated with the sensitivity scales, emotional sensitivity (r = .31, p < .001) and 
social sensitivity (r = .25, p < .001).   
There were largely significant positive relationships between acquisitive self-monito-
ring and the SI factors. Highest correlations were found for global SI and the perceptive-
ness-factor (r = .43, p < .001), global SI and impression management (r = .48, p < .001), 
effective systems handling and the perceptiveness-factor (r = .51, p < .001), and systemic 
flexibility and impression management (r = .54, p < .001). The lowest (and only marginally 
significant) correlation was found for systemic reflection and the perceptiveness-factor (r = 
.08, p = .09). 
Nearly all correlations of SI factors and self-esteem turned out positively significant, 
except for the association with systemic reflection. Effective systems handling even showed 
a correlation of r = .49 (p < .001) with self-esteem. 
From correlations with the Big Five, Emotional Stability (reversed Neuroticism) and 
Extraversion showed highest associations with effective systems handling (r = .42 and r = 
.41, respectively, ps < .001). The only exception from the positive association pattern 
among Big Five and SI factors was systemic reflection: it correlated negatively with 
Emotional Stability (r = –.11, p < .05) and non-significantly with Extraversion and Con-
scientiousness (r = .05 and r = .07, respectively, ps > .10). Further, it is noteworthy to men-
tion that Agreeableness shows generally lower correlations with SI factors. The global SI 
factor shows highest associations with Extraversion and Openness to experiences (r = .37 
and r = .36, respectively, ps < .001), the two most agentic traits of the Big Five. 
Discussion 
Summary of results. In general, the TSIS shows good psychometric properties which is 
reflected in good internal consistencies, a sensible factor structure, and associations with 
other constructs as were hypothesized. Four SI factors (effective systems handling, syste-
mic reflection, holistic systems perception, systemic perspective-taking) were retained from 
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the TSIS with a general or global SI factor hierarchically above these. In particular, SI fac-
tors were positively associated with socio-emotional skills, (acquisitive) self-monitoring, 
self-esteem, and the Big Five. The only factor showing at times divergent (i.e., inverse) and 
even non-significant patterns was systemic reflection. The factor showing strongest asso-
ciations was effective systems handling. 
Interpretation of results. The results are interpreted with respect to the factor structure 
obatinef from the TSIS as well as the associations the retained factors show with other, 
theoretically related constructs. 
Factor structure. Four factors were retained from the 30 items of the TSIS.  
The first factor, effective systems handling, refers to efficient and productive ways of 
acting within complex and dynamic systems and problems. Individuals high in this factor 
exert positive and effective control within systems while remaining flexible and systems-
oriented. Should hindrances occur, they persevere and seek action-oriented solutions. This 
factor is related to the action- or behavior-component of SI (which would also be a core 
factor in systems intelligent leadership).  
The second factor, systemic reflection, refers to the tendency to reflect upon oneself 
and others concerning thoughts, feelings, intentions, and behaviors. Individuals high on this 
factor should be deep in thinking, very reflective, but also very sensitive to their surroun-
dings. This factor relates to the thought- or cognition-component of SI.  
The third factor, holistic systems perception, refers to the tendency to perceive oneself 
within a complex system, one’s actions within this system, but also the feedbacks from this 
system. People high in this factor have perceptional and thought patterns referring to per-
sons and environments “working together” as one whole. Their perception can be described 
as systemic or holistic. This factor reflects both a perceptional and attitude or opinion factor 
(e.g., one has the opinion that he or she acts within a complex system involving feedback 
processes).  
The fourth factor, systemic flexibility, refers mostly to a factor of perspective-taking, 
empathy, flexibility, plasticity, and adaptivity. People high in this factor should be able to 
adapt sucessfully to different situations and also adopt views and opinions different from 
their own, which should make them not only cognitively but also behaviourally more fle-
xible. Further, individuals might also employ a great deal of intuition. This factor relates to 
a cognitive and behavioral competence of taking different perspectives within systems. 
In addition, the study showed that the four retained factors are tied together by an un-
derlying super-factor, which could be tentatively labelled the g-factor of Trait-SI. Thus, the 
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Table 6. Bivariate zero-order (inter-)correlations of SI scales with other constructs 
 
  M SD α SI (g) ESH  SR HSP SF 
Systems intellect          
Systems intellect (global) 2.75 0.42 .89 –     
Effective systems handling 2.59 0.51 .85 – –    
Systemic reflection 3.07 0.57 .72 – .28*** –   
Holistic systems perception 2.52 0.77 .86 – .43*** .24*** –  
Systemic flexibility 2.90 0.50 .69 – .56*** .33*** .40*** – 
Socio-emotional skills         
Emotional expressivity 48.32 8.19 .76 .25*** .30*** –.00 .20*** .16** 
Emotional sensitivity 53.44 6.98 .76 .48*** .38*** .31*** .22*** .51*** 
Emotional control 44.68 8.29 .80 .17** .22*** .07 –.03 .18*** 
Social expressivity 49.58 9.93 .88 .41*** .43*** .08 .32*** .30*** 
Social sensitivity 50.20 9.08 .84 –.10* –.26*** .25*** –.05 –.11* 
Social control 52.77 8.31 .80 .47*** .56*** .03 .27*** .39*** 
Expressivity 97.89 16.53 .89 .37*** .40*** .04 .29*** .26*** 
Sensitivity 103.64 12.15 .81 .20*** .03 .36*** .09 .22*** 
Control 97.45 12.69 .81 .42*** .51*** .06 .16** .37*** 
Emotional intelligence 146.44 12.95 .71 .53*** .53*** .21*** .23*** .49*** 
Social intelligence 152.55 16.82 .83 .42*** .39*** .19*** .30*** .31*** 
Socio-emotional intelligence 298.99 26.08 .86 .53** .51*** .23*** .31*** .45*** 
Self-monitoring (acquisitive)         
Perceptiveness 2.48 0.70 .88 .43*** .51*** .08† .18*** .36*** 
Impression management 2.69 0.59 .80 .48*** .39*** .28*** .21*** .54*** 
Self-esteem 2.26 0.54 .90 .40*** .49*** –.03 .26*** .33*** 
Big Five          
Emotional stability 3.64 1.23 .71 .29*** .42*** –.11* .15** .26*** 
Extraversion 4.97 1.26 .81 .37*** .41*** .05 .28*** .26*** 
Openness to experiences 5.25 1.10 .68 .36*** .31*** .22*** .21*** .30*** 
Agreeableness 5.39 0.94 .52 .22*** .11* .15** .13** .29*** 
Conscientiousness 4.88 1.12 .69 .34*** .38*** .07 .25*** .20*** 
 
Note. N = 408.  
SI (g) = global systems intelligence score; ESH = Effective systems handling; SR = Systemic reflection; HSP = Holistic 
systems perception; SF = Systemic flexibility. 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10. 
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Intercorrelations. As hypothesized, most associations turned out (significantly) posi-
tive. Particularly, high correlations emerged for socio-emotional intelligence and self-moni-
toring. The pattern of findings points towards the positive nature of SI: individuals scoring 
high on Trait-SI can be expected to be socially and emotionally intelligent, self-confident, 
flexible, stable, outgoing, open-minded, warm, and persistent.  
One notable exception to the general pattern of findings (i.e., significantly positive cor-
relations) is the correlations of the SI factor systemic reflection: they were one of the smal-
lest, some were not even significant, and systemic reflection showed a negative association 
with Emotional Stability (whereas the other factors showed positive associations) and a po-
sitive one with social sensitivity (whereas the other factors showed negative associations). 
The latter findings can be explained by the nature of systemic reflection: reflecting upon 
oneself and others in complex systems gives rise to not only thoughtful but possibly also 
ruminative and even depressive (or dysphoric) moods (which is associated with Neuroti-
cism as a domain of negative affect). Further, Neuroticism can be associated with socio-
meter theory (Leary and Baumeister, 2000) which posits that people show individual ten-
dencies to detecting cues of inclusion (acceptance) and exclusion (rejection) which in turn 
determines their self-esteem (Penke and Denissen, 2008). People with a more sensitive so-
ciometer are also more neurotic, sensitive to social cues (especially negative ones), and 
ponder on interpersonal problems (see, e.g., Denissen and Penke, 2008). Therefore, it is 
plausible that systemic reflection is associated with social sensitivity and Neuroticism. This 
is corroborated by the finding that it is not associated with self-esteem (and even shows a 
negative tendency, albeit small). Further, systemic reflection correlates the least with the 
other SI factors and also loads the least on the global Trait-SI factor. These findings seem 
to shed light on more negative aspects of systems intelligent people: even though they 
might be sensitive to themselves and surroudings and know what (is right) to do (i.e., they 
have high competencies in taking actions in systems), especially the sensitivity- and reflec-
tivity-parts could be hindrances at some time (e.g., it may be better at times to not be too 
sensitive or perceptive as well as to not think so much about things and take them too se-
riously). However, there are two upsides that ought not to be forgotten: first, the self-con-
cept, self-efficacy, and general self-esteem may buffer negative states and moods and thus 
counteract depressogenic symptomatology. Second, even if there are ruminative states that 
consume one’s attention, thoughts, and time, this is actually indicative of solving complex 
analytical problems and serves an adaptive purpose (see Andrews and Thomson, 2009; see, 
however, also Lyubomirsky and Tkach, 2003).  
Merits and limitations. The merit of this article lies in proposing a preliminary Trait-SI 
scale along with assessing basic psychometric criteria of the items and scale(s). First steps 
have been taken in developing a scale that can validly and reliably assess individual diffe-
rences in Trait-SI. Other researchers could use the scale in their research and possibly re-
vise and refine the items and scales (or at least adjust them to their needs). However, there 
are also certain limitations that should be briefly addressed. 
One limitation of the findings is the sample used. First, there was a female overrepre-
sentation (77.50%). Even though it is unlikely that females systematically differ in their SI 
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skills and traits,16 future studies should seek to balance out the sex ratio. Second, all partici-
pants were students and thus had higher education levels which could have led to higher le-
vels of SI-related traits (e.g., more and deeper reflection tendencies, striving to think holis-
tically, etc.). Third, mostly adolescents were in the sample which restricts generalisability 
to other age classes. Fourth, all participants were native speakers of German, and so the 
TSIS and all other scales were administered in German versions. This may limit the fin-
dings on the TSIS. Future studies ought to use the English items17 and replicate findings 
from this study. A further limitation is the reliance on self-reports and cross-sectional data. 
Due to the latter, no causal inferences can be made and associations cannot be sufficiently 
interpreted. The effects and interactions of the variables remain thus unclear. This limits 
our view to a structural rather than a process-oriented and dynamic one. Longitudinal data 
would be needed to gain insight into causality and dynamics. Self-reports should be com-
plemented by peer-ratings and (observed) behavioural data in future studies. Also, multi-
trait-multimethod analyses should be employed. Another limitation concerns social desira-
bility of answering. Most traits were genuinely positive traits (e.g., self-esteem, emotional 
stability) and correlations might be inflated due to a socially desirable response style. Fur-
ther, the TSIS might not have any predictive and incremental abilities. No SI-related cri-
teria were sampled and thus the predictive validity of the TSIS remains unclear as of yet. 
The scale’s applicability will have to be tested in future research and under other circum-
stances. Moreover, the scale’s content and face validity was not assessed. Face validity is 
not that important in the case of the TSIS, but content validity is, especially because there 
are no other scales that could be used to assess construct validity in terms of convergent 
(and discriminant) validity. Therefore, experts in SI should rate the proposed items accor-
ding to their respective levels of capturing SI-relevant aspects.18 
Prospects: future lines of research. Future research should be especially concerned 
with maximising content validity, revising, and validating the TSIS. In general, not only 
should self-ratings but also peer-ratings (with different levels of acquaintanceship) be sam-
pled. Further, the factor structure of the TSIS ought to be replicated and confirmatory factor 
analyses employed (as opposed to the exploratory factor analyses conducted in this study). 
Moreover, test-retest reliability needs to be assessed for the scale in order to ensure that a 
stable trait (i.e., enduring characteristics) is measured. Additionally, the scale should be in-
tegrated into a wider nomological network of (theoretically) related constructs. The present 
                                                 
16 Indeed, Mann-Whitney Us turned out non-signficant. No sex differences were found for the four SI factors and the 
global Trait-SI factors. 
17 The English items proposed are suggestions from the author; they have not (yet) been derived by the usual translation–
backtranslation process. 
18 Lawshe (1975) proposed following method: a panel of subject matter experts (i.e., experts in SI) should examine the 
items and indicate whether they are “essential”, “useful (but not essential)”, or “not necessary”. The content validity ratio 











   ne = absolute number of times which an item is rated “essential”; N = absolute number of raters  
CVR values range from +1 to –1. Positive values and such closer to +1 indicate that experts are in agreement that the item 
should be deemed as essential to content validity. A mean CVR across items as an indicator of overall content validity can 
also be computed. 
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study only used a small selection of possibly related constructs (and also measured each 
construct only with one instrument). Possibly, also latent state-trait models and multitrait-
multimethod analyses could be used in the future. A further concern will be to establish cri-
terion validity of the TSIS as the scale(s) should be able to “predict” SI-related real-life cri-
teria (from the past, at the present, and in the future). Another area of investigation would 
be whether SI structures (and the constructs themselves) differ according to socio-demogra-
phic variables (sex, age, education, nationality, etc.) and whether there are cultural differen-
ces. Specifically, future research should focus on identifying (a) behavioural criteria of 
(Trait-)SI that can be observed and coded by raters (in order to show associations between 
behavioural scores and the TSIS) and (b) critical real-life outcomes (criteria) for (Trait-)SI. 
This will also help improve the scale.  
Conclusion 
The present article proposed a preliminary Trait-SI Scale (TSIS) to assess trait-aspects 
of SI. Thus, first steps towards measuring individual differences in SI in a psychometric 
sense were made. Self-reports might capture some trait-related aspects of SI, but the pro-
posed scale should be under close and rigorous scrutiny in future empirical studies. Not 
only should basic psychometric criteria be met, but also should self- and peer-ratings as 
well as behaviour observations be employed to study the properties of the items and 
scale(s) more closely.  
It is my hope that other researchers in the filed of SI find this article, its statistics, and 
the items of the TSIS useful for their own research and even strive to revise and improve 
the scale. Hopefully, a valid and reliable scale of Trait-SI will emerge that will be capable 
of quickly and easily assessing individual levels of Trait-SI. 
References 
Andrews, Paul W., Jr. Thomson., and J. Anderson. 2009. The bright side of being blue: 
Depression as an adaptation for analyzing complex problems. Psychological Review, 
vol. 116, pp. 620–654. 
Campbell, Donald T. and Donald W. Fiske. 1959. Convergent and discriminat validation by 
the multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, vol. 56, pp. 81–105. 
Cattell, Raymond B. 1966. The scree test for the number of factors. Multivariate 
Behavioral Research, vol. 1, pp. 245–276. 
Cattell, Raymond B. and Paul Kline. 1977. The scientific analysis of personality and 
motivation. New York: Academic Press. 
Cortina, Jose M. 1993. What is coefficient alpha? Examination of theory and applications. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 78, pp. 98–104.  
Costa, Paul T. and Robert R. McCrae. 1992. Revised NEO personality inventory (NEO PI-
R) and NEO five factor inventory. Professional manual. Odessa, Florida: Psychological 
Assessment Resources. 
Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 106
Cronbach, Lee J. 1951. Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests. Psychometrika, 
vol. 16, pp. 297–334.  
Denissen, Jaap J. A. and Lars Penke. 2008. Neuroticism predicts reactions to cues of social 
inclusion. European Journal of Personality, vol. 22, pp. 497–517. 
Dziuban, Charles D. and Edwin Shirkey. 1974. When is a correlation matrix appropriate for 
factor analysis? Some decision rules. Psychological Bulletin, vol. 81, pp. 358–361. 
Glorfeld, Louis W. 1995. An improvement on Horn’s parallel analysis methodology for 
selecting the correct number of factors to retain. Educational and psychological 
measurement, vol. 55, pp. 377–393. 
Hämäläinen, Raimo P. and Esa Saarinen, eds. 2004. Systems intelligence – Discovering a 
hidden competence in human action and organizational life. Helsinki University of 
Technology, Systems Analysis Laboratory, Research Reports A88, October 2004.  
Hämäläinen, Raimo P. and Esa Saarinen, eds. 2007. Systems intelligence in leadership and 
everyday life. Espoo: Systems Analysis Laboratory, Helsinki University of Technology.  
Hämäläinen, Raimo P. and Esa Saarinen, eds. 2008. Systems intelligence – A new lens on 
human engagement and action. Espoo: Systems Analysis Laboratory, Helsinki 
University of Technology.  
Horn, John L. 1965. A rationale and test for the number of factors in factor analysis. 
Psychometrika, vol. 30, pp. 179–185. 
John, Oliver P. and Sanjay Srivastava. 1999. The Big Five trait taxonomy: History, 
measurement, and theoretical perspectives. In Handbook of personality: Theory and 
research (2nd ed.), Lawrence A. Pervin and Oliver P. John, eds., pp. 102–138. New 
York: Guilford. 
Kaiser, Henry F. 1970. A second generation Little Jiffy. Psychometrika, vol. 35, pp. 401–
416. 
Laux, Lothar and Karl-Heinz Renner. 2002. Self-monitoring und authentizität: Die 
verkannten selbstdarsteller. Zeitschrift für Differentielle und Diagnostische Psychologie, 
vol. 23, pp. 129–148. 
Lawshe, Charles H. 1975. A quantitative approach to content validity. Personnel 
Psychology, vol. 28, pp. 563–575. 
Leary, Mark R. and Roy F. Baumeister. 2000. The nature and function of self-esteem: 
Sociometer theory. In Advances in experimental social psychology, Mark P. Zanna, ed., 
pp. 1–62. San Diego: Academic Press. 
Luoma, Jukka, Raimo P. Hämäläinen, and Esa Saarinen. 2008. Perspectives on team 
dynamics: Meta-learning and systems intelligence. Systems Research and Behavioral 
Science, vol. 25, pp. 757–767. 
Lyubomirsky, Sonja and Chris Tkach. 2003. The consequences of dysphoric rumination. In 
Rumination: Nature, theory, and treatment of negative thinking in depression, Costas 
Papageorgiou and Adrian Wells, eds., pp. 21–41. Chichester, England: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Chapter 4: Measuring Trait Systems Intelligence 
 107
Mumford, Karen R., John M. Ferron, Constance V. Hines, Kristine Y. Hogarty, and Jeffrey 
D. Kromrey. 2003. Factor retention in exploratory factor analysis: A comparison of 
alternative methods. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Educational Research Association (Chicago, IL: April 21–25, 2003). 
Penke, Lars and Jaap J. Denissen. A. 2008. Sex differences and lifestyle-dependent shifts in 
the attunement of self-esteem to self-perceived mate value: Hints to an adaptive 
mechanism? Journal of Research in Personality, vol. 42, pp. 1123–1129. 
Riggio, Ronald E. 1989. Manual for the social skills inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting 
Psychologists Press. 
Rosenberg, Morris. 1965. Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Schmitt, Neal. 1996. Uses and abuses of coefficient alpha. Psychological Assessment, vol. 
8, pp. 350–353.  
Schupp, Jürgen and Jean-Yves Gerlitz. 2008. BFI-S: Big Five inventory-SOEP. In 
Zusammenstellung sozialwissenschaftlicher items und skalen, Angelika Glöckner-Rist, 
ed., ZIS Version 12.00. Bonn: GESIS. 
Snyder, Mark. 1987. Public appearances/private realities: The psychology of self-
monitoring. New York: W. H. Freeman and Company. 
Wylie, Ruth C. 1974. The self-concept. Revised edition. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press. 
Zwick, William R. and Wayne F. Velicer. 1986. Comparison of five rules for determining 
the number of components to retain. Psychological Bulletin, vol. 99, pp. 432–442. 
Author 
John F. Rauthmann is currently studying psychology at the University of Innsbruck, 
Austria. His interests and research areas are personality and individual differences. 
Email: j.f.rauthmann@gmx.de 
Acknowledgements 
Special thanks go to Raimo P. Hämäläinen, Esa Saarinen, Mikko Martela, and Jukka 
Luoma for their useful help and comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. All 
remaining errors are the author’s. 
Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 108




Different psychometric criteria will have to be assessed for the preliminary Trait-SI 
scale. In the following, different “traditional” criteria of validity and reliability, which the 
Trait-SI scale should meet, are briefly outlined. 
Validity 
Validity refers to the extent to which the construct that should be measured by a certain 
measure is actually measured by this measure. This means that a scale aiming at measuring 
Trait-SI should indeed capture Trait-SI (or at least essential or constituting parts of it) and 
not measure (self-reported) intelligence or socio-emotional competences. The proposed 
scale is solely theoretically generated, and its validity needs to be evaluated in future empi-
rical studies. 
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Content validity 
Content validity refers to the extent to which a measure or rather its item content 
represents the construct that should be measured. Although this form of validity is not too 
often quantified, expert ratings can be used to evaluate whether the items are useful or not 
for a certain construct.  
Face validity 
Face validity refers to the ability of a measure to at least appear to superficially mea-
sure a certain construct (whether it may do this in fact or not). Face validity can be assessed 
by asking non-expert subjects (lay persons) whether the items account for SI aspects after 
giving them an introduction on what SI is and how it is mentally and behaviourally mani-
fested. Of course, face validity is not essential in all measures, and some constructs might 
even provoke social desirability through their face validity.  
Construct validity: convergent and discriminant (divergent) validity 
Convergent validity refers to the extent to which one construct is similar to another 
theoretically near construct (within a nomological network). This is often used to show that 
one particular construct can be assessed by several measures that claim to measure that 
same construct. Discriminant validity refers to the extent of which one construct is not si-
milar to certain other constructs (and should be lower than convergent correlations). Both 
forms of validity can be assessed in multitrait-multimethod analyses (Campbell and Fiske, 
1959). In the future, also Gardner’s multiple intelligences could be correlated with SI (if 
valid and reliable tests can be found)19. Yet, convergent validity cannot be clearly assessed 
as there are so far no valid and reliable scales to measure Trait-SI. However, one could find 
scales measuring certain constructs that are highly similar to sub-scales of the global SI or 
its subcomponents and explore correlations. 
Construct validity: factorial (structure) validity 
We should think about the structure of a scale that we expect: do we expect orthogonal 
or interrelated factors? Do we expect higher-order factors? Do we expect a hierarchical 
structure? Do we expect a circumplex? Why do or should we expect certain SI structures? 
These are questions that both theorisation and sound research ought to address. After 
excluding items that show poor content validity (they need not necessarily have high face 
validity, though), it might be advisable to reexamine the factorial structure of the TSIS. 
Also, it will be interesting to see which and how much items load on which and how much 
extracted factors. Further, the factor structure of the TSIS needs to be replicated in different 
samples. Future empirical studies should address these issues with both exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses. 
                                                 
19 We need to be careful when “mixing” abilities with traits here: The intelligences should be assessed as both abilities 
and traits (cf. Ability-, Integrative, and Mixed-Models) and then convergent and discriminant correlations can be 
computed. 
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Criterion validity: retrospective, concurrent, and predictive/prospective/prognostic 
validity 
Criterion validity refers to the extent to which the measured construct (predictor) can 
predict construct-related real-life phenomena or outcomes (criteria) either from the past 
(retrospective), at the moment (concurrent), or in the future (predictive, prognostic, 
prospective). The TSIS should especially be analysed concerning its criterion validity. For 
this, however, suitable indicators or criteria for (Trait-)SI need to be found. Future research 
should hence focus on investigating SI-related criteria (be they set in the past, present, or 
future), evaluating their specific relevance to certain aspects of (Trait-)SI, and eventually 
assessing the criterion validity of the scale.  
Incrementanl validity 
The most interesting “test” for SI will be its incremental validity: can Trait-SI predict 
relevant or critical real-life criteria when controlling socio-demographic variables (sex, age, 
education, socio-economic status, nationality, culture, etc.) and person variables 
(personality factors, intelligence, other forms of “intelligence”, etc.)? Should the scale not 
perform well on incremental validity, then this does not necessarily mean that SI should not 
be treated as a distinct construct; it might also be due to unsatisfactory item generation and 
poor operationalisation. However, should the scale perform well on incremental validity, 
then this is no guarantee that (Trait-)SI is actually measured – the scale measures something 
that is able to predict certain criteria above the controlled variables (but what exactly is 
measured and why it contributes an incremental portion to predictive variance remains 
unclear). Therefore, we ought to maximise content and construct validity for the SI scale 
before aiming at incremental validity or else findings will not be interpretable that easily. 
Additionally, (Trait-)SI should be integrated into a nomological network. 
Reliability 
Reliability refers to the extent of how consistently a construct is measured by a certain 
measure. This means that measures of long-term stable tendencies such as traits should 
have a high reliability: a person should not be very systems intelligent in week 1 and then 
not in week 2 or vice versa. This is referred to as test-retest reliability. However, reliability 
can also be assessed in other ways (e.g., by internal consistency). 
Internal consistency 
Internal consistency of a scale can be indexed by Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951; 
see also Cortina, 1993; Schmitt, 1996) with a range from .00 to theoretically 1.00 (which is 
practically never achieved, though). Cronbach’s alpha should not be mistaken as an index 
for dimensionality: a high alpha does not necessarily mean that the scale is unidimensional. 
Dimensionality should be investigated via factor analyses. Cronbach's alpha taps the 
consistency or homogeneity of a scale: if there are strong intercorrelations among items 
(which indicate that they are somehow tied together), then the scale, resulting from these 
items, can be expected to be homogeneous and show a high alpha.  
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Test-retest reliability 
Test-retest reliability concerns stability, that is when administering the measure of a 
certain construct at two (or more) times apart and correlating the obtained scores, then there 
should be high correlations suggesting a certain stability of the measurement and construct 
(if we are assessing a trait). This type of reliability is very important for Trait-SI as it 
should be a stable construct. Under the presumption that there are minimal variations in 
Trait-SI over time, test-retest correlations should be quite high or else the measure might 
capture more state-related aspects of SI. Cases of SI-training can be particularly 
problematic here: people might be able to train and further their SI to some extent but this 
refers mostly to Ability-SI. The relationships between ability- and Trait-SI have yet to be 
explored and it will be interesting to see whether an increase in Ability-SI is also 
accompanied by an increase in Trait-SI (i.e., the person’s values, self-descriptions, and 
traits have changed in some way)20. Then, test-retest reliability can be lower, indicating that 
a change has occurred.  
                                                 
20 Also, it would be interesting to investigate if one or both (ability-SI, trait-SI) can decrease and how and why this may be 
the case. 
Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 112
Appendix B.  
English Items German items (used in the study) Codings 
I perceive myself as part of a whole. Ich nehme mich als Teil eines Ganzen wahr. + 
I am usually aware of my surroundings and its influences on 
me. 
Ich bin mir meistens über meine Umgebung und 
dessen Einflüsse auf mich bewusst.  
+ 
I have an intuitive feeling for unspoken things. Ich habe ein intuitives Gefühl für 
unausgesprochene Dinge.  
+ 
I am usually not quite aware of the impact of my actions on 
my surroundings. 
Meistens bin ich mir nicht bewusst, welche 
Auswirkungen meine Handlungen auf meine 
Umgebung haben. 
– 
I feel as part of a bigger system. Ich empfinde mich als Teil eines größeren 
Systems. 
+ 
I observe my own interdependence within my surroundings. Ich beobachte eine wechselseitige Abhängigkeit 
von mir und meiner Umgebung. 
+ 
I have difficulties seeing things from different perspectives. Ich tue mich schwer, Dinge aus einer anderen 
Perspektive zu betrachten.  
– 
I am very well aware that I live and interact within a 
complex and dynamic system. 
Ich bin mir voll bewusst, dass ich in einem 
komplexen und dynamischen System interagiere. 
+ 
I can easily adopt the perspective of other people and “feel” 
what they are thinking and feeling. 
Ich kann leicht die Perspektive anderer 
einnehmen und fühlen, was sie denken und 
fühlen. 
+ 
I perceive myself as part of a whole, the influence of the 
whole upon myself, as well as my own influence upon the 
whole. 
Ich nehme mich selbst als Teil eines Ganzen, den 
Einfluss des Ganzen auf mich sowie meinen 
Einfluss auf das Ganze wahr. 
+ 
I would not describe my thinking as “holistic” and 
“intuitive”. 
Ich würde mein Denken nicht als „holistisch“ 
(ganzheitlich) und „intuitiv“ beschreiben. 
– 
I often ponder on my thoughts, feelings, intentions, and 
actions. 
Ich denke oft über meine Gedanken, Gefühle, 
Absichten und Handlungen nach.   
+ 
I would describe my thinking as quite “complex” and 
“interwoven”. 
Ich würde mein Denken als ziemlich „komplex“ 
und „verwoben“ beschreiben. 
+ 
I usually have no problems dealing with difficult and 
complex problems when going them through step by step in 
my mind. 
Ich habe normalerweise keine Schwierigkeiten 
mit komplexen und schweren Problemen, wenn 
ich diese in meinem Geist Stück für Stück 
durchgehe. 
+ 
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I am not a very self-reflexive and thoughtful person. Ich bin keine sehr selbst-reflexive und 
nachdenkliche Person. 
– 
I often ponder on others’ thoughts, feelings, intentions, and 
actions. 
Ich denke oft über Gedanken, Gefühle, Absichten 
und Handlungen anderer nach.  
+ 
I often think about my role in my surroundings. Ich denke oft über meine eigene Rolle in meiner 
Umgebung nach. 
+ 
I envision and identify productive ways of behaviour in my 
mind if confronted with complex problems. 
Im Geist vergegenwärtige ich mir und 
identifiziere produktive Verhaltensweisen, wenn 
ich mit einem komplexen Problem konfrontiert 
bin. 
+ 
My thinking is very action-oriented. Mein Denken ist sehr handlungsorientiert. + 
I am a very reflexive person. Ich bin eine sehr reflexive Person. + 
I am able to manage most of my everyday activities 
successfully. 
Ich bin der Lage, die meisten meiner alltäglichen 
Anforderungen erfolgreich zu meistern. 
+ 
I can adapt to varying situations quite flexibly. Ich kann mich sich ändernden 
Umgebungsbedingungen sehr flexibel anpassen. 
+ 
I can influence my surroundings, be they living or not. Ich kann meine belebte und unbelebte Umwelt 
beeinflussen. 
+ 
When confronted with complexity, I persevere until I have 
found a productive solution. 
Wenn ich mit komplexen Dingen konfrontiert 
bin, dann bemühe ich mich beharrlich, bis ich 
eine produktive Lösung dafür gefunden habe. 
+ 
I exercise productive ways of influence within my 
surroundings. 
Ich übe einen produktiven Einfluss innerhalb 
meiner Umgebung aus.  
+ 
I have difficulties adjusting my thoughts, feelings, and 
actions to my surroundings and situations. 
Ich habe Schwierigkeiten, meine Gedanken, 
Gefühle und Handlungen meiner Umgebung 
sowie Situationen anzupassen. 
– 
I usually cannot influence much in my surroundings. Meistens kann ich nicht viel in meiner Umgebung 
beeinflussen. 
– 
I tend to just do things right. Ich habe die Tendenz, Dinge „einfach richtig“ zu 
machen. 
+ 
I do not give up until I have achieved my goal. Ich gebe nicht auf, ehe ich mein Ziel erreicht 
habe.  
+ 
I sometimes have the feeling that there is not much what I 
can influence by my own actions. 
Ich habe manchmal das Gefühl, dass es nicht 
vieles gibt, was ich durch meine eigenen 
Handlungen beeinflussen kann. 
– 
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English Items Item content  SI concept References 
I perceive myself as part of a 
whole. 
attitude                                
self-description 
Whole is more important than parts. 
 
In our culture the human conceptual system 
emphasizes linear thinking, isolating thinking 
and seeing separate units rather than seeing 
wholes. Our perception mechanisms exhibit a 
similar tendency. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 52/53) 
I am usually aware of my 
surroundings and its 
influences on me. 
situational awareness    In our culture the human conceptual system 
emphasizes linear thinking, isolating thinking 
and seeing separate units rather than seeing 
wholes. 
Our perception mechanisms exhibit a similar 
tendency. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 
I have an intuitive feeling for 
unspoken things. 
intuition                              
description 
The behaviour of people often reflects their best 
guess of rational behaviour but that guess can be 
completely erroneous. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 
I am usually not quite aware 
of the impact of my actions 
on my surroundings. 
self-monitoring                   
description 
Human beings perceive themselves as 
independent individuals, yet they most often are 
encompassed in systems. 
 
In most systems, each subject separately reacts to 
the system without seeing the cumulative overall 
effect of the reactive behaviours on the others. 
Our perception mechanisms exhibit a similar 
tendency. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 
I feel as part of a bigger 
system. 
attitude Whole is more important than parts. Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 52) 
I observe my own 
interdependence within my 
surroundings. 
self-monitoring                   
 description 
Systems approach looks beyond isolated linear 
cause-and-effect chains for interconnections and 
interrelations. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 52) 
I have difficulties seeing 
things from different 
perspectives. 
empathy                             
 social competences 
Systems approach starts when you perceive the 
world through the eyes of another person. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 52) 
I am very well aware that I 
live and interact within a 
complex and dynamic 
system. 
attitude                               
 description 
Systems approach looks beyond isolated linear 
cause-and-effect chains for interconnections and 
interrelations. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 52) 
I can easily adopt the 
perspective of other people 
and “feel” what they are 
thinking and feeling. 
empathy                              
emotional intelligence 
Systems approach starts when you perceive the 
world through the eyes of another person. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 52) 
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I perceive myself as part of a 
whole, the influence of the 
whole upon myself, as well 
as my own influence upon 
the whole. 
attitudes                              
self-description 
In most systems, each subject separately reacts to 
the system without seeing the cumulative overall 
effect of the reactive behaviours on the others. 
Our perception mechanisms exhibit a similar 
tendency. 
 
“Part” and “Whole” are relative abstractions that 
are always subject to potential redefinition by 
changing the perspective. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 52/53) 
I would not describe my 
thinking as “holistic” and 
“intuitive”. 
thinking style Whole is more important than parts. 
 
In our culture the human conceptual system 
emphasizes linear thinking, isolating thinking 
and seeing separate units rather than seeing 
wholes. Our perception mechanisms exhibit a 
similar tendency. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 52/53) 
I often ponder on my 
thoughts, feelings, 
intentions, and actions. 
reflection                             
meta-cognition   
In our culture the human conceptual system 
emphasizes linear thinking, isolating thinking 
and seeing separate units rather than seeing 
wholes. Our perception mechanisms exhibit a 
similar tendency. 
 
Systems approach looks beyond isolated linear 
cause-and-effect chains for interconnections 
and interrelations. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 52/53) 
I would describe my thinking 
as quite “complex” and 
“interwoven”. 
thinking style In our culture the human conceptual system 
emphasizes linear thinking, isolating thinking 
and seeing separate units rather than seeing 
wholes. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 
I usually have no problems 
dealing with difficult and 
complex problems when 
going them through step by 
step in my mind. 
complex problem 
solving        
Human agents can influence entire systems. Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 52) 
I am not a very self-reflexive 
and thoughtful person. 
reflection (trait) Systems approach looks beyond isolated linear 
cause-and-effect chains for interconnections 
and interrelations. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 52) 
I often ponder on others’ 
thoughts, feelings, 
intentions, and actions. 
reflection                             
 meta-cognition 
In our culture the human conceptual system 
emphasizes linear thinking, isolating thinking 
and seeing separate units rather than seeing 
wholes. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 




In our culture the human conceptual system 
emphasizes linear thinking, isolating thinking 
and seeing separate units rather than seeing 
wholes. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 
I envision and identify 
productive ways of 
behaviour in my mind if 
confronted with complex 
problems. 
visualising                           
complex problem 
solving 
Much of the time, people display behaviours they 
would change if they only could see the 
bigger picture of the setting they are in. 
 
A system can make people act in some 
undesirable ways but as people act in such ways, 
they maintain the system and its influence upon 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 
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the others, partly causing the system of 
undesirable behaviours to regenerate itself. 
 
In most systems, each subject separately reacts to 
the system without seeing the cumulative 
overall effect of the reactive behaviours on the 
others. 
My thinking is very action-
oriented. 
thinking style Beliefs regarding structures produce behaviour. Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 
I am a very reflexive person. reflection (trait) Systems approach looks beyond isolated linear 
cause-and-effect chains for interconnections 
and interrelations. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 52) 
I am able to manage most of 
my everyday activities 
successfully. 
successful intelligence     
behaviour description 
Human agents can influence entire systems. 
 
There does not need to be an external reason for 
the particulars of a system, yet people in the 
system can feel helpless regarding their 
possibilities of changing the system. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 
I can adapt to varying 
situations quite flexibly. 
situational adaptability       
flexibility                            
There does not need to be an external reason for 
the particulars of a system, yet people in the 
system can feel helpless regarding their 
possibilities of changing the system. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 
I can influence my 
surroundings, be they living 
or not. 
social / emotional 
intelligence  
behaviour description 
Human agents can influence entire systems. 
 
There does not need to be an external reason for 
the particulars of a system, yet people in the 
system can feel helpless regarding their 
possibilities of changing the system. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 
When confronted with 
complexity, I persevere until 
I have found a productive 
solution. 
perseverance    
conscientiousness (trait)    
There does not need to be an external reason for 
the particulars of a system, yet people in the 
system can feel helpless regarding their 
possibilities of changing the system. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007) 
I exercise productive ways of 
influence within my 
surroundings. 
social / emotional 
intelligence    
behaviour description 
Human agents can influence entire systems. Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 
I have difficulties adjusting 
my thoughts, feelings, and 
actions to my surroundings 
and situations. 
social / emotional 
intelligence   
Much of the time, people display behaviours they 
would change if they only could see the 
bigger picture of the setting they are in. 
 
Systems approach starts when you perceive the 
world through the eyes of another person. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 52/53) 
I usually cannot influence 
much in my surroundings. 
social / emotional 
intelligence   
behaviour description 
There does not need to be an external reason for 
the particulars of a system, yet people in the 
system can feel helpless regarding their 
possibilities of changing the system. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 
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I tend to just do things right. (behavioural) intuition   
behaviour description 
The behaviour of people often reflects their best 
guess of rational behaviour but that guessan be 
completely erroneous. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 
I do not give up until I have 
achieved my goal. 
perseverance 
conscientiousness  
goal achievement               
Human agents can influence entire systems. Saarinen and Hämäläinen 
(2007, p. 53) 
I sometimes have the feeling 
that there is not much what I 
can influence by my own 
actions. 
social / emotional 
intelligence                 
(learned) helplessness 
There does not need to be an external reason for 
the particulars of a system, yet people in the 
system can feel helpless regarding their 
possibilities of changing the system. 
Saarinen and Hämäläinen 














The Social System of Systems Intelligence – 
A Study Based on Search Engine Method 
Kalevi Kilkki 
This essay offers an preliminary study on systems intelligence as a social 
system based on four cornerstones: writings using the terminology of systems 
intelligence, search engines, models to describe the behavior of social 
phenomena, and a theory of social systems. As a result we provide an 
illustration of systems intelligence field as a network of key persons. The main 
conclusion is that the most promising area for systems intelligence as social 
system is to systematically apply positive psychology to develop organizational 
management and to solve our everyday problems. 
Introduction
The social system of systems intelligence is an ambitious topic, particularly for a 
person without any formal studies in sociology. Moreover, systems intelligence is a novel 
area of science and, hence, the development of its social structures is in early phase. It is 
even possible to argue that there is not yet any social system of systems intelligence.  
The approach of this study is based on four cornerstones: first, the literature that has 
used concept of systems intelligence, second, search engines, third, models to describe the 
behavior of social phenomena, and forth, a theory of social systems. As a result we may be 
able to say something novel about the development of systems intelligence as a social 
system. 
As to the social systems this essay relies on the grand theory developed by Niklas 
Luhmann (Luhmann 1995).  One of the main statements of Luhmann is that social systems 
are systems of communication; even the mental processes of persons participating the 
communication process are excluded. Another key concept is environment that is, from the 
perspective of any social system, immensely complex. Other relevant terms are autopoiesis 
and binary code. All these concepts are relevant for any social system, including systems 
intelligence as a social system. 
A central assumption of this essay is that the term “systems intelligence” defines the 
limit of the social system of systems intelligence. Because any social system is 
communication (in Luhmann’s theory) we can observe the social system by observing the 
communication that somehow includes the term systems intelligence. Thus if the term 
“systems intelligence” is observed often enough, we may justifiably argue that the 
corresponding communication is part of the social system of systems intelligence. Note 
particularly that in this phase of analysis we do not need to assume any coherent group of 
Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 120
people that intentionally have formed a society of systems intelligence. However, for the 
autopoiesis of the social system (or for the survival of the concept), a formal society is 
obviously useful, or maybe even necessary.  
The paper is organized as follows. First we introduce the technical method applied in 
the paper called search engine method. The method is used to derive the list of most 
important systems intelligence names. The names are then located into a systems 
intelligence map based on the information about which names most often occur with each 
other. The map reveals seven subfields of systems intelligence. Moreover, the names are 
classified based on their emotional flavor that describes how often emotional concepts 
appear together with the name. In order to assess the future of systems intelligence we draw 
another map that includes only those persons that supposedly are still active and thus are 
able to contribute to the creation and development of the social system of systems 
intelligence. Finally, we provide some preliminary thoughts about the most promising 
future directions for the whole endeavour of systems intelligence. 
Search Engine Method 
The starting point of our analysis is that the social system of systems intelligence 
consists of communication that regularly uses the phrase of systems intelligence. Therefore, 
we can just observe any communication both in formal scientific papers and in any other 
communication media. Fortunately, nowadays this kind of research is quite straightforward 
thanks to powerful search engines, like Google, Yahoo, and Live Search. There is no lack 
of numerical information about any subject. Still we need to be careful with the 
interpretation of the numbers.  
I have applied a similar method to generate long tail distributions (Kilkki 2007), for 
instance, to describe distribution the most popular string of characters in the Internet: www, 
the, in, to, and, a, by, home, of, for, com, on, 1, etc. (etc is 446th on the list). The study also 
revealed some problems related to the number of results given by different search engines 
(see figure 11 in Kilkki, 2007).   
The search engine method adopted in this essay is the following. First we recognize a 
number of names that are somehow linked with systems intelligence. Note again that the 
persons themselves are excluded from the social system, while the names of the persons, of 
course, appear in the communication process related to systems intelligence (even when the 
person had not ever himself used the concept of systems intelligence). The second phase of 
the analysis is to identify those names that most often appear together with the concept of 
systems intelligence. The process is quite simple except that we need to have some insight 
about the potential names. Once again, the web provides several useful sites that give an 
overview about the topic and a lot of relevant names as well. In this process the primary 
source has been the Wikipedia pages about systems intelligence, systems thinking, Systems 
Theory, and Cybernetics.  
With the list of potential systems intelligence names we can start to use search engines 
and observe how many results we get with each name. For instance, a search “Peter Senge” 
“systems intelligence” produces 426 results in Google, 458 results in Yahoo, and 160 
results in Live Search. Note particularly that both the whole name and systems intelligence 
shall be in quotation marks. Sometimes the results by different search engines significantly 
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differ from each other, which makes it somewhat problematic to give an unambiguous 
definition for the importance of the name. Here we use the simple rule that systems 
intelligence score (SI-score) for a name is the median of the three results; for instance, the 
SI-score for Peter Senge is 426. The list of 38 names with SI-score of at least 50 is 
presented in Table 1. It is likely that some names that should appear in the list a missing. 
However, we can safely assume that this set of names gives a representative sample of SI-
names. 
Seven persons have SI-score higher than 100; we may call them the seven systems 
intellectuals. While only 16 out of 38 of the SI-persons are still alive, all top five SI persons 
are alive.  
The background of SI-persons is highly varying; there are mathematicians, engineers, 
psychologists, biologists, etc. Many of the SI-persons have studied several sciences. For 
instance, Wikipedia describes Gregory Bateson as anthropologist, social scientist, linguist, 
semiotician, and cyberneticist. Another interesting point is that many key persons have 
lived extraordinary and rich life; for instance Chilean Francisco Varela spent seven years in 
exile in USA during Pinochet’s regime, became a Tibetan Buddhist, and finally taught 
neuroscience at the University of Paris. We might even speculate that in order to see the 
world as an intelligent system one requires a kind of outsider perspective.  
Drawing the Systems Intelligence Map 
The second step in the study is to define the map of the systems intelligence names by 
observing how often each pair of names appears on the same web pages. A similar search 
engine approach as earlier can be used. However, at this phase only one search engine is 
used, in this case Live Search provided by Microsoft. For instance, according to Live 
Search, “Richard Dawkins” and “Stephen Jay Gould” together gives 114000 results, 
whereas “Richard Dawkins” and “Mihajlo D. Mesarovic” together gives only eight results. 
Because of these extreme variations it is not reasonable to assess the strength of 
relationship between two names directly by the number of results; instead, for each person 
we take into account the commonness order of the other SI-names. For instance, in case of 
Daniel Goleman, the most common names appearing with him are Howard Gardner 
(18600), Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (14100), Richard Dawkins (13500), and Peter Senge 
(10400).  
It is apparent that most of these results do not relate in any way to the concept of 
systems intelligence. However, it is not possible to restrict the search to those pages that 
also contain phrase “systems intelligence” because there are too few pages to allow any 
statistically significant study. Besides, the key idea is to measure the closeness of the names 
in general. Figure 1 shows the systems intelligence map drawn based purely on this web-
closeness information, in a way that a name is primarily situated close to the name that 
appears most often with the name. Unfortunately, it is hard to avoid some long connectors 
on a two-dimensional map. Actually, an essentially better map (in the sense that there are 
very few long connectors) would be obtained if it were possible to use two layers, one for 
theoretical field, and another one for applied field. In Figure 1 the applied part of systems 
intelligence is dispersed to the boundaries of the map, and particularly on the left side of the 
map.  
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Table 1. List of systems intelligence names 
 
Abbr. Name SI-score Orig. discipline Key concept 
ARa Anatol Rapoport 74 Psychology Tit-For-Tat 
ATu Alan Turing 80 Mathematics Turing machine 
BHB Bela H. Banathy 103 Linguistics White Stag leadership 
CFr Charles François  55 Commercial sc. Systemics 
CSh Claude Shannon 53 Engineering Information theory 
DBo David Bohm 53 Physics Thought as a system 
DGo Daniel Goleman 120 Psychology Emotional intelligence 
DMe Donella Meadows 76 Enviromental sc. Limits to growth 
ELo Edward Lorenz 54 Mathematics Butterfly effect 
ESa Esa Saarinen 1180 Philosophy Systems intelligence 
FVa Francisco Varela 63 Biology Neurophenomenology 
GBa Gregory Bateson 101 Anthropology Criteria of mind 
GKl George Klir 50 Computer sc. Systems science 
GWe Gerald M. Weinberg 57 Psychology Law of Twins 
HGa Howard Gardner 171 Psychology Multiple intelligences 
HMa Humberto Maturana 65 Biology Autopoiesis 
HOd Howard T. Odum 59 Ecology Ecological modeling  
HvF Heinz von Foerster 63 Physics Doomsday Equation 
IPr lya Prigogine 60 Chemistry The End of Certainty 
JHo John Holland 73 Psychology Six personality traits 
JLu Jukka Luoma 64 Engineering  
JPi Jean Piage 89 Philosophy Four development stages 
LvB L. von Bertalanffy 95 Biology General systems theory 
MCs M. Csikszentmihalyi 50 Psychology Flow 
MDM Mihajlo D. Mesarovic 53 Engineering GLOBESIGHT 
MMe Margaret Mead 56 Anthropology Primitive Societies 
MWh Margaret Wheatley 50 Management Systems thinking 
NLu Niklas Luhmann 72 Law Social systems 
NWi Norbert Wiener 79 Mathematics Cybernetics 
PCh Peter Checkland 59 Management Soft System Methodology 
PSe Peter Senge 426 Engineering The Fifth Discipline 
RDa Richard Dawkins 96 Biology The selfish gene 
RPH Raimo P. Hämäläinen 327 Engineering Dynamic game theory 
SBe Stafford Beer 56 Business POSIWID 
SJG Stephen Jay Gould 54 Biology Punctuated equilibrium 
TPa Talcott Parsons 55 Sociology Action theory 
WCh West Churchman 97 Philosophy To secure improvement 









Figure 1. The map of systems intelligence. For name A, name B occurs most often with it 
in the web, followed by names C, D and E. B belongs to the seven systems intellectuals 
(SI-score > 100).  Arrows with numbers indicate subfields (see list below). 
 
We can identify several subfields with key persons as follows: 
 
1) Mathematical basis: Claude Shannon – Norbert Wiener  
 
2) General systems theory: C. West Churchman – Ludwig von Bertalanffy 
 















































Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 124
4) Systems thinking: Peter Senge – Peter Checkland 
 
5) Psychology: Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi – Daniel Goleman  
 
6) Biology: Richard Dawkins – Stephen Jay Gould  
 
7) Systems intelligence group: Esa Saarinen – Raimo P. Hämäläinen 
 
As the Figure 1 shows there are no clear boundaries between the subfields, and some 
persons might even belong to several subfields. Note also that this map is very specific 
viewpoint defined by the concept of systems intelligence. A similar study with another 
concept may results in a different structure. Each subfield is just a sample of the huge area 
of the corresponding discipline. We may say that by using a specific concept and the search 
engine method, we select the highest peaks of each discipline from the specific viewpoint 
(here systems intelligence). Then the other step that defines the closeness of those peaks is 
used to draw a map across the disciplines. However, systems intelligence seems to be a 
specific concept in the sense that the highest peaks locate in so many diverse disciplines. 
Systems intelligence is a concept that has a strong creative flavor, and thus requires a 
multidisciplinary approach.  
As to theoretical subfield, systems theory lies on a solid mathematical basis. Certainly, 
Claude Shannon and Alan Turing have been important for systems theory by defining the 
strict limits related to how information can be processed and transmitted within any system. 
As to the field of modern general systems theory, Lars Skyttner (1996) lists as the key 
persons Kenneth E. Boulding, T. Downing Bowler, C. West Churchman, Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy, and Joseph A. Litterer. Only Churchman and von Bertalanffy exceed the SI-
score threshold of 50, Boulding was quite close with SI-score of 44, while Bowler and 
Litterer have quite low SI-scores.  In general, it seems that most of the important 
contributions in these theoretical fields have made during the 20th century. Thus, it is 
uncertain whether we should expect any major discovery in this theoretical basis that would 
have a significant effect on systems intelligence – but we cannot be sure.  
Sociology and biology are, of course, very active fields, although there are not any 
particularly young persons on our SI-list. From systems intelligence viewpoint systems 
thinking and psychology are most important and active fields.    
Emotional Flavor 
Next we consider a key question of this paper: what kind of issues does the social 
system of systems intelligence consider compared to other closely related fields? The 
approach is, once again, based on the results obtained by search engines.  
To formally analyze the difference between the fields or persons, we define emotional 
flavor (EF) as follows: 
 
( )
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where Ri is the number of results given by Live Search for the search “forename surname” 
“ith term” (if there is no results, Ri = 1). The terms are 
 
(1) happiness  (5)  problem 
(2) meaning of life  (6)  efficiency 
(3) self-actualization  (7)  proof 
(4) satisfaction  (8)  theory 
 
For instance, search “Gregory Bateson” “meaning of life” gives 830 results, and with 
other search results Gregory Bateson gets EF of 9.9 %. Thus, the more scientific and 
problem-oriented text appears in the web together with the given name, the smaller the 
emotional flavor. There are vast variations between the names from George Klir (EF = 1.6 
%) to Daniel Goleman (EF = 22 %).  Figure 2 illustrates how the EF values vary over the 
systems intelligence field. As could be expected, top scientist with theoretical background, 
like Claude Shannon, Alan Turing and Norbert Wiener have low EF, which means that 
theoretical concepts occur very often with their names. The average EF over the SI-persons 
listed in Table 1 is 7.6 %. For comparison we can take some randomly selected names (that 
is, names without any dominant person): EF for Thomas Jones is 3.7 % and EF for Paula 
Smith is 5.9 %.  
The above analysis is based rather on names than persons, because we did not expect 
any own activity of the person, only that the name has appeared together with systems 
intelligence. Of course, for majority of the persons mentioned in the SI-list any activity 
would be impossible as they have not been alive during the relatively short existence of 
systems intelligence as a systematically used concept. As to the future of systems 
intelligence as a social system, it is obvious that some key persons will have a decisive role. 
Table 2 shows a list of persons that are still alive and are supposedly active; here we 
assume that person is still active if he or she is born 1940 or later. Of course, this crude 
criterion may leave out some people that still may affect the formation of systems 
intelligence as a systematic concept.  
Particularly with the alive persons, it is very likely that several persons are missed, 
because the threshold for SI-score is as low as 10. On the contrary, it is quite probable that 
there are not many unidentified persons with SI-score above 30. In addition to the group led 
by Esa Saarinen, there are very few persons that are actively using the concept of systems 
intelligence: if the term appears 10 or 20 times in the same web pages as a name, it is only 
an indication that the person has potential to become active actor in the systems intelligence 
field. 
The main difference between the two SI-maps shown in Figures 1 and 3 is that with all 
SI-persons (Fig. 1) there is a strong theoretically oriented area on the right side of the map 
whereas in case of active SI-persons (Fig. 3) there is not any clear area of theoretical 
persons. Although some active SI-persons have strong theoretical basis, such as 
Feigenbaum, Yorke and Wolfram, they are located rather on the boundaries of the SI-map. 
The centre of the SI-map is occupied by persons that primarily apply the SI-concept on 
personal development or on management problems. 
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Figure 3 also shows the emotional flavor of active SI-persons. The average EF over the 
active SI-persons listed in Table 2 is 11.6 % or about 50 % higher than the average EF of 
all SI-persons listed in Table 1. This significant difference also indicates that the most 
natural application for systems intelligence seems to be in the development of emotionally 







Figure 2. Emotional flavor (EF) of systems intelligence names. A:  EF > 13%, B: 13% > EF 
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Table 2. List of active systems intelligence persons 
 
Abbr. Name SI-score 
Original  
discipline Key concept 
AdB Alain de Botton 20 Philosophy How Proust can change your 
life 
BKe Bradford Keeney 20 Psychology Creativity in therapy 
BKo Bart Kosko  14 Engineering Fuzzy thinking 
DGo Daniel Goleman 120 Psychology Emotional intelligence 
DHa Debora Hammond 14 History Health and healing 
DHo Douglas Hofstadter 26 Physics Strange loop 
ESa Esa Saarinen 1180 Philosophy Systems intelligence 
HGa Howard Gardner 171 Psychology Multiple intelligences 
JAY James A. Yorke 13 Mathematics Chaotic systems 
JCo Jim Collins 13 Business Built to last 
JLu Jukka Luoma 64 Engineering  
LSk Lars Skyttner 14 Systems 
science 
General systems theory 
MCJ Michael C. Jackson 13 Philosophy Critical systems thinking 
MFe Mitchell 
Feigenbaum 
12 Physics Feigenbaum constant 
MGl Malcolm Gladwell 19 Journalism The tipping point 
MLo Marcial Losada 22 Psychology Meta learning model 
MMa Mikko Martela 45 Engineering  
MSe Martin Seligman 15 Psychology Learned helplessness 
PHi Pekka Himanen 15 Philosophy Hacker ethic 
PLi Petri Lievonen 13 Engineering  
PSe Peter Senge 426 Engineering The fifth discipline 
RCo Randall Collins 19 Sociology Interaction ritual chains 
RDa Richard Dawkins 96 Biology The selfish gene 
RJo Rachel Jones 11 Literature Management communication 
RPH Raimo P. 
Hämäläinen 
327 Engineering Dynamic game theory 
SWo Stephen Wolfram 18 Physics Cellular automata 
WBA W. Brian Arthur 12 Economics Increasing returns 










Figure 3. The systems intelligence map of active persons 
Future of Systems Intelligence 
Now we can consider the major question of this essay: what will be the future of 
systems intelligence as a social system?  
Systems intelligence as a genuine social system requires a strong enough community of 
active people. But then the community as a social system inevitable needs to consider and 
maintain its own future, or its autopoiesis. One requirement for a successful autopoiesis is 
that the social system is able to distinguish itself clearly enough from its environment. In 
case of systems intelligence, the environment includes well-established areas identified in 
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psychology, and biology. The most important neighbours for SI are scientific community in 
general, systems thinking as a more pragmatic field, and psychology as a field of personal 
development. For a successful autopoiesis, systems intelligence must be able first to define 
a clear enough difference with neighbouring fields, and secondly to form close enough 
relationship with those fields.   
Systems Intelligence as a Scientific Community 
As to the relationship with the scientific community in general, the key question is 
whether systems intelligence wants to position itself inside the scientific community. 
Systems intelligence as a scientific discipline is quite a problematic approach, because for 
science the binary code, to apply Luhmann’s (1995) terminology, is true/false. If systems 
intelligence wants to use this strict code, it has to consider very carefully what questions 
can be truly assessed by the true/false code. Furthermore, to gain recognition in the 
scientific field requires, first, publications in respected forums and, secondly, a lot of 
citations to those publications. As the competition in the scientific field is extremely hard, it 
is mandatory to carefully obey all the rules of scientific research and dissemination of 
results. A strictly scientific approach might lead to situation in which systems intelligence 
loses its strong holistic perspective and starts to concentrate to those specific issues that can 
be formally studied by scientifically respectable methods, for instance by means of 
sophisticated statistical techniques. As Esa Saarinen (2008) has expressed his way of 
thinking, “philosophy helps the manager in the challenge of figuring out what cannot be 
decided by facts and information.” If something cannot be decided by facts, it is very 
difficult to apply a true/false code. Instead, systems intelligence shall look towards the 
opposite direction, to the outcomes of certain way of behaving.  
Saarinen and Hämäläinen (2004) have defined systems intelligence as intelligent 
behavior in the context of complex systems involving interaction and feedback. What is 
true intelligence and what is false intelligence, anyway? Intelligent behavior implies the 
ability to cope with new situations and problems. In case of new situations in complex 
systems, it will be extremely difficult to scientifically prove that some behavior is 
intelligent. In many cases, the objective of systems intelligence is rather to develop skills 
that makes it possible for persons acting in a system to identify the uniqueness of the 
situation and then to cleverly act according to the achieved understanding for the benefit of 
the whole system. Due to the uniqueness of various situations, it will be very tricky to 
replicate studies and to gather material for statistical analysis. Moreover, it is extremely 
difficult to define whether the outcome of a separate action was beneficial or not, or what 
the consequences actually were (because it would be impossible to return exactly back to 
the same situation, to make another decision, ceteris paribus, and then to compare the 
consequences of those two actions).   
Systems Intelligence vs. Systems Thinking 
One of the basic remarks of systems intelligence is that the reason for many observable 
phenomena in complex systems is in the structure of the system rather than in any separate 
actions. Then a natural question to be studied is how the structure of the social system 
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influences the success of the system. Thus if systems intelligence wants to make significant 
scientific contributions, a promising area is to study system structures and how they can be 
changed by means of cleverly selected actions. However, general systems theory has 
already a long tradition on the theoretical part of that area. Thus in order to provide own 
contributions systems intelligence needs to emphasise intelligence as a research topic. Still, 
to take that direction seems to resemble the fundamental approach of systems thinking.  
As Jones and Corner (2007) have noticed, systems intelligence has a more personal 
emphasis compared to systems thinking that focuses more on objective modelling. 
However, if we take the two key persons representing systems thinking and systems 
intelligence, there is no difference between the Emotional Flavors:  
 
- Systems Thinking: Peter Senge’s EF = 10.5 %, Michael C. Jackson’s EF = 4.9 % 
 
- Systems intelligence: Esa Saarinen’s EF = 10.6 %, Raimo P. Hämäläinen’s EF = 4.7 % 
 
According to Michael Jackson (2003), “systems thinking is holistic rather than 
reductionist and, at least in the form of critical systems thinking, does everything possible 
to encourage creativity”. In this respect systems intelligence and systems thinking visibly 
resemble each other. However, the main criterion for successful System Thinking seems to 
be the efficiency of management, at least if we consider the central books about systems 
thinking, written by Senge (1990) and Jackson (2003). Thus the final criterion for good 
systems thinking seems to be the benefit of the organization which the person is working 
with. In a commercial company the benefit means economical success. Consequently, the 
best systems thinking book gives the best advices to increase the efficiency of management 
in complex organizations. The endeavour of systems intelligence goes farther, both to the 
direction of individuals and to the direction of the whole society. 
Systems Intelligence vs. Positive Psychology 
If systems intelligence goes deeply in to the area of another disciplines, like psychology 
or systems theory, it had to accept the methods, concepts and principles of those 
disciplines. General systems theory seems to be too theoretical as a sole framework for the 
development of systems intelligence. Although general systems theory offers a lot of 
valuable insight to be applied within systems intelligence, systems thinking is already a 
sensible approach to apply general systems theory in practical problems. The additional 
value of systems intelligence, compared to systems thinking, might be based on more 
thorough application of psychology, particularly positive psychology.  
In the systems intelligence map shown in Figure 3, the key names representing 
psychology are Martin Seligman (EF = 29.5 %), Daniel Coleman (22.5 %), Bradford 
Keeney (25.0 %), and Howard Gardner (13.4 %). Furthermore, another key name from 
systems intelligence perspective is Barbara Fredrickson with as high EF as 32.8 % (see also 
Rönkkönen, 2010).  
However, rather than to directly contribute to positive psychology, the scholarly role of 
systems intelligence might be to transmit the message of positive psychology particularly 
towards all managers that have to cope with complex organizations.  In this sense systems 
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intelligence comes close to the positive organizational scholarship (see Cameron et al., 
2003). 
Conclusions 
As a social system, it would be useful for systems intelligence to define a binary code, 
something similar to true/false used in scientific domain, or information/non-information 
applied by mass media. However, it might be that if the objective of systems intelligence is 
to support human flourishing, as Esa Saarinen (2008) has defined his personal ambition, it 
will be very difficult to define a single binary code. Niklas Luhmann (1998) stated that 
although most symbolic generalizations are binary coded, it is not possible to find any 
binary code for empassioned love. As Dustin Kidd (1999) has expressed it, love, more than 
any other social system, is characterized by contingency and fluidity. Human flourishing is 
a similar concept, evasive, and hard to formalize and compress to a binary code. But it 
might indeed be that a social system’s autopoiesis requires binary code. Someone may even 
argue that a binary code will inevitably emerge when a social system grows sufficiently 
large.   
However, I would argue that systems intelligence is as much art as it is science– art of 
systems, or even art of life. But how, then, can the social system of systems intelligence 
live in the middle area without the support of any established social structure, like science, 
art, or economy? 
It would be useful to apply the key principles and methods of systems intelligence to 
systems intelligence. However, that effort is problematic if for any working inside the SI-
field, for the reasons discussed by Pronin (2006) and Palonen (2010). On the other hand, it 
is not possible to investigate systems intelligence as a social system without intervening in 
the social system of systems intelligence; this is an obvious paradox. But the paradoxical 
nature of the effort means that we indeed need creative intelligence to sustain the endeavour 
of systems intelligence. An example of this kind of intelligence is presented by Ella 
Rönkkönen (2010) in her essay in which she applies the concept and methods of catalysts 
to consider the effects of positive emotions. 
Therefore, a promising approach is to define systems intelligence as a framework rather 
than as a social system. The SI-framework makes it possible for all of us to create new 
insight to cope with the environment in which we live our everyday life, the extremely 
complex global society. The framework facilitates the transmission of insight and 
information between different disciplines (systems theory, psychology, sociology, etc.) and 
our everyday life. Persons primarily working in any other field are welcome to participate 
in the construction work of systems intelligence framework. 
However, even the term framework per se is problematic because it does not naturally 
include the essential creative flavor of systems intelligence. Even more than a framework 
systems intelligence is a mindset that stimulates our capabilities to be aware of holistic 
system level phenomena and to use positive emotions to benefit both our personal life and 
the social systems we are living in. 
 
Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 132
References 
Cameron, Kim S., Jane E. Dutton,  and Robert E. Quinn.  (2003). Foundations  of  positive  
organizational  scholarship. In Positive organizational scholarship, K. S. Cameron, J. E. 
Dutton, and R. E. Quinn, eds., San Fransisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler.  
Jones, Rachel and Corner James. 2007. Systems intelligence and its relationship to 
communication theories, in Systems intelligence in leadership and everyday life, Raimo 
P. Hämäläinen and Esa Saarinen, eds., Helsinki University of Technology.  
Jackson, Michael C. 2003. Systems thinking: creative holism for managers. Chichester, 
England: John Wiley and Sons. 
Kidd, Dustin. 1999. How do I love thee? No really, how? Theory, literary history, and 
theory in Luhmann's love as passion. URL: http://xroads.virginia.edu/~MA99/kidd/ 
resume/ luhmann.html [2010-25-02]. 
Kilkki, Kalevi. 2007. A practical model for analyzing long tails. First Monday, vol. 12, no. 
5. 
Luhmann, Niklas. 1995. Social systems, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
(German orig. and English tran.) 
Luhmann, Niklas. 1998. Love as passion; The codification of intimacy. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998. (Originally published in 1982 by Suhrkamp Verlag as Liebe als 
Passion: Zur Codierung von Intimitat) 
Luhmann, Niklas. 2000. The reality of the mass media, Cambridge: Polity Press; Stanford, 
CA. 
Palonen, Otso. 2010. Systems thinking and learning with the systems intelligence 
perspective. In Essays on Systems Intelligence, Raimo P. Hämäläinen and Esa Saarinen, 
eds., Systems Analysis Laboratory, Aalto University School of Science and Technology, 
Espoo, Finland. 
Pronin, Emily. 2006. Perception and misperception of bias in human judgement. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 37–43. 
Rönkkönen, Ella and Esa Saarinen. 2010. Fredrickson’s broaden-and-build theory, 
chemical engineering, and systems intelligence.  In Essays on Systems Intelligence, 
Raimo P. Hämäläinen and Esa Saarinen, eds., Systems Analysis Laboratory, Aalto 
University School of Science and Technology, Espoo, Finland. 
Saarinen, Esa. 2008. Philosophy for managers: Reflections of a practitioner. Philosophy of 
Management, vol. 7, supplement. 
Saarinen, Esa, and Raimo P. Hämäläinen. 2004. Systems intelligence: Connecting 
engineering thinking with human sensitivity. In Systems intelligence: Discovering a 
hidden competence in human action and organizational life, Raimo P. Hämäläinen and 
Esa Saarinen, eds. Espoo: Helsinki University of Technology, Systems Analysis 
Laboratory, pp. 9–38. 
Senge, Peter. 1990. The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization. 
New York: Currency Doubleday. 
Chapter 5: The Social System of Systems Intelligence – A Study Based on Search Engine Method 
 133
Senge, Peter, Bryan Smith, Sara Schley, Joe Laur, and Nina Kruschwitz. 2008. The 
necessary revolution: How individuals and organizations are working together to create 
a sustainable world. US Green Building Council. 
Skyttner, Lars. 1996. General systems theory, origin and hallmarks. Kybernetes, vol. 25, 
no. 6, pp. 16–22. 
Author 
The author is working as chief research scientist at the Department of Communications 
and Networking, Aalto University. He has published one book and several articles dealing 





Systems Thinking and Learning with the 
Systems Intelligence Perspective 
Otso Palonen 
This article delves into the systemic dimensions of learning, particularly in the 
sense of non-conceptual, intuitive learning. Even though complex situations and 
problems may be beyond our ability to reason, we as human beings still possess 
intuitive tools for solving problems and learning from and of our environment. 
These tools, while present in every human being, are not necessarily being used 
to their fullest potential. Combining them with simulative learning 
environments may open up new vistas for learning, both for the individual and 
for groups. 
Introduction
Even though the surrounding world continues to dazzle us with its complexity and 
ever-evolving nature, we still somehow manage to hang on. Much of our learning happens 
at a non-conceptual level and we realize a lot more of the underlying causal relations than 
would at first glance seem to be possible. Inbuilt mechanisms drive our learning and 
understanding, and because of that, we act intelligently even when no apparent framework 
to leverage with reason is available. 
The question then is whether or not we should be more aware of these mechanisms and 
ways we can take advantage of them to further our understanding of the world and of 
ourselves. And if the answer is yes, how can such awareness arise other than through sheer 
life experience? This paper argues that simulations may prove to be useful for enhanced 
understanding of the world we live in and the systems we interact with. 
Systems Thinking as a Tool for Understanding the World 
John D. Sterman is a leading advocate and a pioneer in the movement that is called 
systems dynamics. His book Business Dynamics (Sterman 2000) is a comprehensive work 
that, for many people, is bound to help them understand how complex systems work. In the 
book and in his article, Learning in and about complex systems, Sterman argues that the 
human capacity to understand complex systems is woefully inadequate, and much practice 
is needed to properly understand the various causal relationships between variables. For 
example, if presented with a simple causal relationship, such as the inflow to and outflow 
from a bathtub, most people are unable to infer correctly the behavior of the amount of 
water in the tub. Even when presented with a simplified explanation of the system, it still is 
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not readily apparent how the system will behave. The problem is even more evident with 
real-world systems of complexity, in which it is difficult to comprehend the causal 
relationships or to be able to predict the system’s behavior intuitively. 
Sterman presents more detailed examples in the book. Car manufacturers in the USA 
used to offer very short term lease plans for their cars, reckoning that it would boost their 
sales as new cars would be perceived by customers as easier and less risky to acquire. What 
they did not take into account was the fact that after a certain delay, the used car market 
would be flooded with these almost-new vehicles and thus,  even less people would hold on 
to their car after the lease period expired (lowering used car prices and thus creating a 
positive feedback loop in which even more people would off-lease their vehicle) and even 
more damagingly to the car companies, cheap, good-condition used cars heavily undercut 
the sales of new cars, hitting the companies’ profits hard. This is an example of a seemingly 
rational move (boosting car sales in the short term) that, due to the nature of the whole 
system which in the initial decision-making went unnoticed, ends up achieving just the 
opposite of what was desired, in this case, lowering new car sales substantially. 
These examples demonstrate how oblivious we can be to the systems around us. What's 
even more, even if we are presented with explanations of these systems, such as causal 
charts, sets of equations etc. we still cannot bring ourselves to comprehend the true inner 
workings of the systems. As Sterman points out, we often act in an event-based manner, 
disregarding any possible delays. Most of the things we are adept at, such as riding a 
bicycle, offer instantaneous feedback of our performance and allow us to quickly change 
our behavior accordingly. Our brains are hardwired to learn quickly in a situation like that, 
and a task like riding a bicycle which would seem insurmountable given all the equations of 
friction, gravity, velocity and inertia that are the mathematical representation of it, is 
entirely doable with a little practice. Unfortunately, as delays between action and result, 
cause and effect are introduced, our inbuilt learning mechanisms have a much harder time 
of coping with them. Systems thinking is a movement that seeks to help people develop 
mental tools to comprehend these complex networks of intertwined causes and effects. 
The Mental Framework 
Systems thinking, as a discipline, recognizes the importance of mental models. Mental 
models are, in the words of a leading systems thinking advocate, Barry Richmond, 
“selective abstractions of reality that you carry around in your head.” (Richmond 1997). 
The whole concept of a mental model revolves around explicit knowledge:  “If you wish to 
employ non-rational means (like gut feel and intuition) in order to arrive at a conclusion or 
a decision, no mental model is needed. But, if you want to think… you can’t do so without 
a mental model.” (Richmond 1997) Mental models are constructs that are semi-reachable 
from consciousness in the sense that we are aware of them (at least once we’ve been given 
the idea of a mental model), but are tacit in the sense that they are not easily explicated as 
discussed by Sterman in “Expert knowledge elicitation to improve formal and mental 
models” (Sterman 1998). 
Mental models are also featured prominently in the visual description of the learning 
process that Sterman provides in his paper “Learning in and about complex systems”; this 
diagram is reproduced in Figure 1.  








Decision Rules Mental Models  
 
Figure 1. The learning process (Sterman 2000b) 
 
The figure unfolds as follows. We make observations of the real world and based on 
those, we make decisions which in turn influence the world. This is what could be called 
the main loop in the chart. However, we base our actions on previous interactions with the 
world. These are represented in the mental models, which are our inner models of the 
outside world based on all previous interactions. Based on these mental models, we 
formulate strategies and heuristics for dealing with the real world, which in turn guide our 
decisions. It is important to note that the interaction between the feedback we get from the 
world and our mental models is two-way; new information shapes our mental models but in 
turn we view feedback from the world through the glasses of our existing mental models. 
Mental models are important to how we interact with the world. Sterman puts it thus: “on 
the contrary, our world is actively constructed – modeled – by our sensory and cognitive 
structures.” (Sterman 2000b) Thus we can expect that more refined mental models result in 
more accurate actions, resulting in a better input/output relationship between perceptions 
and actions. On the other hand, even a small distortion in the mental models can change the 
way we perceive a phenomenon, and because it can further reinforce itself in the loop, the 
bias may end up as a dominant factor for the phenomenon in question. Thus even small 
biases can distort the mental models severely, if they are based on a narrow experience 
base. 
If learning involves evolution of the mental models, which are the cornerstone of our 
conceptual understanding of the world, certain requirements for effective learning can be 
identified on the basis of Sterman’s learning process. First of all, a large exposure to new 
things is necessary to form a proper mental model about them. A narrow base of experience 
will lead to biased views of the phenomenon in question. A major issue to consider here is 
the human incapability to see the stochastic nature of the world we live in, that things that 
work one time might not the next time, since other relevant parameters will have changed, 
even if the agent’s actions are precisely the same. We will return to this issue later on when 
discussing simulation as a way to gather experience about unfamiliar situations and 
environments, and the effects of our actions on them.   
Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 138
Secondly, it is necessary to get accurate feedback in order to learn properly. If feedback 
is incomplete, distorted or delayed, learning is severely impaired. Like previously 
mentioned, the human mind is not by default conditioned to cope with noisy and delayed 
feedback, though the capability can be improved. A classic example of this is the Simple 
Beer Distribution Game (for a detailed description, see Sterman 1992), where a very simple 
system goes out of control simply because the players do not take deterministic delays into 
account while playing. Simulation can help in this as well.  
The third requirement is that a person needs to have an open mind and be able to re-
evaluate the existing mental models, without starting a trench war against new ideas. This 
might in some sense be the area in which systems intelligence can make the largest 
contribution. Re-examination of current mental models can be hard, but questioning them is 
vital to learning. This also involves contextuality of the lessons learned, because learning in 
one environment can also yield valuable lessons regarding other types of situations.  
If all of these three criteria are met, false, biased or incomplete mental models will be 
exposed and corrected efficiently, and the learning process can work in a more optimal 
manner. However, not all learning rests on explicit mental models. 
Systems Intelligence and Non-Conceptuality 
If we consider the fact that it is unadvantageous or even impossible to present all 
information explicitly, shouldn’t we also take this into account when considering learning? 
Objectivization of knowledge and striving towards more explicit information is a valuable 
tool for codifying information, but a large part of learning happens at a non-conceptual, 
non-representative manner. Like Hämäläinen and Saarinen (2008) put it, “those that are 
‘teaching’ might not even know what they are teaching, nor might they be able to point to 
any objectively identifiable representations of the systems structures they in fact employ, 
and still people learn, via a kind of ‘making a lot out of a little’ systems capability that 
Bruner identifies in children.” This stands in stark contrast with Richmond’s claim that 
“…unless a mental model changes, learning does not occur!” (Richmond 1997). If mental 
models are explicit, and no learning occurs without them changing, does this mean no 
implicit learning can occur? 
Hubert Dreyfus addressed implicit knowledge in his presidential address (Dreyfus 
2005) Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit from the 
Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise. In the address, he takes expertise into focus and 
argues that through practice, a tacit form of learning occurs which eventually causes the 
learner to become more than competent in a given skill, and becomes an expert. However, 
an expert is unable to explain why he decides to act in a particular way. As Dreyfus puts it, 
“…the master may make moves that are entirely intuitive and contrary to any preconceived 
plan. In such instances, when asked why he did what he did, he may be at a loss to 
reconstruct a reasoned account of his actions because there is none.” 
Dreyfus puts forward an example in the form of lightning chess. This type of chess 
game involves the players making their moves very quickly (in less than a second per 
move), so that the whole game lasts less than two minutes. Yet, these games, when played 
by chess Grandmasters, are as complex as normal Master level games. Dreyfus notes, “At 
this speed he (the Grandmaster) must depend entirely on perception and not at all on 
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analysis and comparison of alternatives.” The Grandmaster doesn’t think his moves, but 
rather just simply reacts to the patterns on the board. In this sense, a task as complex as 
playing chess can be non-conceptual. What the chess grandmaster has developed is not a 
complete mental model of the game, but rather a “feeling of a system” (Hämäläinen and 
Saarinen 2008), in this case, the feeling of the system of chess. 
Another relevant example could be jazz improvisation. A jazz musician accumulates 
the skills needed to jam with a band during his whole playing career, and the patterns the 
band weaves through playing together can be complex indeed, even though there is no 
central guiding rules except for a few, such as the scale etc. However, the musician would 
be, just like the chess master, at a loss to explain why certain passages need to follow others 
in the song; he just knows it. Moreover, unlike in chess, where a supercomputer could find 
the rationale behind some move, in jazz improvisation no formal explanation can be 
constructed algorithmically. It’s not just that the associated decision-making is non-
conceptual but the whole process is non-conceptual. This is what Hämäläinen and Saarinen 
(2006) talk about when they say “…human activities that worked, even when there was no 
theory to explain why they worked, or even a recognized need for a theory.” 
To help comparison between the more conceptual mental models and the non-
conceptual, implicit knowledge, let us call the latter “tacit models”. An example of a tacit 
model would be the model which guides bicycle riding, or guitar playing. While obvious 
that there is some mental construct at work in these activities, the concept of a mental 
model does not fit the bill very well. First, it is almost impossible to articulate anything 
about the nature of tacit models, and second, they can only be acquired through personal 
experience. Tacit models are a sort of “feeling of a system”. 
To illuminate the concept of tacit models further, let us take an example of a case in 
which a tacit model is not strictly rational, yet effective none the less. Sterman argues in his 
book that model boundaries must be carefully considered so as to include all phenomena 
which have two-way causalities with the phenomenon to be studied, and that in 
constructing models it is necessary to “challenge the clouds”. In Learning in and about 
complex systems Sterman recounts a story of a baseball batting champion, Wade Boggs, 
who always ate chicken before a game after performing particularly well after a chicken 
meal. As Sterman argues, of course eating chicken in itself did not further the batter’s 
skills. But here we need to bring Sterman’s own points to bear on himself and “challenge a 
cloud” by asking whether or not the mental state and constructs of the batsman can be left 
out from his system of batting? Even though in “the scientific worldview” there is no causal 
relationship between eating chicken and batting well, if eating chicken serves as a lucky 
charm which makes the batter believe in himself (even if this is completely irrational) and 
thus makes him perform better, shouldn’t we view eating chicken a completely rational 
choice – indeed, the right choice? 
Surely the system that determines a person’s batting prowess incorporates both 
physical and mental elements, and neither should be neglected. Of course, attuning one self 
to batting by eating chicken can be seen as superstitious, but it if works and enables the 
batter to perform well, it doesn’t seem prudent, wise or productive to judge such a form of 
objectively ill-founded action too harshly. Of course, if the batter was able to see this 
superstition for what it is, and be able to attune himself to the games in some other, non-
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Simulations grant us a view to the 
parameters of the simulation and 
the effects of our actions that 
would not be possible in the real 
world 
ritualistic way, so much the better, but that does not diminish the fact that for him, eating 
chicken is a sort of system intervention with positive results.  
Bearing Dreyfus’ earlier points in mind we can take another perspective at Boggs. 
Boggs, as an expert batsman, would equally be at a loss as the chess grandmaster playing 
lightning chess to explain how he accomplishes such great results. He might emphasize 
things like striking posture, swing technique, and eating lemon chicken. The first two are 
things that many people could agree on, but the problematic third one is no less important, 
but a part of his tacit model nevertheless. It just happens to be a part of the way he plays 
baseball. Dreyfus writes, “…expert coping needn’t even be even implicitly rational in the 
sense of being responsive to reasons that have become habitual but could be reconstructed.” 
And as we have concluded, the preparative chicken dinner is not objectively rational, but as 
a part of Boggs’ tacit model of batting, it is an important primer to great performance. 
Flight Simulators 
If mental models and tacit models coexist in our coping, do they both stem from the 
same sources? Sterman argues that simulations should be utilized more in making the 
behavior of complex systems more understandable to us. He has developed what he calls 
management flight simulators, which are, in his words, “virtual worlds” in which people 
can interact with the model, much like they would interact in the real world, but see the 
results of their actions much more clearly than would be possible in real life. For example 
the confusing effect of delays can be made transparent via simulation, and the oft-
misleading stochastics can be made explicit. 
Having just recently taken part in a business simulation game, I can wholeheartedly 
agree with Sterman on their effectiveness in developing an eye for the behavior of complex 
systems. A business environment, even a simplified one in a business flight simulator, is an 
immensely complex network of causes and effects that no one person can hope to be able to 
grasp in its entirety. That is why we observe and control the world at a higher level of 
roughness, where we see and set trends rather than individual transactions. Most business 
models are probabilistic in their assumptions and operation, which is a common feature of 
models in which it is no longer feasible to model lower, more tangible levels (like for 
example economics abstracts individual consumer preferences away). The trick lies in 
being able to interpret the interactions of these 
trends and applying the right leverage in the right 
point to push the system towards a more favorable 
state. 
Using simulations grants us a view to the 
parameters of the simulation and the effects of our 
actions that would not be possible in the real world. 
Simulation allows us to peel away inessential and confusing facets of the system to reveal 
its core; the core we seek to understand. Things such as delays and unobservable states 
often confuse us in the real world, where it seems that some causalities that ought to work 
to our advantage fail to do so while others go unseen and work against us. While this 
problem is unassailable in the real world, if the models used in simulations fit their purpose 
well, they are analogous enough that we may gleam understanding from experience in 
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them. The effect of various parameters can be made even more understandable if we allow 
game participants to vary them and see how it affects the game world. As Sterman (1992) 
himself puts it, “thus to be effective, management flight simulators must be more than just 
business games. They must be embedded in a learning environment that encourages 
reflection on the perceptions, attributions, and other mental models we use to interpret 
experience as well as the substantive lessons of the situation.” The idea in a simulator is not 
just to simulate the situation, but to expose the situation and the factors driving it to us. This 
supports our natural learning abilities and reduces the confusing effects of delays and 
hidden variables. 
According to Richmond, the way simulations affect learning is basically about molding 
mental models: “call it self-reflective learning. It comes about when simulation outcomes 
are used to drive a process in which a mental model’s content, and/or representation of 
content, is changed.” In essence Richmond’s view purports that the virtue of simulations is 
that they change the content of our mental models. As discussed before, this is a valid 
perspective, but also lacking. Simulations can also build non-conceptual capabilities. A 
good example would be learning to fly, not a business organization, but an airplane. Flying 
an airplane is largely non-conceptual, as evident in the fact that no human could hope to 
constantly simulate the physical forces actually keeping the plane in the air. The cockpits of 
flight simulators are designed to resemble the cockpit of the real plane as closely as 
possible, to make the simulation as close to the real thing as possible. Even the surface 
materials are chosen to be the same, in order to enable the pilots to develop a tacit model 
for flying, a feel of the system of flying if you will.  
Another advantage of simulations is that they may be used to experience things that are 
hard, costly or even impossible to do in the real world. For example, it is not possible for 
the author to spend a few years as CEO of a large company in order to gain business 
experience and to complete a course for his degree. It’s even less possible when we 
consider how many peers of his would need to be able to do same. However, using a 
business simulator, not only is it possible, but rationally thinking even necessary! 
Simulations enable us to experience things that normally would not be possible, whether is 
the viewpoint, the situation or our response strategy we wish to try out. And we can go 
through a variety of runs in a short period of time to develop an intuitive feel for the 
system, whereas in real life we can only try one course of action in any given situation. To 
sum it up, simulations open up new situations for us to learn in. As Sterman put it, “most 
important, when experimentation in the real system is infeasible, simulation becomes the 
main, and perhaps the only, way learners can discover for themselves how complex 
systems work.” 
Towards a Broader View of Learning in Simulation 
Simulation should not be viewed in the narrow sense of computer-based or otherwise 
external simulations, they may be an integral part of our inbuilt learning drive. This 
observation legitimizes the use of simulations in learning even further and may give us 
intuitive insights to its use. There are some additional viewpoints that can shed further light 
on simulations.  
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First, simulations can be seen in everyday life as an instrument of learning. Seeing 
simulation-based learning in other situations than just the pre-designed runs and games that 
jump to mind can open up new intuitions to their importance to us. Second, simulation are 
not just a tool for a single person to learn about things, an important part of action is those 
that act alongside us and thus it’s important to remember the social aspects of learning in 
simulations. This also ties in with the idea that externalizing oneself from the simulation 
may not be a good idea in the long run. And for simulations to be effective, the lessons 
learned in them must be carried on to other situations which are not simulations, in other 
words, new contexts. Unfortunately, this may not be automatic. Finally, no matter what sort 
of simulation is in question or what lessons there are to be learned, if the actor in the 
simulation is not open to the lessons, the simulation is useless. In the next five paragraphs, I 
will explore these topics. 
Simulation in Everyday Life 
When a layman hears the word simulation, she often thinks of the weather forecast and 
of some near-mythical supercomputer that makes said forecast. Or animations of wind 
tunnel simulations in designing new cars, etc. On the other hand, when people with 
technical backgrounds hear the word simulation, things that spring to their minds are 
models, runs, variables and statistics. What we need in our discussion, however, is a 
slightly broadened view on simulation which doesn't necessarily exclude the previous two 
viewpoints but rather builds on them. 
As reasonable as the thought of using simulations to pierce the veil laid upon complex 
systems is, it would be arrogant to think that it is a purely human invention; nature does it 
too. Not in the sense of running simulations to predict the outcome, but in learning. As 
Martin and Caro discussed (Martin and Caro 1985) “… have distilled the many hypotheses 
into three main classes: play as motor training, play as socialization, and play as cognitive 
or sensorimotor training. All have in common the notion that, as a result of playing when 
young, the individual is better able to perform some form of serious behavior later in 
ontogeny.” Animals play in adolescence to build skills. Take for example the play of bear 
cubs. Considering the argument that Martin and Caro rise, what superficially seems to be 
just passing time and having fun while growing up is in fact a combat simulation which 
prepares the adolescent bears for their future lives in which their mother no longer 
competes for the scarce resources of the wild forest for them, but they are left to fend for 
themselves. Being able to simulate a hostile encounter with another bear in a friendly 
environment is valuable training for the life ahead; a life when a real fight against a rival 
may well decide whether or not the bear gets to make cubs of its own. This fact provides 
the necessary evolutionary link which demonstrates why playing, which is very common 
amongst young mammals, has evolved. Martin and Caro express this as “biologists 
generally assume that for a behavior pattern to have evolved and be maintained by natural 
selection, it must have biological benefits which, on average, outweigh its costs.” So 
animals simulate to survive and the ability to play is in fact an evolutionary advantage. 
Of course, since animals lack the self-regulation and self-reflection capabilities of us 
humans, it might seem a bit off the point to discuss their simulative habits of learning. This 
is not so, however; we humans do it too. One might argue that little boys fighting and 
Chapter 6: Systems Thinking and Learning with the Systems Intelligence Perspective 
 143
wrestling is essentially the same behavior we see in the bear cubs, but it doesn't stop there. 
Learning by playing is an innate inclination in human children, as well. Combining this 
with the previous discussion about non-conceptual learning (which, considering animals, 
seems all the more natural now) it seems that simulations could be a major part of our lives 
already, even if it is not readily apparent at first glance. Of particular note is the fact that 
play most often develops skills that are not conceptual in nature, and as such might be seen 
as tacit models. Simulations are thus not something that must be artificially constructed, but 
something that are a part of our nature and nature at large. 
Virtual Worlds and Team Learning 
Simulations are not just for individual learning, however. Just as they allow individuals 
to test their understanding of complexity, groups can also benefit from interaction with the 
simulation to practice their own interactions. Peter Senge (1990) argues that high-
performing teams need “practice fields” in order to further their collective learning skills. 
Virtual worlds provide a playground for people to experiment in and to build team learning 
skills. As Senge points out (The Fifth Discipline, pg. 241), “Interestingly, the few examples 
in business of teams which learn consistently over a long period of time seem to be exactly 
those settings where effective virtual worlds operate.” Based on Senge’s observations, it 
seems that simulations can serve as an efficient facilitator of learning to work as a team. 
Human interaction and interpersonal chemistry are largely non-conceptual, so that 
viewing a team learning simulation solely through the glasses of systems thinking may hide 
some important notions about the large spectrum of learning opportunities present in a 
simulation. Formal structure in human interactions, no matter how well conceived, 
guarantees no results. Much of the interactions arise non-conceptually and the attunement 
of people to the situation and to each other contributes much to the effectiveness of the 
group. Interpersonal skills are a valuable inbuilt asset in ourselves which can be bolstered 
by simulations. 
Intersystem Insights 
An interesting and familiar phenomenon is that when a close friend is distressed, it’s 
sometimes easy to see her situation more clearly than she herself does. Her judgment of the 
situation and the causes and effects related to it may be clouded for a variety of reasons, as 
people are prone to having biases which affect their evaluation of themselves. A person 
who has intimate knowledge of the situation but does not suffer from these biases is much 
more able to make a clear assessment of the situation. This is what might be called “the 
outsider view”. An actor which is not in the center of the system in question can perceive 
the whole much better than one that is in the midst of all the action, as she does not have 
the biases which affect the central actor. Close participation in a system inevitably brings 
the biases into play, as the actor needs not only consider the system outside herself, but the 
two-way interaction between the system and herself as well.  
Conceptual learning, as previously outlined, can be seen as the adaptation of our mental 
models to match the real world as closely as possible. These biases, then, distort our 
perception of the world and our interactions with it and other actors, and thus result in 
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malformed mental models which do not accurately portray the world. It can be hard to see 
through the biases, since they alter our perceptions in fundamental ways. The Systems 
Thinker seeks to externalize the problem field and causal relations in order to study them. 
As Hämäläinen and Saarinen summarize it, “Systems thinking highlights a domain of 
objects it believes is neglected – systems. But systems remain objects nonetheless, entities 
to be identified and reflected from the outside.” Being able to distance oneself from a 
system is an advantage of simulation with regard to the notion that externalization is 
necessary for an objective study of the system.  
Unfortunately, this approach also bears an externalist trap. A systems intelligent actor 
in a simulation does not wish to externalize the system or push it away to see it more 
clearly, she wants to immerse herself in the system and learn from it directly. Mental 
models may be tuned by simple dissection of the systems but tacit models and coping 
capabilities need contact with the system in order to develop. In this sense, it is not solely 
advantageous to use simulations as tools for externalization. It can be necessary to be able 
to immerse oneself in a simulation and to be able to “think real thoughts and feel real 
feelings” (Weston 1996) to properly get in tune with the system that is being simulated and 
to be able to develop a feel for it. 
Transcending Context  
In addition to immersion in a simulation, one aspect of the simulative learning 
experience which should not be overlooked is the importance of context. Learning new 
principles of interaction and laws of system behavior is quite possible in a simulation, but 
unfortunately the lessons learned do not automatically apply to other situations. People 
trying to learn by simulation must be able to transcend context and be able to see a more 
generic framework in the background. 
It is not by any means obvious that just knowing about something induces behavior 
based on that knowledge. An everyday example of this would be the people who smoke. 
Although it is widely known and largely undisputed in this day and age that smoking is 
very detrimental to an individual’s health, a large percentage of people steadfastly cling to 
this habit. Even though they know that in the long run they’d be much better off quitting, in 
the short term they end up lighting another cigarette. Just because they know of its health 
effects doesn’t mean that they have been able to internalize this knowledge to the extent 
that it would affect their behavior. 
This means that in some sense, it is necessary to be able to believe in the simulation 
and believe that the lessons learned therein are real and can be applied to the real world and 
not just the world of the simulation. Both mental and tacit models are, in a sense, principles 
which guide us in interactions with the world, and something that is not credible and 
concrete might not change them at all. Take for example the smokers, which obviously in 
some sense do not believe that smoking is truly harmful to them, or at least that they are 
better off smoking than quitting. 
Senge (1990, pp. 175) categorizes attempts to develop mental models into two 
categories: reflection and inquiry. Reflection involves scrutinizing the way mental models 
are formed and how they affect our actions. Inquiry skills have to do with interpersonal 
communication. He also discusses the way our “espoused theories” differ from our 
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“theories-in-use”, by which he means that our professed views differ from what we actually 
do. In Senge’s view, this is not a catastrophe or something that should be gotten rid of, but 
rather a possibility to close the gap and and thus develop. Smokers would do well to take 
their espoused theory (smoking is bad for me and I intend to quit) and their theory-in-use 
(smoking’s never done me no harm, and it’d be a pain to quit) and close the gap between 
them.  
Gary Johns addresses contextuality in his paper, “The essential impact of context on 
organizational behavior” (Johns 2006). His main point in the paper is that context is 
something that should not be dismissed and factored out from scientific studies. His 
opinion is that scientific studies try to extract the essence from a phenomenon to generalize 
it, and this is detrimental to the understanding of the issue in question in the long run. Even 
though this may apply in many scientific studies, it is also what the human mind is prone 
to, and what happens in the formation of mental models. This is what Senge calls making 
“leaps of abstraction”. Leaps of abstraction occur when our minds make abstractions to do 
away with a clutter of details and instead arrive at a simple concept.  Considering how 
limited our cognitive capabilities are in specifics (as evident in, for example, the lack of 
perfect recall) it is obvious that the human mind must do away with context, at least to 
some extent, and concentrate on more abstract features. Doubtless there is a sweet spot 
somewhere between complete abstraction and pure data, and this sweet spot may very well 
be the tacit models our minds construct when trying to make sense of incoming data 
concerning, for example, good business practices. 
Making Mental Models more Malleable 
When new experiences are available and enough information is available about them to 
make correct inferences and generalizations from them, all that remains to be done are the 
changes to the mental and tacit models. This process is, of course, automated and 
constantly ongoing, but not necessarily very efficient. 
A striking example is one that the developer of the business simulator the author 
partook in, Juuso Töyli, related. A team of executives from a large Finnish company took 
part in a session of the game, and had prepared a “winning strategy” as well as 
“impeccable” modelling tools for monitoring their performance in the game. They led their 
company in the game the same way they had always done in real life. When their 
calculations did not match the calculations of the simulator and their game performance did 
not match their expectations, they declared that the simulator was flawed and marched out 
of the game. 
Peter Senge (1990, pp.165) brings up another example. When Japanese auto makers 
were gaining a large share of the American market, U.S.-based companies began to be 
worried about the fierce competition from overseas. A group of auto executives travelled to 
Japan to witness firsthand the source of the competitive advantage of the Japanese 
companies. However, they were unimpressed, and one executive said, “They didn’t show 
us real plants. There were no inventories in any of the plants. I’ve been in manufacturing 
operations for almost thirty years and I can tell you those were not real plants. They had 
clearly been staged for our tour.” Today, we know that one of the cornerstones of lean 
manufacturing, the manufacturing philosophy that granted the Japanese their advantage, is 
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minimizing (or even eliminating) inventories. But the executives’ mental models, which 
included the notion that manufacturing plants must feature inventories, would not allow for 
this possibility and the source of the Japanese success remained a mystery. 
Even if we disregard such adamant resistance to learning new things, it could be argued 
most people can see some of the very same disposition in themselves, and if they do not, 
they should. It is plainly obvious that should our expectations (be they based on intuition, 
calculation or simulation) be different from observations of the real world, it’s the source of 
the expectations that should be corrected. However obvious this seems, not many of us can 
claim to have truly taken it to heart. 
How to tackle this problem then? If resistance to change and adherence to working, if 
suboptimal, methods is a proven tactic we utilize almost subconsciously, how can it be 
overcome? First of all, it is necessary to recognize the mental models. This can be difficult 
though, since biases tend to make them hazy and intangible. One method of working 
toward knowing them is to study the heuristics which are in a sense their offspring. A 
relevant example in a business context is a person’s risk-aversiveness. Even though it can 
be hard to determine which factors have shaped the model, it is reflected in an abundance 
of heuristics, which are easier to study with introspection. Once a person knows at least a 
rough outline of his mental model, it is easier to start probing for related biases and their 
effects on interactions with other people (who may have different conceptions about risk) 
and on their decision-making. 
What is also important to consider is that because in simulations there are no real 
dangers of any kind, it can be easier for a person to try out new approaches to situations. 
Mental models and ideas are not the lifeline in survival they often seem to be in everyday 
life, but something that can be shifted and molded to new shapes. This links to the idea of 
taking theories lightly, like Donna Orange phrases it in her book: “In this conversation I 
argue for holding some basic attitudes. [...] A second value or attitude concerns the 
importance of fallibilism, the commitment to hold theory lightly, to live with uncertainty 
and ambiguity, and to be always prepared to revise our views. This attitude keeps us 
constantly ready to learn something, from our patients and from each other.” (Orange 1995) 
While she was speaking of psychoanalysis, the idea carries on to other domains very 
naturally. Senge tells a story which serves an example of holding theories lightly, in the 
words of a Harley-Davidson senior executive: “I hear more and more people say, ‘This is 
the way I am seeing things’ rather than ‘This is the way things are.’ It may not sound like 
much, but the former leads to a different quality of conversation.” 
Conclusions 
Even though our understanding of causal diagrams and the evolution of the system 
states of complex systems over time is severely lacking, one does not need to despair. We 
as human beings possess intuitive tools for comprehending the world and these tools, 
combined with modern possibilities such as business flight simulators, can make these 
systems more understandable and controllable. We must not limit learning to simply mean 
the evolution of our conceptual tools and frameworks, but also include the non-conceptual, 
tacit learning exhibited by true masters in several fields. A concept of “tacit models” was 
introduced to portray the non-conceptual models in our minds. Learning also includes 
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learning to lift the lessons learned from a specific context and being able to transfer the 
knowledge garnered to other situations.  
This paper raised five broadened viewpoints to simulations. Simulations are a part of 
nature and can serve to improve both individual and team performance. For simulations to 
be most effective, the “feeling for the system” must be maximized and the ability for 
immersion in the simulation be facilitated. Systems Intelligent actors also feel no 
compulsion to externalize the system, but to immerse themselves in it, although conceptual 
externalization also has its merits. In addition being able to experience the simulation, for it 
to bear fruit it is also important to “hold theories lightly” and be able to carry the lessons 
learned to other contexts and situation. It is important to recognize one’s fallibility and to 
be aware of the compression of raw perception into mental and tacit models. 
Although several shortcomings regarding our ability to comprehend abstractions can be 
identified, our ability to cope must not be underestimated. Like Hämäläinen and Saarinen 
(2008) wrote, “In the systems dimension, humans have remarkable abilities to learn and to 
improve even in the absence of explicit objective knowledge.” The human mind is 
wondrous in its ability to bend to different situations and demands, and with some nudges 
toward the right direction can master diverse fields. Maybe in the future, simulation can 
help learning in many disciplines and walks of life, and on all levels of the intellectual 
hierarchy. In this pursuit, human nature must not be underestimated or forgotten, but 
embraced. 
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Chapter 7  
Fredrickson’s Broaden-and-Build Theory, 
Chemical Engineering, and Systems 
Intelligence 
Ella Rönkkönen and Esa Saarinen 
The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions of Barbara L. Fredrickson 
argues that positive emotions broaden momentary thought-action repertoires 
and build longterm intellectual, physical and physiological resources. In this 
paper the broaden-and-build theory is approached from the point of view of 
chemistry as a platform for illuminating generative metaphors. Fredrickson’s 
theory of positive emotions is interpreted in terms of catalysts, and discussed 
using key chemical terms such as porous material, activation energy and coke. 
We further link chief insights of Fredrickson’s theory with the systems 
intelligence approach of Raimo P. Hämäläinen, Esa Saarinen and their 
associates. We offer an outline of a perspective on human growth based on 
chemical metaphors, conceiving positive emotions as catalysts for human 
flourishing and for the enchancement of systems intelligence. The proposed 
construct of “the upward spiral of positively catalysed systems intelligence” is 
intended as a contribution of particular relevance to positive psychology and 
positive organizational scholarship.  
Introduction
Emotions are fleeting mental and physiological states, multicomponent response 
tendencies that open out over short time periods and contribute to a variety of personal 
resources (Fredrickson, 2004). In the past, emotion researchers have mainly concentrated 
on the negative emotions, such as fear, anger, anxiety and sadness (Seligman and 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). The negative emotions are in many ways more powerful and more 
attention grabbing than positive emotions (Baumeister et al., 2001) and they are often 
conceived as evolutionary adaptations to threats our ancestors faced. The adaptive value of 
negative emotions seems to be connected with their ability to spark specific action 
tendencies (Frijda, 1986). Critical to survival, negative emotions narrow the human’s 
thought-action repertoires, affect specific physiology changes in the body and thus, enable 
the quick and decisive actions needed to adapt the current threatening situation. 
(Fredrickson, 2004). Positive emotions, on the other hand, are considered more diffuse 
(Ellsworth and Smith, 1988), fewer in the number of basic types than negative emotions 
(Matsmoto and Ekman, 2009) and relatively undifferentiated from each other. Moreover, 
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positive emotions are mainly felt in safe and satiated atmospheres (Fredrickson, 1998; 
2004).  
The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 1998; 2001) argues 
that positive emotions broaden momentary thought-action repertoires and help to build 
intellectual, physical and physiological resources for the future. In evolutionary terms this 
contributes to greater odds of survival and reproductive success (Fredrickson, 2003a).  
Research has indicated that feelings of love, joy, enthusiasm, interest, gratitude and 
contentment can contribute significantly to several beneficial life outcomes, such as 
friendship development (Waugh and Fredrickson, 2006), marital satisfaction (Harkel and 
Keltner, 2001), higher incomes (Diener, 2000), better physical health (Richman et al., 
2005) and remarkably even in living a longer life. According to a landmark study of the 
lives of 180 Catholic nuns, the nuns who expressed the most happiness, interest, love and 
hope in autobiographical essays written in their youth lived up to ten years longer compared 
to nuns who expressed the fewest positive emotions (Danner et al., 2001). Studies also 
show that good feelings benefit people’s bodily systems in a number of ways, including 
speeding recovery from the cardio-vascular after effects of negative effect (Fredrickson et 
al, 2000), and increasing the immune function (Davidson et al., 2003). Furthermore, 
positivity is connected to better mental and physical health outcomes (Tugade et al., 2004, 
Davis, 2009) such as increased happiness (Fredrickson and Joiner, 2002) and reduced 
inflammatory responses to stress (Steptoe et al., 2005), and to effective team work (Losada 
1999, Losada and Heaphy 2004). 
On the basis of a bulk of research, it seems safe to conclude that positive emotions do 
contribute significantly to personal growth and development. A key point in Fredrickson’s 
groundbreaking work is to point out that this is achieved by the broadening of the 
individual’s habitual modes of thinking and acting which triggers building effects as a 
result. In other words, individuals who experience positive emotions can transform 
themselves, become more creative, knowledgeable, resilient, socially integrated and 
healthy. Furthermore, individuals are not stagnant and instead grow continually towards 
optimal functioning (Fredrickson, 2004). 
The systems intelligence approach studies human intellect in action as it emerges in 
unfolding real-life environments and contexts. As an approach to human agency, the 
systems intelligence approach combines a holistic outlook with a localized, contextualized 
and positively tuned emphasis on the human potential. The systems intelligence approach 
follows the tradition of System Thinking (Jackson 2000; 2003; Senge 1990) in believing in 
adopting the concept of a system to approach holism and the phenomena of connectivity 
and interrelatedness (Saarinen and Hämäläinen, 2004; Hämäläinen and Saarinen, 2006; 
2007a; 2008; Luoma, 2009). At the same time, the systems intelligence perspective works 
with a keen sense of the experiential, subjective and phenomenological dimensions of our 
human endowment, and with a commitment to do justice to phenomena not necessarily 
accountable from an objective, from-outside perspective (Hämäläinen and Saarinen, 
2007b). Of particular relevance to systems intelligence are those human abilities that relate 
an individual to other human beings in the intersubjective realm and in forms that are 
nonverbal and inarticulate (Stern, 2004). It emphasises attunement to situations, contexts, 
other people and to the present moment (conceived of as “systems”) as humanly 
fundamental. The commitment to talk about the human subject and systems at the same 
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time and as interrelated is a distinct aspect of the systems intelligence approach. It seeks to 
bring back that rich human endowment, that “systematicity” that research has found even in 
infants (Bruner, 1983; Beebe and Lahmann, 1998), which the systems thinking movement 
often has bypassed (Hämäläinen and Saarinen, 2008). Reaching out beyond the narrow 
realm of the cognitive and objective, the systems intelligence perspective connects an 
action-oriented systems perspective with a focus on the human sensitivities (Saarinen and 
Hämäläinen, 2004, Hämäläinen and Saarinen, 2008). 
The aim of this paper is two-fold: 
 
- To reconstruct Fredrickson’s broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions using 
chemistry as a framework for illuminating generative metaphors. 
 
- To link Fredrickson’s theory with the systems intelligence perspective, and use 
Fredrickson’s theory, as reconceptualised in this paper, in order to highlight and develop 
further some chief features of systems intelligence. 
 
The result is an outline of the upward spiral of positively catalysed systems 
intelligence, a construct we believe is highly useful for positive psychology and positive 
organizational scholarship and for the understanding of human agency at large. 
Positive Emotions as Catalysts 
The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 1998; 2001) argues 
that positive emotions broaden our momentary cognitive, attentional, and motivational 
capacity beyond basic needs and build long-term personal resources. As empirically 
demonstrated (Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005), the array of thoughts and actions that 
come to mind is widened when positive emotions are experienced. In the studies of 
broaden-and-build hypothesis with 104 college students it was observed that positive 
emotions broadened the scope of attention, the scope of cognition as well as the scope of 
action compared to neutral state (Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005). These broadened 
thought-action repertoires can have the effect of building an individual's personal resources, 
including physical resources, intellectual resources, and social resources. Thus, people who 
experience more positivity grow psychologically and become more optimistic, more 
resilient, more open, more accepting and more driven by purpose (Fredrickson et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, they build constructive mental habits since positivity opens us to moments 
and thus the surroundings are more efficiently observed and appreciated (Fredrickson, 2009 
p. 92). Barbara L. Fredrickson enlightened the potential significance of positive emotions 
as follows (Fredrickson, 2004, p. 153): 
”Positive emotions provide the fuel, creating a self sustaining system. In 
particular, positive emotions generate what I have called an upward spiral 
towards optimal functioning and enhanced emotional well being.” 
The concept of an upward spiral is highly appealing, and it is one of the most catchy 
notions of positive organizational scholarship. How should we understand this important 
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semi-intuitive concept? We propose to reconstruct it using concepts of catalyst chemistry, 
the first author’s primary field of research. 
Let us first determine the flourishing as living within an optimal range of human 
functioning, characterized by goodness, generativity, growth, and resilience (Fredrickson 
and Losada, 2005). In this paper, we shall assume that human flourishing can be 
approached in terms of thoughts, attentions and actions, i.e., whatever the details of human 
flourishing, it will involve thoughts, attentions and actions lived out by the subject in a way 
that is appropriate for the flourishing to take place.  
Our first proposal based on chemical engineering vocabulary amounts to a suggestion 
concerning the flourishing of an individual on the theoretical level. We prose that the goal 
of a human life is to have the reversible equilibrium reaction 1 to occur as far as possible 
towards its equilibrium state: 
Individual + attentions, thoughts, actions ↔ flourishing individual (1) 
The reversible reaction means that a reaction can happen in both directions. The chemical 
equilibrium denotes the fact that there exists a condition (an equilibrium state) where the 
products of the reaction are formed at the same rate at which they decompose back into the 
reactants. Thus, the concentration of each reactant and product remains constant. At 
equilibrium state, the forward and back reactions occur at the same rate. Thus an individual 
is thought to grow in the dimensions of attentions, thoughts and actions in line with the goal 
to flourish. Likewise, in a reaction taking place towards flourishing, the individual is 
thought to be subject to attentions, thoughts and actions appropriate to growth in 
flourishing. In this context the equilibrium state of human flourishing would describe the 
ideal state of living at “an optimal range of human functioning, characterized by goodness, 
generativity, growth, and resilience” (Fredrickson and Losada, 2005). 
However, it is possible in chemistry that a mixture might seem to have no tendency to 
change, and still it is not at its equilibrium state. This is because there exists a kinetic 
barrier which prevents the relevant change from taking place. This barrier can be 
approached by the concept of an activation energy which is needed for the reaction to 
occur. Sometimes this activation energy can be very high. For example, gaseous hydrogen 
and oxygen are virtually inert at room temperature, but react rapidly to water when exposed 
to platinum catalyst (Fogler, 1999).  
Likewise we propose it is useful to approach the hindrances to flourishing in terms of 
kinetic barriers within us which hinder the reaction 1 to take place – the point being that 
the kinetic barrier can be overcome with a substance called a catalyst. 
Although catalytic reactions were already used in antiquity, the principles of catalysis 
were slow to become unveiled. The term catalysis was introduced in 1836 by Berzelius 
(Hagen, 1999). Catalysts, in chemical discourse, are substances which 
 
- increase the rate of chemical reactions 
 
- do not have an effect on the thermodynamic equilibrium of the reaction 
 
- do not change during the reaction (Fogler, 1999). 
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This means that catalysis is a cyclic process: the reactants are bound to one form of the 
catalyst and the products are released from another, regenerating the initial state. The 
intermediate reaction complexes are usually highly reactive and difficult to detect (Hagen, 
1999). To illustrate the importance of catalysis, notice that most of our liquid fuels and 
some 80% of chemical products are manufactured with the assist of catalytical conversions 
(Santen et al., 1999). Chemical catalysis can be generally divided into homogeneous, 
heterogeneous and bio catalysis (Richardson, 1989).  
Heterogeneous catalysis, which we shall use here as a metaphor, involves more than 
one phase, and typically the catalyst consist of a support material and an active material 
(e.g. a metal) (Fig 1). The active material is dispersed on a support material that enhances 
the effectiveness of the catalyst or minimises the cost of the catalyst.  
Sometimes the support is a porous structure, upon which the active material is spread, 
to increase and to extend the surface area. A catalyst with a large area resulting from many 
fine pores is called a porous catalyst. The large surface area is beneficial in order to attain 
reaction rates high enough for the process to occur. Often the support and the active 
material interact, affecting the catalytic reaction (see the supported catalyst structure in 
Figs. 1, 2 and 4) (Richardson, 1989; Fogler, 1999). 
Examples of heterogeneous catalysis are many, including reduction, oxidation and 
electrocatalytic reactions. An illustrative example is the so called three-way-catalyst, 
consisting of Pt and Rh metal particles supported on a ceramic monolith to control the 
emissions of CO, NO and hydrocarbons from automotive exhausts by the overall reactions 
of 2-4. This catalytic treatment of motor vehicle exhaust has been applied in all passenger 
cars e.g. in USA since the 1975 models (Santen et al., 2005). 
CO+1/2O2→ CO2       (2) 
NO+CO → 1/2N2+CO2     (3) 
CxHy+3/2xO2 → xCO2+y/2H2O     (4) 
One instructive way, we propose, to view the broaden-and-build theory and the upward 
spiral circle towards flourishing individual (reaction 1) is to envision positive emotions in 
terms of a heterogeneous catalysis. 
We shall say that a positive emotion catalyst consists of the support material and active 
materials dispersed on it. Fredrickson, (2009, pp. 39–48) introduces ten most common 
positive emotions in the order of their feeling frequency: joy, gratitude, serenity, interest, 
hope, pride, amusement, inspiration, awe and love. However, love is in many ways an 
exceptional emotion as it has aspects or reflections of all the other nine emotions, 
amounting a “many-splendored thing” (Fredrickson, 2009). Indeed love is a fundamental 
construct which in most of the great spiritual traditions is perceived as the ultimate source 
of good. The speciality of love, a transient and ever-fleeting in its essence but mesmerizing 
in its gravity, has inspired some of the most impressive lines civilisation has produced, such 
as the words of Rumi: 
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This is love: to fly toward a secret sky, 
to cause a hundred veils to fall each moment.  
First, to let go of live. 
In the end, to take a step without feet;  
to regard this world as invisible, 
and to disregard what appears to be the self.  
Heart, I said, what a gift it has been  
to enter this circle of lovers,  
to see beyond seeing itself,  
to reach and feel within the breast.  
Love, as an overreaching and arch-like fundamental emotion, we suggest, can be seen 
to act as a porous support structure, while other positive emotions, as conceived in a 
fredricksonian broaden-and-build spirit, are dispersed active materials.  
In other words, we suggest that reaction 1 on the positive emotion catalyst takes place 
at the interface of the love support and the active positive emotion materials. In general, in 
catalysis, the more porous the support, the more extended the surface area – the more 
effective the support. This is because the porous structure means more channels and pores 
in the material which enhance its total surface area. Following this metaphor, we suggest 
that the more porous the (love) support, the more effective the catalyst. The porosity of 
love can be seen to demonstrate itself in the myriad forms love can operate, for instance by 
being patient, kind, not-envying, not-boasting, not-proud, not-rude, not-self-seeking, not-
easily-angered, by rejoicing-with-the-truth, by being protecting, trustful, hopeful, and 
always persevering, if we dare to apply, with due respect, the immemorial characterizations 
of 1. Cor 13 in this context.  
In general a catalyst should have the following characteristics: 
 
- activity on the certain specific reactions (involving reference to a measure of how fast 
one or more reactions proceed in the presence of the catalyst), 
 
- selectivity to catalyse only certain specific reactions (involving reference to a measure of 
the fraction of the starting material that is converted to the desired product) and  
 
- stability against deactivation, i.e. loss of activity (involving reference to the lifetime of a 
catalyst in a certain process).  
 
Since the priorities in today’s industry require the efficient utilization of feedstock and 
energy with the lowest possible environmental impact, the relative order of importance of 
these functions is often considered to be selectivity > stability > activity (Hagen, 1999).  
Let us illustrate these considerations using the first author’s primary area of research on 
biomass gasification gas clean-up. Both zirconia and nickel based catalysts can remove an 
undesirable tar molecule from the complex mixture of the gasification product gas. In this 
application the removal of tar, e.g. naphthalene (C1OH8) and toluene (C7H8), is necessary in 
order to utilize the gas to any of its further use e.g. in energy production. However, the 
mechanism of these two catalysts is not the same, meaning that different reactions enable 
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the tar removal from the gas. In the case of zirconia the main reaction is a two step partial 
oxidation of tar (Eq. 5 and 6 for toluene) (Viinikainen et al., 2009; Rönkkönen et al., 2009; 
Juutilainen et al., 2006) whereas over Ni mainly dry and steam reforming (Eq. 7 and 8) 
reactions occur (Hepola, 2000; Simell, 1997): 
C7H8 + 5.5 O2 → 7 CO + 4 H2O     (5) 
CO + ½ O2 → CO2     (6) 
C7H8 + 7 CO2 → 14 CO + 4 H2O     (7) 
C7H8 + 7H2O→ 7CO +11 H2     (8) 
Similarly, in the path towards flourishing, it is important to travel beyond the “one-
size-fits-all terms like happy and good into precisely named emotional states” (Fredrickson, 
2009). This means that diverse positive emotions as active materials will enable various 
kind of actions, thoughts, attentions to react with the individual. As a result, various 
emotions can contribute to several longterm building effects.  
In heterogeneous catalysis, the reactions occur between species in different phases, e.g. 
gas-solid, liquid-solid, and liquid-gas. The most common of these is the gas-solid reaction, 
and we shall use it here for illustration. Most catalytic reactions follow the multi-stage 
process shown as an example in Fig 1. In this process the gaseous reactants 1) are 
transferred (by mass transfer processes such as diffusion) to the external surface of the 
catalyst particle and further in the catalyst pores leading to the reacting surface sites of the 
(e.g. metal) catalyst. Then, 2) the molecules adsorb on the surface of the metal because of 
what are known as the attractive forces between molecules and the metal. The reacting 
surface molecules are brought close enough, and 3) the desired surface reaction occurs. 
Once the reaction is over, the reaction products 4) are transferred (e.g. by diffusion) from 
the pores and from the surface and the catalyst is left unchanged. This is an ideal catalyst 
reaction: the rate of a reaction is increased and the catalyst is left unchanged. Thus, it can 
continue to participate in the same process again (Bowker, 1998; Hagen, 1999; Fogler, 
1999).   
Thus conceived, the positive emotions act as catalysts in the reactions between an 
individual and her attentions, thoughts and actions, resulting in a temporarily broadened 
individual as an intermediate result and as an individual with building effects in the longer 
run (a.k.a. flourishing individual) if the cycle is repeated. By “a temporarily broadened 
individual” we mean a subject that is temporarily more optimistic, more resilient, more 
open, more accepting, and more driven by purpose (Fredrickson, 2009, p. 91) than she 
tends to be before the intervention. By “individual with building effects” we mean a subject 
whose psychological strengths are thus affected more permanently.    


















Figure 1. A heterogeneous catalytic reaction on the surface of the catalyst (Bowker, 1998). 
 
 
We propose that the steps of the catalytic system of upward spiral towards the 
flourishing of an individual include both the momentary circle of broadening as well as its 
repeated cycles to be discussed shortly (and depicted in Fig 2). Furthermore, we suggest 
that systems intelligence (of self as a system) involves the ability to be mindfully (Langer, 
1989) aware of the possibilities and feasibility of the catalytic system of upward spiral 
towards the flourishing of an individual. 
The momentary circle of broadening is a temporary state, yet significant in its effects. 
People in a state of positivity have wider outlook, more ideas come to mind, more actions 
are viewed as possible and more creativity is experienced (Fredrickson, 2009).  
We shall now pick up from a metaphorical, almost poetical description from 
Fredrickson in order to develop out chemistry-inspired reconstruct of the broaden-and-build 
theory and of Fredrickson’s ideas on the upward spiral towards optimal functioning. In her 
landmark book Positivity Fredrickson writes: 
”Positivity – whether it blooms as joy, serenity, or any other hue on your 
positivity palette – literally gives you a new outlook on life. This, as I’ve 
mentioned, is the first core truth about positive emotions. Imagine yourself as a 
flower your petals drawn in tightly around your face, if you can see out at all, it 
is only a speck of light. You can’t appreciate much of what goes on around you. 
Yet once you feel the warmth of the sun things change… your petals loosen and 
begin to stretch outward exposing your face. You see more and more. Your 
world literally expands. Possibilities unfold.” (Fredrickson, 2009)   
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Setting this process in the conceptual frame of a chemical engineer yields a step by step 
process description or mechanism for the key reaction 1, which demonstrates how the 
mechanism of the reaction is different with the catalyst as opposed to without it. In general, 
the overall process by which heterogeneous catalytic reactions proceed can be broken down 
into a sequence of individual steps (as shown in Fig. 1) (Fogler, 1999). Furthermore, in 
order to understand and further develop and scale-up chemical processes, the mechanism 
and kinetics of the reactions need to be known. Representing the individual as “a flower 
bud”, and the actions, thoughts and actions as “flower petals” the mechanism of the 
summary reaction 1 runs through the following stages:  
 
1) mass transfer (diffusion) of the individual (marked as flower bud in Fig 2.) to the 
surface of the positive emotion from the state of neutrality or languishing (“the individual 
moves towards positivity and starts to feel the first signs of positive emotions”). Similarly 
occurs the mass transfer of attentions, thoughts and actions towards the positive emotion 
catalyst (marked as flower petals). 
 
2) adsorption of the individual on the active site of the positive emotion. This creates 
an individual with an urge which is associated by positivity (in the sense in which e.g. play 
is associated with joy) (Fredrickson, 2004), which in turn creates the attractive forces for 
step 3 to manifest (“the individual starts to undergo the feeling of the positive emotions”).  
 
3) dissociative adsorption  of attentions, thoughts and actions (marked as flower petals 
in Fig 2.) on the positive emotion because of the attractive forces made possible by the 
individual with a positively charged urge (“the individual’s thoughts, attentions and actions 
start to get reoriented as a result of the positive emotions”). 
 
4) surface reactions on the positive emotion catalyst to manifest a broadened individual 
(marked as flower bud with the added petals in Fig 2.) (“the effects of the positive emotions 
upon the individual can be seen even by others”). 
 
5a) desorption of (the release of) the broadened individual from the surface of the 
active site of the positive emotion (“the individual moves on, as affected by the positive 
emotions to some extent and with the new thought-action repertoires they immediately give 
an opening for”). 
 
6a) mass transfer (diffusion) of the individual back to a neutral state and possibly again 
to the surface of a positive emotion (“the individual goes back to a neutral emotional 
state”).  
 
In addition to the one-time reaction path just described, the possibility of a higher-level 
reaction path also exists and can be described in the chemistry-inspired language for 
positive emotions. A higher-level reaction path follows when after step 4), instead of 5a) 
and 6a), the broadened individual stays at the stage of dissociative adsorption and thus 
continues to undergo the effect of the support material and of the positive emotion. The 
effects of the catalyst are multiplied as there is a loop from positive emotions to action-
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thought repertoires which repeats the reaction process on the surface of the catalyst. In 
other words, in the higher-order reaction the steps are: 
 
5b) dissociative adsorption of broadened attentions, thoughts and actions on the 
positive emotion catalyst (marked as flower stems in Fig 2.); the broadened attentions, 
thoughts and action keep on being affected by the positive emotion catalyst (“the 
individual’s thoughts, attentions and actions are more deeply reoriented”). 
 
6b) surface reactions within the broadened individual and her broadened specific 
thought-action-repertoires (marked as a flower with added petals and stems in Fig 2.) (“the 
broadened individual is building several long term effects upon the individual, which can 
be seen also by others”).  
 
7) desorption, the release of the individual from the active site (“the individual moves 
on, and the repeated feelings of positive emotions together with the new thought-action 
repertoires generate enduring social, physical or intellectual building effects which become 
part of the individual’s  transformed self”  
 
8) mass transfer (diffusion) of the individual with building effects (marked as a flower 
with added petals and stems in Fig 2.) back to the neutral state and back to the circle (“the 
individual goes back to the neutral emotional state and has a chance to move again towards 
the positive emotion”).  
 
Building on the imagery of our petals-and-stems description, we can now articulate the 
upward spiral towards the flourishing of an individual. It can be conceived as a life-long 
process where loops of the momentary circle of broadening have the possibility to add 
petals to the individual’s personal blooming while similarly the parallel loops towards 
longterm building effects have the possibility to create stems of flowering.  
In principle, any step (mass transfer, adsorption, surface reaction or desorption) of a 
chemical catalytic reaction can become the rate limiting step, i.e., constraint upon the 
process. Indeed, the rate of the whole reaction can become severely limited by a particular 
step. Often in chemistry this means that the overall rate of reaction is equal to the rate of the 
slowest step in the mechanism. For this reason, it is important to know the rate limiting step 
so that the rate of the reaction could be increased. When the mass transfer steps are fast 
compared to the reaction steps, the concentrations in the near vicinity of the active sites are 
indistinguishable from those in the bulk fluid and the mass transfer does not affect the rate 
of the reaction. However, if the reaction steps are fast compared with the mass transfer 
steps, then mass transfer affects the reaction rate (Fogler, 1999). 
As an illustration, consider, an individual who moves by mass transfer processes 
towards positive emotion (step 1) and then adsorbs on the surface of the positive emotion 
(step 2). Then, in a state of positive emotion (such as joy) she might became an individual 
with an inner urge for action (in the sense in which e.g. joy can create the urge to play 
(Fredrickson, 2009)). When this action (play) is adsorbed (step 3), the individual is 
momentarily broadened resulting from the surface reactions (step 4 creating an 
intermediate reaction product). The broadened actions/thoughts/ attentions adsorb on the 
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surface of the positive emotion because of the attractive forces between the adsorbed 
individual on the positive emotion and the broadened actions/thoughts/attentions. Thus 
broadened, the individual is brought together with more creative thoughts, attention and/or 
actions (e.g. to actions unrelated to play while still playing). Since the broadened effect is 
temporary, the broadened individual is desorbed from the surface of the positive emotion 
(step 5a) thus freeing also the positive emotion catalyst. And the individual mass transfers 
back to the neutral state (step 6a). “Just as day lilies retract when sunlight fades, so do our 
minds when positivity fades. Threatened with negativity, our minds constrict even further. 
As positivity and negativity flow through us the scope of our awareness blooms and retracts 
accordingly” (Fredrickson, 2009, p. 55.). 
Notice, however, that at this point of the cycle, the individual can also choose to adsorb 
to the active site of a negative emotion, thus generating quite different reaction pathways. 
We can use a quotation from Fredrickson (2009, p 231) to illustrate the crucial dimension 
of choice of the adsorption step:  
”Life gives us negativity on its own. It’s our job to create positivity. Positivity 
is a choice - a choice we all need to make again and again, day after day… 
Your emotions are as far from random as they are from fixed by your genes… 
And the more you value positivity, the more often its upward spiral will lift you 
to new heights… The more positivity you seed and harvest, the better become 
your prospects for flourishing.”  
However, as Fredrickson rightly points out, “there is no limit, how often our minds can 
cycle through these expanded and retracted awareness” (Fredrickson, 2009). Furthermore, 
as empirically demonstrated (Fredrickson and Joiner, 2002): “positivity and openness feed 
on each other each reinforcing and catalyzing each other. This is the upward spiral that the 
positivity triggers in you”. Thus, it seems that the momentary reaction cycles of broadening 
can start to catalyse themselves. In other words: the momentary reaction cycles of 
broadening enable a parallel reaction path towards reaction products of long term building 
effects and flourishing (e.g. in the sense in which play can build enduring physical (Boulton 
and Smith, 1992) and social (Aron et al., 2000) as well as intellectual problem solving 
resources (Fredrickson, 2004). 
These considerations suggest that the rate limiting step in the catalytic system of 
upward spiral circle towards flourishing individual might well be step 2, the adsorption of 
an individual to the surface of a positive emotion. This includes the assumption that the 
concentrations of the reactants (individual and attentions/thoughts/actions) in the near 
vicinity of the active sites of the positive emotions are indistinguishable from those in the 
bulk fluid and thus, the mass transfer does not affect the rate of the reaction. In other words, 
it might be that positivity resides at all times near us, but we need to attach or adsorb on its 
surface. This observation highlights the role of the individual herself in the process of her 
flourishing. In a sense, the individual is only a decisive cognitive step away from what 
would enhance her personal flourishing. A step, which however should be chosen “again 
and again, day after day” (Fredrickson, 2009). This point of course will ring familiar to 
anybody who approaches it from the point of view of spiritual traditions that emphasise the 
momentous role an individual has in her own potential transformation. 
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Steps in momentary circle of broadening  
1. Mass transfer of individual (from the state of neutrality) and attentions/thoughts/actions to the surface of positive 
emotion  
2. Adsorption of individual on the active site of positive emotion (individual with positively charged urge) 
3. Dissociative adsorption of attentions, thoughts and actions on the positive emotion 
4. Surface reaction: individual with positively charged urge and attentions, thoughts and actions react into broadened 
individual 
5a. Desorption: broadened individual desorbs from the positive emotion freeing similarly the active site of the 
positive emotion 
6a. Mass transfer of the broadened individual to the state of neutrality with added petals of personal flourishing 
Parallel reaction path towards long term building effects and flourishing: 
5b. Dissociative adsorption of broadened attentions, thoughts and actions on the positive emotion 
6b. Surface reaction: broadened individual  reacts with broadened specific thought-action-repertoires to make 
individual with building effects  
7. Desorption: individual with building effects desorbs from the surface of the positive emotion complex freeing 
similarly the positive emotion  
8. Mass transfer of the individual with building effects to the state of neutrality with added stem of the personal 
flourishing 
 
Summary of the reaction: individual + attentions-actions-thoughts ↔ Broadened 
individual + Individual with building effects (a.k.a. flourishing individual)  
 
Progress of the reaction: repeated loops lead to flourishing individual as several petals 
of flourishing are added in parallel with several stems.  
 
Figure 2. The mechanism of the catalytic system of upward spiral circle towards flourishing 
of an individual. 
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Table 1 summarizes various positive emotions when viewed as catalysts, with 
paradigmatic parallel attentions, thoughts and actions to contribute to broadening and to 
possible long term building effects (adapted from Fredrickson, 2003b; 2009). For example, 
a joy catalyst on the love support contributes to playing and creative actions in the short run 
and to enduring physical, social and intellectual resources in the long run. (Free play has 
been shown to have crucial impact upon children’s social, emotional as well as cognitive 
development. Free play as child is connected to better adjustment in society, better stress 
handling capacity and even to smartness (Wenner, 2009).) 
Positive-Emotions-Catalysed-Reactions are Energetically Favourable  
Why do we need the catalytic system of the upward spiral towards the flourishing of an 
individual and not just act rationally in a state of neutrality towards flourishing? It was 
suggested earlier that the reaction 1 is a reverse equilibrium reaction. This means that a 
reaction can happen in both directions and that there exists a condition where the products 
of the reaction are formed at the same rate at which they decompose back into the reactants. 
However, in everyday life we often encounter situations in which no movement towards 
flourishing is taking place and yet the equilibrium state of personal flourishing in the sense 
of  reaction 1 has been achieved, neither. Somehow people can get stuck in their path to 
flourishing. This familiar phenomenon suggests that there exists a kinetic barrier within us 
for the reaction, meaning that a certain activation energy is needed for the reaction to occur. 
When the kinetic barrier is overcome, the path towards the flourishing individual “who 
lives within an optimal range of human functioning, characterized by goodness, 
generativity, growth, and resilience” (Fredrickson and Losada, 2005) is made possible. 
Furthermore, in the reverse reaction, the possibility emerges in which the flourishing 
individual will provide the appropriate thoughts, attentions and actions in line with a drive 
for human flourishing. In other words, the significance of catalysis as a process is 
enormous, if one can make it happen. 
The magnitude of the significance of catalysis, when it takes place, is a point we cannot 
overstate. Recall what Santen et al (1999) point out in the preface of their book Catalysis: 
An Integrated Approach: 
”Chemical reactions, for which one would expect half-life times as long as 
centuries, can be accomplished in minutes to hours with the magic power of a 
mysterious black box containing a catalyst.” 
This point perhaps illustrates the striking power of positive emotions as triggers of 
change. 
We shall now turn to another important aspect of our analysis of positive emotions as 
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Table 1. Positive emotions as catalysts to broaden-and-build an individual towards optimal 




actions to contribute 
broadening Long term building effects 
Joy Feeling playful, bright, 
light, spring in the 
steps, inner glow 
Play, pushing limits, 
being creative 
Enduring physical, social stress 
handling, intellectual resources  
Pride Upright posture, slight 
smile 
Sharing news from 
achievement with others, 
envisioning of new 
achievements in future 
Fuels self-esteem, and 
achievement motivation 
Interest Sense of possibility or 
mystery, fascination, 
feeling open and alive 
Exploring, taking in new 
information and 
experiences, expanding 
the self, learning more 




Feeling that everything 
is right as it is 
  
Savouring current life 
circumstances, integration 
of the circumstances into 
new view of self and 
world  
Produces self-insight and alters 
worldviews 
Gratitude Feeling of appreciation 
of something that has 
come to our way 
Creative and wide array of 
actions to promote the 
well being of other people 
Builds and strengthens social 
bonds and friendships, builds 
social resources, motivates 
permanent faithfulness and 
spiritual growth 
Love   Contains and overlaps 
all the other positive 
feelings 
Exploring, savouring, and 
enjoying people and life at 
large 
Inspired and uplifted 
interactions to build and 




In chemistry, bonds have to be weakened in order to allow for the change of one 
substance into another, and this involves the input of energy. To increase the rate of a 
reaction you need to increase the number of successful collisions of the reacting particles. 
Collisions only result in a reaction if the particles collide with enough energy to get the 
reaction started. This minimum energy required is called the activation energy (Fig. 3). 
Remarkably, a catalyst provides an alternative route for the reaction. That alternative route 
has a lower activation energy resulting in an increase of the reaction rate. We believe this 
point is absolutely vital to appreciate, and a strong indication of the usefulness of the 
chemistry metaphor in the connection of the study of positive emotions and flourishing.  
















Figure 3: Generic graph showing the effect of a catalyst in a hypothetical exothermic 
chemical reaction. Uncatalysed reaction is shown with the upper line and catalysed reaction 
with the lower line in the graph. 
 
As in any catalytic process, the positive emotions catalysts are ideally not consumed or 
changed during the process but only facilitate the kinetic effect of cognitive broadening and 
self growth. This means that the potential of an individual to react according to the reaction 
1 is significantly accelerated on top of a platform of positive emotions as compared to a 
situation without them (non-catalysed conditions). The non-catalysed conditions would 
mean actions, attentions and thoughts in a state of emotional neutrality (perhaps through 
emotionally neutral rational thinking) towards flourishing individual.  
Furthermore, this change in the rate of reaction, vital for catalysed reactions and for the 
functioning of positive emotions as reconstructed here, is made possible because the 
mechanism of the reaction is sharply different when the catalyst is involved and when it is 
not involved. The path to the goal of flourishing with positive emotions is energetically 
favourable compared to the path without positive emotions.  
Why is the activation energy and the kinetic barrier within us lowered by positivity? 
Energy is a semi-intuitive concept often alluded to in human sciences, organizational 
research and their applications. Differentiated from the physical concept of energy, energy 
in human contexts can be approached in a number of ways but here we find it useful to 
view it as “a type of positive affective arousal, which people can experience as emotions – 
short responses to specific events – or mood – longer-lasting affective states that need not 
to be a response to a specific event” (Cross et al., 2003). Since energy is a reinforcing 
experience, people attempt to enhance, prolong, or repeat the conditions they perceive to be 
increasing it. Likewise, people try to diminish or avoid the circumstances that are perceived 
as decreasing their energy (Collins, 1993). Furthermore, since energy is a positive affect, 
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people who feel high levels of energy have a tendency to view events positively and to 
expect positive events to occur (Arkes et al., 1988).  
It has been suggested that the energy for human actions comes from four main 
wellsprings: body, emotions, mind and spirit. Positive emotions contribute to the quality of 
energy; when people are in a state of positive energy, they perform as their best (Schwartz 
and McCarthy, 2007). Fredrickson observes in her book (2009, p. 226) that based on her 20 
years of studies on positive emotions, positive experiences outnumber negative experiences 
in their relative frequency by about 2 to 1 with most people. At the rate of 2-1, life is not 
particularly distinctive. When the ratio is raised to 3 to 1, a major transformation occurs, 
“you have stepped up to a whole new level of life”. The ratio of 3-1 is the tipping point of 
flourishing, Fredrickson suggests. Many researchers believe that at the fundamental level, 
positivity alters the brain and affects the way the individual interacts with the world (Ashby 
et al., 1999). This is where the catalysis starts to take place. 
Positive Emotions as Catalysts Towards Systems Intelligence 
The research of Fredrickson and her associates have demonstrated that people who 
experience positive emotions take more easily a “big-picture” view, attending to the general 
outline of images rather than to the details (Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005). They are 
more open to new information, are more creative as more ideas and thoughts come into 
their mind. Research suggests that positivity enhances broader flexible cognitive 
organisation and ability to integrate diverse material (Isen, 1990). With positive emotions, 
the scope of the attention is widened (Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005).   
These key features of positive emotions are vital for systems intelligence. As is 
customary within the systems thinking movement, the systems intelligence approach wants 
to find ways to articulate the human strive towards the big picture as opposed to the details. 
Anything that enhances the subject’s abilities to see the forest for the trees is welcome news 
for systems intelligence. Some of that is bound to be related to the subject’s cognitive 
realm, but not all, as a subject might well approach a whole in the sense in which a 
conductor in the living and emerging presence of the performance of a symphony. Many of 
the skills that are called upon in that kind of extended grasping of wholes are likely to be 
emotion-related – and are part and parcel of a fredricksonian broaden-and-build process. 
Indeed, anything that increases an individual’s skills to adapt successfully to wholes 
and to conduct productively “processes of systems thinking” (using the apt phrase of 
Luoma, 2009), is welcomed by systems intelligence. Many of the parameters to be 
encountered are likely to have a strong subjective and intersubjective twist to them, as 
opposed to the positivistic objective. This introduces a powerful playing ground for positive 
emotions. From the point of view of systems theorizing, as well as the understanding of 
emotions, we believe this point is critical to appreciate. It is vital to bring the research on 
emotions and the research on systems to bear on one another. (On this theme, see also 
Hämäläinen and Saarinen, 2008 and Luoma et al., 2008.) 
Many forms of systems thinking tend to emphasise the objective and explicit forms of 
knowledge, with the idea of describing systems from outside as objective phenomena. This 
is fine in many contexts, but typically will amount to disregarding emotions along with 
other subjective phenomena. Yet it seems obvious that emotions are particularly relevant 
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for humans precisely because they allow the subject to sense the environment and the 
situation, other human beings and their intentions etc., more holistically and acutely. The 
subject can adapt more successfully, because she senses a possibility in the air, or a threat 
around the corner, even when she cannot tell what it is. More generally, as pointed out in 
the systems intelligence literature, many key aspects of the functioning of the systems with 
respect to which the subject is systems intelligent might not be cognitively accessible to the 
agent in question. In order for an agent to act systems intelligently in a system she need not 
know the system in its objective characteristics and might not be in a position to represent 
or describe the system for others. As Hämäläinen and Saarinen (2004, 2008) emphasize, for 
an agent to act intelligently with a system it may be enough for a human to have a “feel” of 
the system. Indeed, such a feel of a system might well be forthcoming well before any 
rational understanding of it, a point reinformed by infant research. In all of this emotions 
loom large. We venture to suggest that a key way in which positive emotions “broaden-
and-build” is by extending the individual’s ability to feel systems, be they contexts, 
situations, the intentions of other people, or oneself as a whole, etc. Positive emotions 
broaden-and-build the sensitivities with which humans tune to their systemic environments 
and thus broaden-and-build the individual’s capabilities to adopt and to thrive. 
We are suggesting that positive emotions not only expand the cognitive mindscape of 
human subjects but also – and importantly – their systemic interface with their 
environments. Positive emotions bring new possibilities into the individual’s scope of 
orientation and realm of sensibilities, thus enabling a wider feel of systems and more 
intelligent actions within those systems. This is remarkable indeed, as all action can be 
conceived as taking place within systems (environments, contexts, etc). Not only do 
positive emotions broaden-and-build the individual’s long term capabilities but also her 
immediate skills of adapting and succeeding with the systems at hand. 
An important aspect of such an extended feel of systems relates to the individual’s 
ability to link with other people. That capacity has been demonstrated to be enhanced by 
positive emotions. For instance, positive emotions enable people to find more varied and 
adaptive ways to use their social support network (Cohn and Fredrickson, 2006). 
These observations are reinforced by the fact that positive emotions increase 
individuals’ use of adaptive reframing and perspective-taking coping skills (Fredrickson 
and Joiner, 2002). As a result, positive emotions offer a support structure for the cognitive 
aspects of an individual’s system intelligence as it operates: “The tools to higher awareness 
via systems intelligence include the reframing and rethinking of own thinking regarding the 
environment and feedback structures and other systems structures of that environment. “ 
(Saarinen and Hämäläinen, 2004)  
As C. West Churchman once put it, systems approach starts when you perceive the 
world through the eyes of another person (Churchman, 1968). Churman’s point is largely 
cognitive in nature, but it can be interpreted more widely. According to empirical studies by 
Fredrickson and her colleagues, positive emotions broaden the sense of self in connection 
to others and thus make people feel a self-other overlap more easily as well as “oneness” 
with the people close to themselves and with people in groups. Positivity shifts from the 
“me” view to more overlapping view of the “we”. (Waugh and Fredrickson, 2006). As a 
result, the individual understands herself easier as a part of the whole, the influence of the 
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whole upon herself and the influence of herself upon the whole, all chief aspects of systems 
intelligence (Saarinen and Hämäläinen, 2004). 
Systems intelligence amounts to intelligent actions in the context of complex systems 
involving interaction and feedback (Saarinen and Hämäläinen, 2004). One potential 
obstacle here is created by various forms of separateness and non-connectivity with other 
people. But positivity has been shown to act as a counterdose to disconnectivity. For 
instance, positive emotions facilitate changes from divisive group attitudes into inclusive 
group identities (Fredrickson, 2009 p. 69). Indeed, positivity helps individuals to stay open 
and alter the view towards strangers. Remarkably, people under positivity recognize people 
of different races in ways more similar to their own race, meaning that we are able to see 
the person behind the racial label. Positive emotions thus help to avoid the trap where all 
the Chinese look similar in the eyes of Europeans and vice versa (Johnson and Fredrickson, 
2005). It is easier to be systems intelligent with the help of positive emotions because you 
more easily link with other people emotionally and cognitively.  
The long list of systems intelligence relevant inducements of the broadening effects of 
positive emotions include: 
 
- Creative and optimal solutions to everyday problems become easier (Fredrickson and 
Joiner, 2002). 
 
- Marital satisfaction is highly correlated to the level of feeling self-other overlap between 
the couple (Aron, 1992). 
 
- Relationships in general are closer, longlasting, attracting loyalty instead of bitterness 
(Fredrickson, 2009) 
 
- Broadening builds “both strategic alliances and globe-spanning friendships” 
(Fredrickson, 2009). 
 
- Managers with greater positivity are more accurate and careful in making their decisions 
and more effective interpersonally, they infect it to the group members making a better 
coordination among team members and reducing the effort needed to get their job done 
(Sy et al., 2005; Staw and Barsade, 1993).  
 
- People who come to the bargaining table with a cooperative and friendly spirit – “riding 
on positivity”  – (Fredrickson, 2009), in contrast to negative or neutral emotions, are 
more likely to incorporate a future business relationship in the negotiated contract 
(Kopelman et al., 2006). 
 
- Organizational groups tend to start working on “we” principle towards common goal 
(Fredrickson, 2009) 
 
It is natural for people to desire improvement and a change for the better. As observed 
in the change literature, often a major change can result as a consequence of a minor initial 
move and with minimal conscious effort (Saarinen and Hämäläinen, 2004). What is the role 
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of positive emotions in bringing about major output with minor input? We believe a 
paradigmatic type of major-change-through-minor-impact is one where a small initial 
change enhances the positive emotions of the participants, in many cases highly irrationally 
and beyond the objective facts, with the result that the catalysis described above starts to 
unfold. (Such logic is clearly at work in “the emergence and amplification of small change” 
analysed by Plowman et al., 2007.)  
Based on the above examples which do not intend to be comprehensive, positive 
emotions seem to fuel and broaden the individual and open the way for the person for 
Systems Intelligent actions and behaviours. The proposal here is that positive emotions are 
catalysts for Systems Intelligent behaviours and actions. In this view the momentary 
reaction circles of broadening produce a momentary Systems Intelligent observer 
(analogously to the broadened individual of Fig. 2).  
Systems intelligence aims to identify the visible and invisible parts of environment 
conceived of as a system and to work with those systems productively (Saarinen and 
Hämäläinen, 2004). Systems intelligence often involves a “thinking of thinking” process 
where the person re-thinks his own thinking. The role of mental models and other mindset-
related matters in human affairs and actions is generally acknowledged (see e.g. Senge, 
1990). The vital role of emotions is less often paid attention to, while there is little doubt of 
its significance for our decisions making processes and modes of operating (Frijda, 1988) 
Even less focus is directed on the fact that humans are systems, i.e. wholes the structure of 
which cannot be reduced to the functionings of its parts. To be a human being is to be a 
complete human being and one intertwined with “strange loops” (Hofstadter 2007).   
Thus, it can be conceived that the catalytical system of Fig. 2. might start to produce a 
self-sustaining positive loop with Systems Intelligent building effects. A remarkable 
outcome of the catalytic system described in Fig. 2 would be an individual with Systems 
Intelligent building effects. The catalytic system of Fig. 2. would amount to the upward 
spiral of positively catalysed systems intelligence.  
Bad is Stronger than Good and Systems Intelligence is Even Stronger 
One aspect of the life of a chemist is that while ideally catalysts should last forever, in 
actual reality they get damaged. Use wears them out, with the result of deactivation, i.e., 
the loss of activity of the catalyst. The causes of deactivation are basically three-fold: 
chemical, mechanical and thermal. The mechanisms of the deactivation can be grouped into 
six: (i) poisoning, (ii) fouling, (iii) thermal degradation, (iv) vapour compound formation 
accompanied by transport, (v) vapour–solid and/or solid–solid reactions, and (vi) attrition/ 
crushing. The groups (i), (iv), and (v) are chemical in nature while (ii) and (vi) are 
mechanical (Bartholomew, 2001).  
Positive and negative emotions cannot fully coexist, since the thought-action repertoire 
cannot be broad and narrow at the same time (Fredrickson, 2004). From an evolutionary 
perspective, survival and reproduction depend on giving priority to avoiding bad rather than 
pursuing good (Baumeister et al., 2001, p 360), thus suggesting that the negative emotions 
have more power compared to positive emotions (Baumeister et al., 2001). However, 
according to Maslow’s motivational theories, the positive feelings begin to direct behaviour 
when the deficiency motives such as hunger, deprivation and danger are satisfied (Maslow, 
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1968), and much of Fredrickson’s work amounts to unveiling the evolutionary and 
motivational significance of positive emotions. It is indeed clear that both negative as well 
as positive emotions are evolutionarily crucial; negative emotions as narrowing the 
thought-action repertoires in order to react to an immediate threatening situation and 
positive emotions for the benefit of growth and optimal functioning.  
In our lives in contemporary technological consumer societies, even if natural threats 
are rare in everyday life, our inbuilt and evolutional tendency to focus upon the minimizing 
of bad is still strongly functioning within us as a gift of evolution. Using again the 
chemistry inspired metaphors of the discussion above, one could say that to the extent that 
“bad is stronger than good”, we have a tendency to close our petals from light and to close 
ourselves in nonporous negativity (Fig. 4). In catalytic terms this can be described as the 
sintering of the support of the positive emotion catalyst, which amounts to reducing the 
surface area of the (love) support where the positive emotions could adsorb. This is 
analogous to the case where chemical catalysts sinter, lose their porous structure, thus 
leaving less active space for the reactions because of prolonged exposure e.g. to high gas 
phase temperatures (Richardson, 1989).  
Another usual deactivation mechanism is coke formation (Fig 5A) where carbon may 
get chemisorbed strongly as a monolayer or physically adsorb in multilayers and in either 
case block access of reactants to metal surface sites, or totally encapsulate a metal particle 
and thus completely deactivate that particle, and plug pores such that the access of reactants 
is denied inside these pores (Bartholomew, 2001). The concept of coke formation, we 
propose, is quite suggestive as a metaphor for the understanding of the obstacles to positive 
emotions. Negative emotions, especially fear, can be seen as  responsible for the coking 
effects on positivity. Fear bonds with an active site as well as with the love support of the 
positive catalyst to block the catalytic function.  
Another usual deactivation mechanism is poisoning (Fig. 5B). Poisoning takes place as 
the strong chemisorption of reactants, products or impurities on the active sites which are 
otherwise available for catalysis (Bartholomew, 2001). As in the case of Fig. 5B, sulphur 





Figure 4. Deactivation mechanism by sintering (Lassi, 2003). The active metals which 
potentially could serve as catalysts are marked as “diamond structures” on the porous 
support material. 
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The limitations to the growth of systems intelligence as described by Saarinen and 
Hämäläinen (2004, p. 69) include: reactionary mindset, static, mechanical improvement 
command- and control kind of and no-growth modes of thinking, elementalism, 
individualism, and cynism. These negative tendencies do seem to function like the catalyst 
poisons depositing on the positive emotion catalyst by the time on stream and thus limiting 
the surface area for the reactions of the upward spiral of positively catalysed systems 
intelligence.  
From the point of view of chemistry, coking is a particularly serious phenomenon. The 
significance of coking is described powerfully by Bartholomew (2001):  
”Finally, in extreme cases, strong carbon filaments may build-up in pores to the 
extent that they stress and fracture the support material, ultimately causing 
disintegration of catalyst pellets and plugging of reactor voids” 
Likewise, when seriously coked by negativity the love support of the positive emotion 
catalyst would not have porosity or space for activity and in extreme case could lead to 
disintegration and self-plugging. It could be further thought that if love is the support 
material for the upward spiral of positively catalysed systems intelligence, then the support 
material for the systems of holding back (Saarinen and Hämäläinen, 2004, Hämäläinen and 




Figure 5. Deactivation mechanisms by A) Coke formation, B) Poisoning (Lassi, 2003). 
 
Luckily, it is also possible to regenerate a catalyst. For example, coke depositions can 
be burned in the air and thereby the catalyst activity can be regained. Similarly, one could 
envision ways to regenerate the activity of a love support. It is indeed inspiring to think of 
fear as coke to be burned with the flames and air of positivity to reveal the original support 
in its purity. Likewise one could study means to minimise the sintering phenomena. One 
might be tempted here to speculate with the possibility of stepping beyond the current 
system of minimizing of bad and towards the evolution of positive mindfulness. In the latter, 
we would increase the degree of mindfulness of our positive systemic endowment, and be 
particularly mindful to fight the catalytic coke of negativity as well as the poisoning of the 
love support, thus paving the way for flourishing.  
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In most approaches to human growth reframing and rethinking of one’s own thinking 
looms large. Human beings can observe their thinking and the effects of that thinking on 
what follows. There is the possibility to become more acutely aware of flourishing-
generating modes of thinking as well as of the accompanying practices. Remarkably, 
according to recent research, randomly chosen working adults who were assigned to 
practise loving-kindness meditation, increased the daily experiences of positive emotions, 
which further increased wide range of personal resources such as increased mindfulness, 
purpose in life, social support and decreased illness symptoms (Fredrickson et al., 2008). 
Moreover, Fredrickson offers an impressive toolbox for both decreasing negativity and 
increasing positivity in her book Positivity. In our framework, reducing negativity means 
cutting down the poisoning and coking agents for the catalyst activity. The techniques that 
Fredrickson (2009) suggests seem appropriate here (disputing negative thinking, breaking 
the grips of rumination, becoming more mindful with the use of meditation techniques, 
assessing media diets, finding substitutes for gossip and sarcasm and learning to deal with 
negative people with different techniques). We encounter here efficient ways to increase 
the positivity ratio, through the cycles of Fig. 2.  
How could we speed up the overall reaction 1 in line with our process description in 
Fig. 2? We have suggested that the rate limiting step of the whole process might well be the 
adsorption on the positive emotion catalyst. Fredrickson’s list of techniques for increasing 
positivity could be interpreted as a toolkit for increasing the adsorption on the surface of 
the positive emotion. The relevant techniques include: finding positive meaning in 
situations, savouring goodness, being kind to others, following your own passions, 
dreaming of the future, connecting with nature and others, applying your strengths in every 
day situations and open your mind and heart via meditation practices (Fredrickson, 2009). 
It is worth noticing the strong presence of life-skill-like and accessible-to-all elements in 
Fredrickson’s list. The tools relate to the fundamentals of what it means to be human, as 
opposed to being formally trained or being strong in academic competencies. Objective 
knowledge does not dominate. Here one is reminded of a key emphasis of the systems 
intelligence approach in its desire to do justice to those aspects of human situational action 
capabilities that point beyond what can be known or grasped in objective terms. Laugher 
and humour, two channels of everyday systems intelligence, bear a family resemblance to 
Fredrickson’s list. “Systems intelligence is about compassion and love that makes good 
pragmatic sense” (Saarinen and Hämäläinen 2004 p. 68).  
As already suggested, Fredrickson’s theory of positive emotions can be seen as an 
articulation of the catalytic nature of positive emotions towards human flourishing. The 
systems intelligence perspective is a theory of the positively tuned, situational, action-
based, whole-and-system-oriented, sensibilities based nature of the human condition. As 
such, it is natural to assume that the systems intelligence perspective builds upon the 
functionings of the human catalysts for human growth and flourishing whatever they might 
be. Those catalysts, to the extent they exist and operate via positive emotions, are likely to 
be only partially accessible to introspection and available to the subject’s objective grasp. 
What is the nature of the skill set of a subject who is able to use positive emotions as a 
broaden-and-build reservoir in her catalytic processes towards growth? Nothing overtly 
reliant on system 2 of Stanovich and West (2000) only, we suggest!  
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Instead, the intelligence that carries the subject day in and day out, indeed since early 
infancy, will involve rich reliance of sensibilities, intuitions, subjective factors and 
intersubjectivity skills that positivistically oriented scholars have typically bypassed and 
dismissed. It is those aspects of the human endowment that the systems intelligence 
theorists have time and again highlighted. As we have tried to suggest in this paper, that 
systemic endowment assigns a key role for positive emotions. Positive emotions broaden-
and-build human flourishing in the dimension of systems intelligence. 
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Being Individually Together is Systems 
Intelligent: Lessons from Volunteerism 
Research 
Anne Birgitta Pessi 
This essay brings into dialogue the concept of systems intelligence and the 
scientific empirics of volunteering. The empirical section presents a 
phenomenological study that focused on individual-level volunteer motivation 
and the experience of volunteering. This study produced an octagon model of 
volunteer motivation − one that can be captured into the expression 
`individually together´. In the light of these findings the article proceeds to 
ponder the power and potential of the system called volunteer work from three 
perspectives: 1) what does the system generate, 2) how does the system a mould 
human beings, and 3) what kind of `in-between´ does the system endors. It is 
further suggested that the social system of volunteer work produces novel 
systemic intelligence by both promoting social interaction of individuals and by 
widening the other-centred as well as positive horizons of individuals. 
Concluding discussion focuses on further applications of the approach. 
Introduction
With this essay21 I aim to bring into dialogue the concept of systems intelligence and 
the scientific empirics of volunteering.22 Research on volunteering takes as its point of 
departure the motivation to volunteer and the experience of volunteering, subjects that have 
                                                 
21 The author wishes to warmly thank Professor E. Saarinen for the most insightful comments to previous versions of this 
text! 
22  The discussion on volunteering in this essay is based on my previous empirical phenomenological studies with Finnish 
church social work volunteers (see, particularly, Yeung 2004a). I define volunteering as a helping action by an individual 
that is conducted out of free will and without pay22 in an organizational context. Van Til (1988, p. 6), for example, has 
defined volunteering as the "helping action of an individual that is valued by him or her, and yet is not aimed directly at 
material gain or mandated or coerced by others". Three specifications are needed concerning my definition in relation to 
the van Til´s. First, I include the "helping action" but understand it broadly to include both social work and other activities 
that a person does for the benefit of others. It must also be noted that "others" might include the volunteer’s own personal 
benefits. Second, I omit "valued by him or her" from the definition as being imprecise and, to a certain extent, already 
implicitly present in the formulation "helping action". Third, I add "in an organizational context" to the definition. This 
reflects both the Nordic societal context, and the fact that van Til´s definition includes even helping one´s relatives and 
family members.   
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attracted interest and been addressed in a number of empirical studies.23 So far the 
interconnections of volunteering and systems intelligence have not been discussed in the 
literature. The aim of the present paper is to break into that fresh territory. 
Systems intelligence combines human sensitivity and engineer thinking and aims to 
integrate the scientific and humanistic traditions. It concerns intelligent action that engages 
with situations and contexts considered as interactional wholenesses with subtle systemic 
feedback mechanisms. Human life and life world is considered from the point of view of 
various systemic, interactional wholenesses − and indeed in weft of wholenesses. Human 
beings are considered to have an instinctive, action-oriented, adaptive, holistic, relational 
capability to face their environment from the viewpoint of engagement. Such ability allows 
humans connect with complex feedback mechanism. (Hämäläinen and Saarinen 2008, pp. 
vii–ix; Hämäläinen and Saarinen 2004, pp. 3–4; Saarinen et al. 2004, p.7) This fundamental 
ability is the focus of systems intelligence. Systems intelligence relates to the wider 
perspective of systemic thinking (e.g., motivational systems theory, MST, by Ford, on 
which more below). However, in relation to, for instance, the intersubjective systems theory 
(IST)24 by Stolorow et al., systems intelligence approach allows us to further understand 
particularly how to act in intersubjective social situations.25 (Martela and Saarinen 2008, p. 
204–205) Systems intelligence approach recognises the significance of first-person-related 
subjectivistic aspects of human endowment as fundamental to human systemic engagement 
(Hämäläinen and Saarinen 2008, p. ix). Furthermore, this approach appreciates the 
“everyday subtleties which continually mould the system we are a part of” (Luoma 2007, p. 
281).  
One could perhaps say that systems intelligence allows us to bring two levels of human 
life − and of analysis − into dialogue. On the one hand, the approach emphasizes the 
construct of a “system” as fundamental. Thus the systems intelligence perspective 
emphasizes that (1) systems always need to be considered. But at the same time, the 
systems intelligence perspective wants to emphasize: (2) an individual (be it a human 
being, an institution, et cetera) must never be left out of focus. The point is to reflect these 
two dimensions at the same time. It is assumed, therefore, that the two can relate to one 
another productively and adaptively – intelligently. Thus, intelligence (be it social, 
cognitive, emotional, et cetera) must also be taken into the focus. The overall focus of the 
systems intelligence approach is both in the system and on individual(s). 
                                                 
23 Previous empirical studies on volunteer motivation have shed light on a number of aspects, usually concentrating on a 
particular perspective or group, such as the motives of young volunteers (e.g., Avrahami and Dar 1993; Hustinx, 2001; 
Schondel and Boehm 2000; Serow 1991) or of elderly volunteers (e.g., Chappel and Prince 1997; Morrow-Howell and 
Mui 1989; Okun et al. 1998) or, e.g., social service volunteers (e.g., Omoto and Snyder 1993; Chambré 1995; Jakob, 
1993). There are also a number of studies, often surveys, which have considered volunteer motives as one of their focus 
among others (e.g., Gaskin and Davis Smith 1995; Sokolowski 1996). For further examples of volunteer work studies, see 
Yeung 2004a; 2004b.   
24 E.g., Stolorow and Atwood 1992; Stolorow et al. 2002. 
25 The authors also note that, on the other hand, the IST then makes us more aware of the subtleties of the context which 
opens possibilitie to become more systems intelligent. It is, indeed, a positive, synergetic cycle of two approaches. Both 
approaches also underscore both human interpretation and intersubjectivity. 
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Possibilities to apply the systems intelligence framework to both conceptual and 
empirical studies are numerous; this is evident also in the various fascinating publications26 
based on the approach. Concerning volunteering, the approach of systems intelligence is 
indeed of great interest. Three particular points of departure (Saarinen et al. 2004, pp. 7–8) 
can be noted, based on the knowledge of previous studies on volunteer work and of the 
phenomenon of volunteering itself:27 
 
− Holistic viewpoint 
o focus on human  
o focus also on whole, on an entirety 
 
− Constructive, positive way of looking at phenomena 
o potentials rather than obstacles 
o individuals who wish to succeed together 
 
− Emphasis also on individual responsibility. 
 
The initial impression is that in relation to volunteering systems intelligence offers a 
potentially fruitful view of the human being as a volunteering subject. In particular, from 
the point of view of volunteering research, it is natural to perceive individuals as having 
latent potentials and being more generous and enthusiastic than what is often expected − a 
view also emphasized in Saarinen’s “positive philosophical practice” and “philosophy for 
managers” (see e.g. Saarinen 2008). I personally believe that the ability of individuals to 
inspire others − and to be inspired by others − is virtually limitless. As, for instance, great 
spiritual traditions emphasize and research demonstrates, human beings want to leave a 
meaningful life.  
What is particularly important to realize is that 
humans are relational beings (see e.g. Fogel 1993). They 
need connection to others for their growth and in 
particular in order to be fully inspired (Saarinen et al. 
2004, pp. 9–10). We do it anyway but typically not to the 
full. As Hämäläinen and Saarinen (2007, p. 301) have 
concluded: ”World will be a better place if more people 
become mindful of their systemic endowment and start to 
make more use of what they’ve got”. This, as they note, 
refers us to consider our immediate everyday lives as well as the collective life of mankind. 
The thread running through all my previous research has been the theme of meaningful 
life of an individual in a social context. In my earlier work (e.g., Pessi 2008) I have argued 
that social ties form the basis of human happiness and contentment; individuals are indeed 
interested in the welfare of others, not only their own; they are willing to invest time and 
money for common purposes; and possibilities for constructing deepening social solidarity 
                                                 
26 E.g., Hämäläinen and Saarinen (eds.) 2008; Hämäläinen and Saarinen (eds.) 2007; Luoma 2009; Luoma et al. 2008. 
27 Further, e.g., review of previous literature, see Yeung 2004b. 
From the point of view of
volunteering research, it is
natural to perceive
individuals as having latent
potentials and being more
generous and enthusiastic
than what is often expected.
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truly exist. The key idea of the present article is to provide a meta-level analysis which 
seeks to study the extent to which the systems intelligence approach resonates to the 
empirics of volunteer work.  
Empirical Approach: Phenomenology, Motivational Systems Theory and 
Systems Intelligence 
The focus of this section is to present the approach of one particular study that focused 
on individual-level volunteer motivation and the experience of volunteering. This empirical 
study28 in focus applied descriptive phenomenological analysis to volunteer motivation. 
Several modifications of philosophical phenomenology have emerged. Notwithstanding 
this, most phenomenological inquiries exhibit the following characteristics: 1) epoché – 
setting aside initial biases and prejudices, 2) description – the primary aim of describing, 
not explaining, and 3) equalization – the avoidance of hierarchies and considering items of 
description as initially of equal significance. (Ihde 1977; Grossmann 1984; Spinelli 1989) 
Descriptive phenomenology focuses on situations in which meanings and values are 
experienced as phenomena. Such phenomenology has a human function in that it can 
provide our existence with an extended sense of the world, “the discovery of the life 
world”, as well as a deepened sense of ourselves. (Spiegelberg 1975, pp. 60–61) Such a 
goal − to deepen one’s understanding of self and the world − resonates strongly with the 
systems intelligence approach. Furthermore, the view of human nature applied in the 
current research is in line with the view by Giorgi (1985, pp. 74–75): phenomenological 
psychology emphasizes that the nature of subjects as societal, historical beings includes the 
role of “relevant others” as well as “the personal past”.  
What is then the phenomenon of concern to the present study? Is it individual motives, 
experiences and the meaning of volunteering, or the phenomenon of volunteer motivation? 
The focus is on the phenomenon of volunteer motivation an sich. The interview data 
includes both descriptions of experiences of events as they had occurred as well as people’s 
interpretations of those experiences. In order to conduct phenomenological data-determined 
analysis on volunteer motivation, a flexible and holistic concept of motivation29 is needed. 
To that effect, I have used Ford’s (1992) motivational systems theory (MST). This theory is 
designed to represent all three traditional human motivation phenomena: direction, 
energization, and regulation of behavior. Ford developed the MST stressing "the need to 
integrate separate but generally compatible ideas into a systematic understanding". The 
MST is based on a general theory of human development and functioning, D. Ford’s (1987) 
living systems framework, a holistic theory and conceptualization of human beings as self-
                                                 
28 In detail, see Yeung 2004a. 
29 Early theories of motivation viewed humans as reactive organisms obeying their internal and external forces, such as 
needs (e.g., Maslow 1970), drives (e.g., Miller 1951), ad instincts (e.g., Freud 1926), theories emphasizing stability-
maintaining mechanisms. The next stage in motivation theorizing included three new aspects. First, the theme of self-
evaluation appeared in self-worth theories, such as those of Harter (1990). The second innovation was personal agency 
beliefs as in Deci and Ryan’s (1985) self-determination theory. The third new approach included concentration on 
cognitive factors in theories such as cognitive dissonance theory (e.g., Festinger 1957). McClelland (e.g., 1958; 1989) was 
the first to include the three main motivational components (direction, energization, and regulation of behavior) into a 
theoretical view of motivation.  
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constructing adaptive control systems. Such an overall perspective, naturally, fits very well 
also to the systems intelligence approach. The MST definition of motivation is as follows: 
motivation consists of the organized patterning of personal goals, emotional arousal 
processes (i.e., emotions), and personal agency beliefs (i.e., capability and context beliefs). 
(Ford 1992, pp. 3, 73–5, 78) From the point of view of system intelligence, four factors of 
MST seem particularly relevant: 1) the comprehensiveness and the width of the definition 
of motivation, 2) motivation is not considered a vacuous inner factor but a phenomenon 
including environment and individual reflection, 3) motivation is seen as interconnecting 
both motives and the elements of commitment, and 4) motivation is reflexive and changes 
over time.  
My study aimed to develop a novel model in order to understand volunteer motivation 
in terms of the experience and its meaning for individual volunteers. The interviewees (14 
men, 4 women, age range from 26 to 68) are volunteers of the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
of Finland or its church associations in three of the biggest towns in Finland. Their relation 
to the Church varies from active to passive. The topics of the interviews covered the past 
and present experiences and meanings of the subjects’ voluntary work as well as views on 
the future of personal volunteering. The themes of motivation and commitment to 
volunteerism were not discussed in terms of “why” questions but were incorporated into 
other issues in all the three time-perspectives: past, present, future. All in all, the 
phenomenological analysis30 progressed via four stages: 1) gaining a sense of the whole 
data, 2) distinction of meaning units, 3) analysis of the meaning units, and 4) from 
synthesis to a consistent description. The analysis gave rise to “the octagon model of 
volunteer motivation”, which is presented in the following section. 
The Octagon Model of Volunteer Motivation 
The study on volunteer motivation − holistically understood31 − with 18 interviewees 
yielded as many as 767 elements of volunteer motivation (i.e., meaning units in the 
phenomenological analysis). The overall analysis − based on analysis of meaning units, 
toward synthesis and a consistent description − concluded four data-determined continuums 
to describe the phenomenon of volunteering experience and motivation for it. Together the 
four continuums form an octagonal map (see Figure 1.), the idea being that each 
motivational element (767 items) can be located somewhere in this map, either into one 
(e.g., giving) or two poles (along a dimension, e.g., getting and giving or between 
                                                 
30 More in detail, see Yeung 2004a. Giorgi (1985) has developed a model for phenomenological empirical psychology, 
which the present study follows in general outline. Giorgi´s sketch has been criticized (Wertz 1985) for its outline 
character and lack of detailed reflection on procedure in each of its phases. The present researcher agrees, but views this 
as a merit of the model, since the outline character of the sketch permits various applications and prevents one from seeing 
this approach as mechanistic. The present article shares the view of Keen (1975, p. 41) that phenomenology is not 
reducible to a set of instructions – it is more a research posture. 
31 Motives, in this study, refer, generally speaking, to factors that make a person act. The interviews, however, did not 
concern only reasons to volunteer. Instead, the motivational elements were more versatile: such elements refer to 
cognitive/emotional/social processes that cause the arousal, direction, and persistence of (voluntary) actions that are goal 
directed (on the concept of motivation, see Ford 1992).  
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dimensions, e.g., thought and action).32 Thus, these eight poles, by no means, exclude each 
other. 
 
                                 
 
Figure 1. The octagon model of volunteer motivation. 
 
Looking at the eight poles of the model, we can see that volunteer motivation includes 
various, also contradictory, elements at a particular point in time. Motivation can − and 
surely it will − also alter over time along the coordinates of the octagonal map. The model 
also has a meta-dimension: the model illustrates that volunteer motivation and experience 
lies in the interaction within the inward–outward dimension of a person; volunteer 
motivation may be more inward oriented − without being more egoistic − towards varieties 
of thought, distance, continuity, and getting (i.e., arrows pointing left). Also, the appeal of 
volunteering may concern the outward elements of an individual − without being 
necessarily more altruistic − in the numerous ways of action, proximity, newness, and 
giving (i.e., the arrows pointing right). All in all, late modern volunteer motivation appears 
a complex, versatile phenomenon. 
In terms of late modernity,33 individuals are today freer – and more compelled – to 
reflect on their relations with others, their position in (to use the concepts of the octagon 
model) getting and giving, continuity and change, thought and action, and to fulfil these 
                                                 
32 As the 767 elements were located on the map − i.e., the data-determined model tested with its own data − the process 
was not content analysis or rigid grouping but rather interpretation; another researcher might have reached different 
conclusions. As a whole, this process was quite smooth, indicating that the four dimensions succeed in capturing the 
richness of the individual experiences and the meanings of the data. All in all, 532 motivational elements found a place 
along the four dimensions (either at the pole or in middle), and 235 at the intersection between two different dimensions. 
The latter particularly indicate the holistic and interlocking nature of the four dimensions, which together form a 
consistent description and synthesis of the volunteer motivation phenomena. The process of building them into one 
synthetic model (both contentual and visual) was heuristic. Numerous versions were tried, especially visually, before the 
final synthesis – an octagon model − was achieved. 
33 On late-modernity – and individualistic choices, emancipation, and self-fulfillment related to that – see, e.g., Giddens 
1990; 1991, 1994; Fukuyama 1999, and on the risks of the late-modern choises, see e.g., Beck 1992; 1994. 
Chapter 8: Being Individually Together is Systems Intelligent: Lessons from Volunteerism Research 
 187
Volunteering is experienced




or concreteness of their
chosen form of activity.
standings either through social activities or more private contemplation − proximity or 
distance. I have suggested (Yeung 2004b) that the best way to capture the overall findings 
on volunteer motivation is under the concept of `individually together´: the idea being that 
individuality, independence and social ties, communality mingle in individual experiences. 
For instance, many people seem to long for even quite intimate social encounters and 
networks in volunteerism, even though such networks are generally restricted, by choice, to 
volunteering. Notice also that the meta-dimension of the octagon model exemplifies what 
Charles Taylor (1992) calls wavering between individualism and relativism − that is, 
culture of authenticity cannot be reduced to either hyper-individualism or soft relativism − 
and volunteering indeed is a fruitful empirical arena for such “wavering”.34 These results 
indicate that volunteering may play a role in both individualism and relativism as well as 
collectivism − and more particularly, in their mixtures. Volunteering includes moves along 
the late modernity processes, such as individualization, yet also indications of its 
countermoves. The way I see it, volunteering is a particular arena for change, personal 
search, and individuality − as well as continuity and communality. While it is true that the 
self today is presented with more choices regarding ways of being, one does not have to 
lose a sense of oneself and the others.  
Next, let us take a few concrete examples concerning the most typical motivations 
found in this study. First, getting versus giving. Volunteering is experienced rewarding in a 
number of different ways; the interviewees mentioned the meaningfulness, conviviality, or 
concreteness of their chosen form of activity. Voluntary 
work also offers possibilities to express one’s 
individuality and self-fulfilment.35 Volunteers had also 
derived well-being and emotional security from 
volunteering, including experiences of success and the 
feeling of being needed and having a personal place in 
society. Then, giving may be related to, for instance, 
altruism or personal crises, based on which a person feels 
s/he has something to offer via volunteering. It must be 
noted also that getting and giving relate to each other a lot − and more than with any other 
motivational poles. A chief feature of volunteering is that it is very much a matter of mutual 
giving and reciprocity: it is very much about gaining by giving. More than is apparent 
prima facie, volunteer work is about mutual help, and it can be a source of considerable 
personal growth through its specific kind of interaction. The results showed that often when 
volunteering is initiated with altruistic wishes, the volunteers have been surprised at how 
much they actually gain.36 
Second, continuity versus newness; continuity may relate to elements such as personal 
identity or life-span (such as teachings of the childhood motivating a person to volunteer 
                                                 
34 Further, see Pessi and Nicolaysen 2009. 
35 This is in line with Wuthnow (1998, p. 218) reporting volunteers claiming to have grown as a result of their 
volunteering by learning and finding self-images, and reporting (1991) expressions of individuality through volunteering.  
36 The direction of typical motivation change in this data was particularly from altruism towards further gaining which is 
the reverse of Wuthnow (1995) who however studied young people particularly. Some of the interviewees of this study 
also explained their satisfaction that their values had “softened”, became more social and altruistic.  
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even decades after), or seeing volunteering as an extension to paid work. Elements related 
to one’s identity and the continuity of its manifestations such as being an active character, 
being empathetic, or maintaining one’s skills also played a role. Newness then may relate 
to, for instance, personal change. The appeal of volunteering as novelty may also lay in its 
interesting new subject matter; it may represent a counter-balance to or extension of one’s 
life milieux. It also provides opportunities for learning, meeting challenges, and personal 
growth – that is, gaining a new perspective on things.37 Third, thought versus action; 
thought may be related to, for example, living through personal matters and crises via 
volunteering, and action to, for instance, filling up spare time, wanting to get involved in 
concrete activities of praxis.  
Fourth, distance versus proximity. The social nature of the activities seems to be one of 
the central appeals of volunteering. Volunteer work is a context for meaningful 
cooperation, and its shared goals are stimulating to most of the interviewees of this study. 
In the longer run, social contacts (to other volunteers, to paid workers, to those being 
helped, et cetera) had deepened the commitment to volunteering in most cases. An integral 
part, more meaningful to some volunteers than others, is a sense of communal spirit. This 
spirit is often based on a sense of acceptance, joint experiences, a shared sense of humor 
and, more practically, chats and discussions. But the pole of distance, in the late-modernity 
perspective, is also fascinating; the interviewees included, for instance, a young lady who 
was very stressed by her work and still wished to become a friend to an elderly. She, 
however, never wanted to see other volunteers or participate in any group activities of the 
organisation. They ended up  agreeing that she can only be reached via cell-phone. She 
gained, thus, both positive social distance and proximity in volunteering. Volunteering 
indeed was a flexible and fruitful choice, both for her and for this particular organisation. 
All in all, volunteering may also offer meaningful interaction while a person wishes to limit 
her/his social networks. The individual may experience being a member of a group even 
though s/he might actually volunteer only every now and then and never (wish to) meet a 
larger volunteer group.  
Individually Together: Volunteering as a Social System 
The starting point in this article was the assumption that the approach of systems 
intelligence is likely to resonate to the empirics of volunteer work. The previous section 
presenting the empirical findings illustrated such resonance in meta-level: the three 
elements of the systems intelligence approach (noted in Introduction) − holistic viewpoint, 
constructive way of looking at phenomena, and emphasis on individual responsibility – are 
indeed all necessary in aiming to capture the colourful grass-roots level experiences of 
volunteering. These viewpoints are clearly relevant to the social system of volunteering.  
But we need to move along from the meta-level. Hämäläinen and Saarinen (2007, pp. 
9–15) have captured in an illustrative manner the power and potential of systems. The three 
key aspects of systems, according to Hämäläinen and Saarinen, are: 1) what does the 
                                                 
37 These results put more emphasis than several previous studies on informal gaining of fresh experiences and 
perspectives, not so much on actual learning per se. Also Marx (1999) has reported motivation element of getting fresh, 
new perspective in human services. 
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system generate, 2) how does the system mould human beings, and 3) what kind of `in-
between´ does the system endorse (the way that people influence and are influenced by one 
another − in the most positive scenario there may be uplifting, stimulating in-between, to 
reach out towards the upscale register). Such three-fold perspective is useful in trying to 
understand dynamics of any social system, including volunteering. I will next aim to 
illustrate the nature of volunteering – based on the above presented empirical findings – in 
terms of the three aspects of systems as identified by Hämäläinen and Saarinen. In other 
words, what is the power and potential of the system called volunteer work? 
First, what does volunteering generate? The fascinating essence of volunteering as a 
social system concerns its fundamental feature: free will. Unlike many of the social systems 
of everyday life volunteer work is activity that – by definition – can be based only on free-
will choice, both when one starts to volunteer and when one continues to volunteer. The 
social system of volunteering is thus delicate like a love-affair that is based on subject’s 
own choice: it may flourish and bring joy only in as much as the subject chooses it (just 
like lovers who know that only free will binds them together). Because volunteerism is 
voluntary, it can be discontinued at any time. There is an obvious, what could be called, a 
free-will-delicate-dilemma: the commitment to the system can only rise from an individual 
choice. Consequently, the mere existence of the social ties of volunteering is of intrinsic 
value. They are a value that the social system of volunteering has generated. But even more 
remarkably, the system of volunteerism generates the choices that make it emerge – it is a 
system of generating acts of choice (and whatever subjective correlates they will give rise 
to). 
But even more is taking place. The social nature of the activities is actually one of the 
central appeals of volunteering, as indicated above in the findings. My work on 
volunteering underscored the fundamental role of social ties and interaction. One could 
argue that this is not very surprising finding at all, since volunteerism is in essence a social 
activity – something people do together. However, besides the free-will-delicate-dilemma 
also the late-modernity perspective complicates the matter. The fundamental question is 
then whether and why individuals long for social ties, networks, and interaction through 
participating in the collective action of volunteering – and why exactly there. This overall 
finding − the central role of social ties in volunteer motivation and commitment − is 
captured well by Habermann (2001, p. 378): 
“Voluntary work is, first and foremost, about being 
a fellow human being … meeting with “the other” 
in an attempt to understand our own life.”  
As a result, the social system of volunteering 
indeed has the capacity of generating something 
quite remarkable: a strengthened sense of being a 
fellow human being and meeting with the other, and 
all that out of an individual free-will choice. It is a 
social system of individually together: people wanting to come together, to do something 
together, to do for others. It is a system that offers more individual choice and flexibility 
than, for instance, work life – yet at the same time a system that offers more and deeper 
meanings than, for instance, watching TV at home. 
The social system of volunteering
has the capacity of generating
something quite remarkable: a
strengthened sense of being a fellow
human being and meeting with the
other. It is a social system of being
individually together.
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The system of volunteer work also generates expanding social ties. Volunteering offers 
an opportunity to come together with friends and acquaintances but also to meet new 
people. The findings above indicated that a wish for new, perhaps even close social 
networks might be highlighted during transitions of personal life, such as retirement, or 
becoming unemployed or a house-parent. Volunteer work offers experiences of communal 
spirit and personal meaningfulness for those who long for it, and may well guard against 
the “fundamental psychic problem in late-modernity”. (Giddens 1991, p. 9) While 
volunteering offers multiple social ties, most people prefer these ties to be restricted to the 
context of volunteering (illustrating perhaps the fragmented nature of late-modernity). 
Thus, volunteering often offers meaningful connections with others: bonds, networks, even 
forms of dependence, in which an individual can experience being a member of a group 
even though s/he might actually volunteer only every now and then. Interestingly, 
volunteering may offer such experiences even if one practically never meets the entire 
volunteer group. The ties of the social system of volunteering still generate a point of 
reference for personal and societal identity construction.  
Furthermore, my research concluded that volunteering is sometimes interestingly felt to 
be a channel for promoting social interaction – a volunteer as a mouthpiece of values, 
altruism, faith, and caring. This illustrates the fact that even though volunteerism does not 
necessarily contribute so much to solving the societal problems of a given context, it 
maintains and promotes hope to a world in which people still care for each other and 
respond to each others’ needs. People indeed are capable of sympathy − and the system of 
volunteer work inspires, promotes, maintains, and expands that aspect of us. Volunteering 
may thus generate forces that might have life-changing influence for an individual (both the 
helper and the one being helped) and – via that in part also − to a society. Real influence 
may start from small. 
Second, how does volunteering (as a system) mould human beings? We have already 
seen glimpses of the ways in which the social system of volunteering generates something 
truly significant. Many of these generative results of volunteerism as a system concern also 
the ways in which volunteering moulds and alters the volunteers as human beings. 
Examples include identity construction, expanding social ties, or acting as carriers of 
caring. Perhaps the strongest moulding power, however, concerns the versatility of the 
social system of volunteering. It is indeed a multifaceted, and sometimes complex, system 
which does not include only the fellow volunteers − with their large versatility − but also, 
for instance, possible `clients´ (that is, e.g., the people whom the volunteer assists) and the 
paid staff in the same organisations. It is more complex system than what one meets in, for 
instance, work places or hobbies. The range of social networks is captured in comments of 
the interview data, such as: “We as a group – sometimes have such a feeling of nearness 
and encounter that whew! But then also very gutsy individualism – very individualistic 
views” (a man in his thirties). The multifaceted social ties of volunteer work offer multiple 
mirrors for an individual; such power to mould is evident in the empirical findings in the 
ways in which volunteers experience, for instance, growing via volunteering, gaining by 
learning from others, or going through personal matters in volunteer work.  
Perhaps more than anything else, volunteerism as a system molds the volunteer as a 
human being capable of doing good to another human being. Thus the volunteer has a 
chance of stepping beyond “systems of holding back” (Hämäläinen and Saarinen 2004). 
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Third, may volunteering endorse ‘in-between’ − the way that people influence one 
another? The fundamental features of volunteer work – doing something together, doing 
something for others – are indeed about influencing one another. Even more importantly, 
they are also about being influenced by others; this indeed relates to the system’s power to 
mould, such as the ability to learn from others in volunteering. In my view, however, the 
most central role of in-between in volunteering relates to its potential to promote 
togetherness. According to my findings, the social system of volunteer work establishes 
togetherness in a dual manner (reinforcing the systems nature of the set-up). On the one 
hand, like-mindedness advances solidarity; for example, some volunteers experience 
connection with people who are similarly action-orientated or altruistic as themselves. On 
the other hand, other individuals particularly wish to meet (or/and enjoy having met) people 
very different from themselves. Furthermore, a shared value-basis and religiosity may play 
a particular role in this experience of esprit de corps.38  
Whether the co-volunteers are like-minded or not, a fundamental feature of volunteer 
networks is sharing - the sharing of deeds and thoughts. Sharing demands and promotes 
trust. Trust indeed is a central notion here: it signals a particularly valuable and subtle `in-
between´ of togetherness in the social system of volunteering. Maintenance and promotion 
of societal trust is a particular challenge under porous social conditions of late-modernity. 
The abstract concept of trust is empty without the actual social circles in which it actualizes 
itself, in volunteering either in a practical way (such as co-operation, or mutual helping) or 
less directly (such as a positive atmosphere or shared values). The results of my empirical 
work indicate that one’s drive towards trust might support and direct behavior towards 
volunteering − and in turn be maintained and strengthened by it. More specifically, 
volunteering is a particularly valuable source of societal trust in 
that the possibility of connecting with people representing 
various backgrounds and different values and norms. While this 
might result in conflict in many social systems, my research 
showed that such diversity among the nets of volunteers and (for 
instance) paid workers was felt to be a benefit, illustrating what 
Giddens39 calls “active trust”, a typical late-modern trust 
mechanism based on open confrontation with others.  
Overall, my results picture volunteering as double-edged in relation to the construction 
of societal trust: volunteering promotes societal trust but it also demands particularly firm 
trust.40 This brings us back to what was noted earlier concerning the centrality of free will 
in volunteering. As Wuthnow (1998, pp. 198, 200–201) states, while volunteering and civic 
associations cultivate trust, their success depends upon even more subtle factors such as 
common courtesy.41 This resonates to the inductive logic of the systems intelligence 
                                                 
38 Several religious small group cases reported in Wuthnow (ed.) (1994) also indicate the power of small groups in 
renewing individual faith and ties with larger denominations and networks.  
39 Caccamo 1998, 126, an interview with Giddens. 
40 Volunteering, e.g., demands firmer trust than paid-work, which relies less on voluntariness and flexibility. 
41 Wuthnow (1998) also felicitously notes that civil organizations “provide opportunities for people to come together to 
define the conditions under which behavior will take place as if trust were present”. 
Volunteering is a trust-
promoting social system
− and indeed social
systems intelligence can
only be built on (certain
degree of) trust.
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approach: the systems intelligence notes exactly the power of such small subtle factors. 
Micro behavior indeed matters; for instance, even if buying roses to each other is an every-
day possibility to most − or all − of us, we seldom do it. A non-rose-buying system 
(unfortunately) dominates. (Saarinen and Hämäläinen 2004, pp. 30) It was noted already 
earlier in this article: real influence may start from small. 
All in all, these two aspects of trust (to promote versus to demand) in volunteering 
affirm and nourish each other. Volunteering is a trust-promoting social system − and indeed 
social systems intelligence can only be built on (certain degree of) trust. Sharing and trust 
are also about reciprocity. A fundamental feature of the social systems of volunteering is 
the cycle of giving and getting. Volunteering is generally felt by volunteers to be an area of 
reciprocity − involving mutual help, and personal growth in social interaction. Reciprocity 
includes emotional rewards such as dispelling a sense of emptiness, earning people’s 
gratitude, and getting a feeling of being needed and having a place in society. My results 
indicated, to give an example, that often when volunteering is initiated with altruistic 
wishes, the volunteers have been surprised at how much they actually gain.42 Reciprocity in 
volunteering significantly establishes individual motivation and commitment and, in part 
thus further, societal solidarity formation.  
Reciprocity of the social system of volunteering also indicates the interrelatedness of 
the three notions tackled here; the ability to generate, to mould, to inspire a trust-rich `in-
between´. They each promote the other two, and are being promoted by them. All in all, 
analytically it would be impossible to draw clear black-and-white distinctions. What is 
important, however, is to conclude that we have now seen some examples of the power and 
potential of the system called volunteer work. The systemic perspective seems to truly offer 
novel light on volunteer work.  
Individually Together: Volunteering as Systems Intelligence 
The previous section indicated that systemic viewpoint indeed resonates and offers 
illuminating perspective to the empirics of volunteer work. But what about systems 
intelligence? The core finding above was that volunteer motivation may be captured in the 
concept of ‘individually together’, and now I would like to ponder whether being 
individually together in volunteerism is systems intelligent.  
My empirical findings discussed in this article have indicated that volunteering takes 
place in a unique context of a system that the giver and the receiver together (and also, for 
instance, volunteers themselves together) constitute. The receiver is not only a receiver but 
an active component, as shown in the results. S/he is a component that participates and 
takes part in creating the generating, moulding, `in-between´ power of the social system of 
volunteering. Something novel and unique is being created, together – and more 
particularly individually together.  
Systems are being created together, and these systems influence each of its part (what 
they get, gain, whom they become, et cetera) as well as the whole, also in volunteering. An 
                                                 
42 The direction of typical motivation change in my data was particularly from altruism towards further gaining which is 
the reverse of Wuthnow (1995) who however studied young people particularly. Some of my interviewees also explained 
their satisfaction that their values had “softened”, became more social and altruistic.  
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intelligent way to act is to bear such a systems perspective clearly in mind. The key point is 
that the system that is being constituted together – in a deeply reciprocal manner – can be 
beneficial to the subjects in unexpected ways, in a number of respects and in a number of 
dimensions. Thus, it is intelligent for a subject to reach out to the beneficial aspects 
provided by the volunteer work system. In that sense, volunteerism indeed involves 
systems intelligence. Being individually together in volunteerism is systems intelligent.  
But what does this mean in concrete terms? I would like to suggest that we can note 
two particular ways in which the social system of volunteer work enhances systems 
intelligence: first, ‘social interaction promotion’ by volunteering, and second, ‘widening 
the horizons’ by volunteering. In other words, the social system of volunteer work produces 
novel systemic intelligence by both promoting social interaction of individuals and of 
whole society, and by widening the horizons of individual volunteers. I argue that this is 
unique intelligence that no other institution or phenomena in our society can in a similar − 
and in such vast − manner generate. Let us next look at these two notions in detail, and 
particularly in dialogue with some recent studies in positive psychology. 
First, social interaction promotion. As we saw above, the role of social interaction in 
volunteer motivation − and in the commitment to volunteer in the longer run − cannot be 
exaggerated; it provides immense benefits for the individual.43 For an individual, such 
networks play a central role also in the construction of personal (social) identity. From the 
point of view of the whole society, volunteering promotes such beneficial virtues as 
sharing, trust, and reciprocity. At best, volunteer work generates considerable positive 
cycles. Systems intelligence as social intelligence, and as related to social skills,44 can be 
lived out, practiced and developed in volunteer work. Systems intelligence approach, 
however, is also able to underscore the fact that volunteering may simply be enjoyable − 
having pleasurable time together with others. Gaining experiences, becoming braver, 
having fun!  
The fact that volunteering involves both individuality and communality is particularly 
relevant from the point of view of systems intelligence – it amounts to growing individually 
in the context of living together. Volunteering can provide meaningful social contacts and 
opportunities for activities also in situations in which a person wants to maintain her/his 
personal boundaries and distance − as seen above. One could of course donate money to 
charity, but the characteristics of volunteer work as a system of mutual uplift, and as a 
practice of face-to-face interactions and practical engagement, involve benefits not 
accessible in the more mechanical give-money-for-people alternative. As a result, the social 
system of volunteerism has its special appeal to many. As noted in the Introduction, the 
ability of individuals to inspire others − and to be inspired by others − is practically 
limitless. We have in this article seen little glimpses of such inspiration in the social context 
of the motivation to volunteer and the meaning of volunteer work. 
Second, widening the horizons by volunteering. Volunteering widens individual 
horizons, and this takes places – and indicates systems intelligence − in two dimensions: 
                                                 
43 For other studies on the role of social ties in volunteer motivation, see e.g., Clary et al. 1992; 1996; 1998, Chambré 
1995; Jakob 1993.  
44 See, e.g., Vilén 2004. 
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Social bonds are not only 
valuable resources but also 
elicitors of positive emotions, 
and people in positive 
emotional states broaden their 
sense of self to include close 
others. 
both by widening positive horizons and emotions and by widening social other-centred 
(altruistic) horizons. Let us start with the latter. Above we saw the very central role of 
wanting to give in volunteer motivation. All the volunteers interviewed were − to certain, 
varied extent − motivated by their general desire to help: wanting to promote the well-being 
of others and to be useful to them. Some of them also emphasized their altruistic 
characteristics and experienced volunteering as natural, even as a calling, in the spiritual 
and other senses. Personal difficult experience had also motivated the volunteers to help, 
some wishing to help others through their own recovery from crisis. Altruism is intimately 
related to other motivational elements, in particular, ‘giving’ and ‘thought’; volunteers 
intend to help, and their values and norms exist hand-in-hand with their altruistic wishes. 
All in all, volunteer work is able to widen − and often in a deeply meaningful manner − the 
social system (intelligence) of an individual. Being altruistic, kind, generous, giving makes 
indeed sense: it has indirect (and possibly also more direct) consequences in the systemic 
setting that is the life of a volunteer.45 And not only the individual life but also life in a 
wider society; for instance, generative energy of an individual toward future generations 
and wider society (such as being a parent or professional know-how). Furthermore, it is 
particularly generative worry and perspective rather than generative actions per se that 
correlates with experienced well-being. (Morfein et al. 2004)46 
Furthermore, previous research has in a fascinating 
manner indicated in relation to widening social horizons 
that not only doing good deeds but also just witnessing 
them – which also takes place in volunteering – gives 
individuals pleasurable feeling (such as warm, pleasant 
feelings in the chest) that may further trigger desires of 
doing food deeds themselves (e.g., Haidt 2003). Such 
pleasurable physical feelings have recently been 
reported in relation to witnessing various kinds of good 
deeds and excellence: gratitude, admiration, and elevation (i.e., emotional response to 
moral exemplars); particularly the last one motivates individuals to be kind and caring to 
others. Furthermore, grateful individuals appear to focus on opportunities to give back to 
others; they may be cued in to social interaction and particularly giving qualities of 
potential interaction partners. (Algoe and Haidt 2009) Indeed, there is much of literature 
indicating that gratitude is central in reciprocal altruism. It motivates people to pay back 
favours. But moreover, gratitude is not just simple tit-for-tat; gratitude motivates people to 
get closer, to strengthen social ties, to move from exchange relations to more communal 
relations. (E.g., Algoe and Haidt 2009; Algoe et al. 2008; McCullough et al. 2001; 
Fredrickson 2004; Trivers 1971; Clark and Mills 1979) Volunteering indeed may be an 
arena for not only witnessing good deeds but also of gratitude. 
                                                 
45 This does not, however, mean that we need to – or should − view volunteering as a tool or of intrumental value. 
46 Morfein and colleagues build here on the classical theory by Erik H.Erikson´s (1977) concerning eight-staged model of 
individual development. The core task of the seventh step, in middle adulthood, is ego development outcome, meaning 
generativity versus self absorption. The task in generativity is to perpetuate culture and transmit values through, e.g., the 
family and working. Strength comes through care of others and production of something meaningful that contributes to 
betterment of society.  
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Such consequences of ‘widening the horizons’ by volunteering towards others and 
altruism may even have interesting health dimensions: for instance, research has indicated 
connection between higher rates of volunteering and lower rates of heart conditions 
(Hyyppä 2001; 2002). Volunteers have wider horizons – and they may even live longer. In 
larger perspective this is in line with, for instance, the classical ‘nun study’ by Danner et al. 
(2001). This study on autobiographies of 180 Catholic nuns indicated a very strong 
association between positive emotional content in youth and risk of mortality in later life; 
there is a highly distict positive link between emotional content in early adulthood and 
longevity six decades later. Emotion-based constructs reflect patterns of coping with, for 
example, negative life events (Danner et al. 2001, 804). Positive emotions may have muting 
effects even on the bodily responses to negative emotions (Fredrickson and Levenson 
1998). 
These social other-centred horizons take place individually together: people gain by 
giving, give by gaining. Volunteer work is a field of reciprocity, in a complex manner. Also 
recent altruism research47 shows that caring for others carries considerable benefits for 
individuals. This takes us towards our second dimension: widening not only of social other-
centred but also particularly positive horizons by volunteering. Interestingly, previous 
research48 has also indicated that caring for others and being happy are interrelated 
phenomena. Cohn and Fredrickson (2006; also Waugh and Fredrickson 2005) have shown 
that social bonds are not only valuable resources but also elicitors of (further) positive 
emotions, and people in positive emotional states broaden their sense of self to include 
close, and potentially close, others49. Positive emotions not only broaden one’s perspective 
but also motivate one to do things that will build resources for the future (Fredrickson 
1998). Also, people in positive emotional states form more inclusive social groups 
(Dovidio et al. 1998) and even perceive strangers in a more positive light (Forgas 2001).  
Repertoires of positive emotions, all in all, build a variety of personal resources for 
individuals; they may be physical (such as skills, health; see, e.g., Danner et al. 2001) or 
social (e.g., support networks, see, e.g., Aron et al. 2000), intellectual (e.g., control, 
knowledge, intellectual complexity, see, e.g., Csikszentmihalyi and Rahunde 1998) as well 
as psychological (such as optimism, creativity, see, e.g., Fredrickson et al. 2003)50. What is 
deeply significant is that such resources accrued by positive emotions are durable: they 
outlast the transient emotional states (Fredrickson and Branigan 2005, 315). Also, it has 
been indicated that positive emotions and broadened thinking influence each other 
                                                 
47 This has also served evolutionary purposes; concerning evolutionary theory of altruism, see, e.g., Brown and Brown 
2006; Flescher and Worthen 2007. For literature review concerning altruism, see, e.g. Pessi and Saari 2008; Pessi 2009; 
Yeung 2006.  
48 E.g., Post and  Neimark 2007. 
49 See also, e.g., Fredrickson 1998; 2001; Fredrickson and Branigan 2005 concerning in more general Barbara L. 
Fredrickson´s `broaden-and-build´ theory of positive emotions which indicates that positive emotions are complex 
phenomena that help create adaptive behavior. The core hypothesis is that positive emotions broaden the scope of 
attention and thought-action repertoires of individuals. In contrast, negative emotions narrow thought-action repoertoires. 
All in all, this theory notes that positive emotions orient our pshyciology and cognition toward cumulative long-term 
benefits. 
50  Further, see, Fredrickson and Branigan 2005; Fredrickson 1998; 2001. 
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reciprocally. Together they may produce an upward spiral over time; people may 
experience true increases in their well-being. (Fredrickson and Joiner 2002; Burns et al. 
2008) Volunteering is a possible arena of multifaceted positive emotions and well-being: it 
offers joy, contentment, even elements of happiness − and often particularly through the 
experiences of meaningfulness and of purpose, sometimes altruism. Volunteers thus all in 
all have both wider and more positive horizons − and they may live not only longer but 
happier. 
These moments of widening horizons in the social system of volunteering may be small 
and quiet, yet deeply touching, moments of social encounter: a forcefield constituted from a 
human being to a human being. This again resonates to the earlier noted inductive logic of 
the systems intelligence approach; small in big. The ability to see the whole only begins 
from looking at the incremental and seemingly insignificant − what is close at hand. The 
ability to create larger effects begins from an ability to generate relevant small deeds. 
Volunteer work in its individually together sense is such activity: large in small, significant 
in incremental. Still it may have life-changing influence. 
Concluding Discussion  
This essay has focused on the inter-connections between the systems intelligence 
approach and individual volunteer experiences and motivation. It has indicated that not 
only is the systemic viewpoint fruitful for understanding volunteer work in a deeper manner 
but that volunteer work indeed promotes systems intelligence. The article suggested that the 
social system of volunteer work produces novel systemic intelligence by both promoting 
social interaction of individuals and by widening the other-centred as well as positive 
horizons of individuals. This concluding discussion will focus on further applications of the 
approach. 
Individuals need connection to others and to greater meanings - to horizons of 
significance as Charles Taylor51 puts it - in order to fulfil and maintain their authenticity. 
Volunteer work individually together offers such connection via the two ways of systems 
intelligence enhancement: both via social interaction promotion and by widening positive 
and other-centred horizons. Both ways are also virtues in human social interaction; 
Saarinen et al. (2004, p. 14) have noted both features and virtues of systems intelligence 
behavior. The former include, among others, humour, listening, encouragement, kindness, 
and the latter, for example, optimism, wisdom, courage, openness, and sympathy. (Saarinen 
et al. 2004, p. 18) Indeed, experiences in volunteer work may teach and support all noted 
elements. Volunteer work is an excellent example of not only social behavior but pro-social 
behavior; it is not always about helping and altruism but it is always about individual 
coming together, doing together, and particularly doing something for a shared purpose, 
often for the common good. Indeed, individually together. 
Where next? Systems intelligence approach can be utilized for interventions, in two 
levels: in everyday life, and in organisations (e.g., at an educational institutions or a 
company) (Saarinen et al. 2004, p. 18). We similarly need interventions to further invest in 
                                                 
51 Further on the connections between the empirics of volunteering and the philosophy of Charles Taylor, see Pessi and 
Nicolaysen (2009). 
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volunteer work and citizen participation; for example, it seems a rewarding way to study 
and learn ethics at schools would be to actually do volunteer work, together with others?52 
Another area of volunteer research – and praxis – that is still under-developed is the 
volunteer work projects in corporate business, as part of both corporate social responsibility 
and human resources development (both learning and recreation). These are just two 
examples in which the systems intelligence approach and the praxis of volunteering could - 
and should - be put into synergy in order to improve, and to conduct further research on, the 
everyday life and wellbeing of social systems. 
Moreover, just looking at the overall phenomenon of volunteer work raises dozens of 
questions and viewpoints for the systems intelligence approach; what about the systems 
intelligence of volunteer work organisations? How would a systems intelligent institution 
develop their volunteerism activities? Definitely they would at least pay attention to the 
volunteers themselves; to learn from their viewpoint, to respect the individual-level and 
group-level systems intelligence. Furthermore, can we talk about the systems intelligence 
of the public sector in promoting − or not − volunteer work? And how about different kinds 
of volunteer groups in comparison, and in relation, to each other? What if we would look at 
third sector organisations and corporate business in cooperation − how would the systems 
intelligence then look like?  
The questions, and possible applications, could continue and continue. A critic may say 
that systems intelligence approach looses something in its width and in its enormous 
application potential. It is a bit like the critics viewpoint on the loved-and-hated concept of 
social capital in sociology; it manages, at the end, in the critics’ view, to illustrate nothing 
or everything concerning social interaction. I have, however, firm belief in the systems 
intelligence approach. The width of the approach opens indeed both inter-disciplinary 
potential and challenge for social sciences. Concerning the former, the core contribution, in 
my view, of the systems intelligence approach lies in its fantastic, holistic and indeed 
respectful view of (every single) human (social) being. Concerning the latter, challenges are 
always to be loved − and deeply − by the academia as well as all others wanting to learn 
and to develop.  
References 
Algoe, Sara B. and Jonathan Haidt. 2009. Witnessing excellence in action: The ‘other-
praising’ emotions of elevation, gratitude, and admiration. The Journal of Positive 
Psychology, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 105–127.  
Algoe, Sara B., Jonathan Haidt and Shelly L. Gable. 2008. Beyond reciprocity: Gratitude 
and relationships in everyday life. Emotion, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 425–429.  
Aron, Arthur, Christina C. Norman, Elaine N. Aron, Colin McKenna and Richard E. 
Heyman. 2000. Couple’s shared participation in novel and arousing activities and 
experienced relationship quality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 78, 
no. 2, 273–284.   
                                                 
52 Further on such an idea, and research on such projects abroad, see, e.g., Grönlund and Pessi (2008). Concerning systems 
intelligence in the school context, see also, e.g., Salaspuro-Selänne and Soini (2004). 
Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 198
Avrahami, Arza and Yechezkel Dar. 1993. Collectivistic and individualistic motives among 
kibbutz youth volunteering for community service. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 
vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 697–714. 
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society. Towards a new modernity. trans. M. Ritter. London: 
Sage.  
Beck, Ulrich. 1994. Reinvention of politics: Towards a theory of reflexive modernization. 
In Reflexive modernization. Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order, 
Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, eds., Oxford: Polity, pp. 1–55.  
Brown, Stephanie L. and Michael R. Brown. 2006. Selective investment theory: Recasting 
the functional significance of close relationships. Psychological Inquiry, vol. 17, no. 1, 
pp. 1–29.  
Burns, Andrea B., Jessica S. Brown, Natalie Sachs-Ericsson, E. Ashby Plant, J. Thomas 
Curtis, Barbara L. Fredrickson and Thomas E. Joiner. 2008. Upward spirals of positive 
emotion and coping: Replication, extension, and initial exploration of neurochemical 
substrates. Personality and Individual Differences, vol. 44, pp. 360–370.  
Caccamo, Rita 1998. The transition to late modern society: A conversation with anthony 
giddens. International Sociology, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 117–133. 
Chambré, Susan M. 1995. Being needful: Family, love, and prayer among AIDS 
volunteers. In Research on the Sociology of Health Care, Jennie J. Kronefeld, ed., vol. 
12, pp. 113–139.  
Chappel, Neena L. and Michael J. Prince. 1997. Reasons why canadian seniors volunteer. 
Canadian Journal on Aging, vol. 16, pp. 336–353. 
Clark, Margaret and Judson Mills. 1979. Interpersonal attraction in exchange and 
communal relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 37, no. 1. 
pp. 12–24.  
Clary, E. Gill, Mark Snyder and Robert D. Ridge. 1992. Volunteers’ motivations: A 
functional strategy for the recruitment, placement and retention of volunteers. Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 333–350. 
Clary, E. Gill, Mark Snyder and Arthur A. Stukas. 1996. Volunteers’ motivation: Findings 
from a national survey. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 
485–505. 
Clary, E. Gill, Mark Snyder, Robert D. Ridge, John Copeland, Arthur A. Stukas, Julie 
Haugen and Peter Miene. 1998. Understanding and assessing the motivations of 
volunteers: A functional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 
74, no. 6, pp. 1516–1530.  
Cohn, Michael A. and Barbara L. Fredrickson. 2006. Beyond the moment, beyond the self: 
Shared ground between selective investment theory and the broaden-and-build theory of 
positive emotion. Psychological Inquiry, vol. 17, pp. 39–44. 
Csikszentmihalyi, Mihály and Kevin Rathunde. 1998. The development of the person: An 
experimental perspective on the ontogenesis of psychological complexity. In Handbook 
of Child Psychology: vol. 1. Theoretical Models of Human Development, William 
Damon, series ed., 5th edition, New York: Wiley, pp. 635–684.   
Chapter 8: Being Individually Together is Systems Intelligent: Lessons from Volunteerism Research 
 199
Danner, Deborah D., David A. Snowdon and Wallace V. Friesen. Positive Emotions in 
early life and longevity: Findings from the nun study. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, vol. 80, no. 5, pp. 804–813.  
Deci, Edward L. and Richard M. Ryan. 1985. Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in 
human behavior. New York: Plenum.  
Dovidio, John F., Samuel L. Gaertner, Alice M. Isen, Mary Rust and Paula Guerra. 1998. 
Positive affect, cognition, and the reduction of inter-group bias. In Intergroup Cognition 
and Intergroup Behavior, Chester A. Insko, John Schopler and Constantine Sedikides, 
eds., Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbau, pp. 337–366.  
Erikson, Erik H. 1977. Childhood and society. London: Paladin/Grafton books. 
Festinger, Leon, ed. 1957. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston: Row Peterson. 
Flescher, Andrew Michael and Daniel L. Worthen. 2007. Altruistic species. Scientific, 
philosophical, and religious perspectives of human benevolence. Philadelphia: 
Templeton Foundation Press. 
Fogel, Alan. 1993. Developing through relationships: Origins of communication, self, and 
culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ford, Donald H. 1987. Humans as self-constructing living systems: A developmental 
perspective on behavior and personality. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale.  
Ford, Martin E. 1992. Motivating humans. Goals, emotions and personal agency beliefs. 
London: Sage. 
Forgas, Joe P. 2001. The affect infusion model (AIM): An integrative theory of mood effect 
on cognition and judgments. In Theories of mood and cognition, Leonard L. Martin and 
Gerald L. Clore, eds., Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 99–134.  
Fredrickson, Barbara L. 1998. What good are positive emotions? Review of General 
Psychology, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 300–319.  
Fredrickson, Barbara L. 2001. The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The 
broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, vol. 56, pp. 218–
226. 
Fredrickson, Barbara L. 2004. Gratitude (like other positive emotions) broadens and builds. 
In The psychology of gratitude, Robert A. Emmons and Michael E. McCullough, eds., 
New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 145–166.  
Fredrickson, Barbara L. and Christine Branigan. 2005. Positive emotions broaden the scope 
of attention and though-action repertoires. Cognition and Emotion, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 
313–332. 
Fredrickson, Barbara L. and Thomas Joiner. 2002. Positive emotions trigger upward spirals 
toward emotional well-being. Psychological Science, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 172–175.  
Fredrickson, Barbara L. and Robert W. Levenson. 1998. Positive emotions speed recovery 
from the cardiovascular sequelae of negative emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 12, pp. 
191–220. 
Fredrickson, Barbara L., Michele M. Tugade, Christian E. Waugh and Gregory R. Larkin.  
2003. What good are positive emotions in crises?: A prospective study of resilience and 
Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 200
emotions following the terrorist attacks on the United States on september 11th, 2001. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 84, no. 2, pp. 365–376.  
Freud, Sigmund. 1926. A General introduction to psychoanalysis. trans. G. S. Hall. New 
York:Boni and Liveright. 
Fukuyama, Francis. 1999. The great disruption. Human nature and the reconstitution of 
social order. London: Profile Books.  
Gaskin, Katherine and Justin Davis Smith. 1995.  A new civic europe? A study of the extent 
and role of volunteering. London: Volunteer Centre. 
Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The consequences of modernity. Cambridge: Polity. 
Giddens, Anthony. 1991. Modernity and self-identity. Self and society in the late modern 
age. Cambridge: Polity. 
Giddens, Anthony. 1994. Living in a post-traditional society. In Reflexive modernization. 
Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order, Ulrich Beck, Anthony 
Giddens and Scott Lash, eds., Oxford: Polity Press, pp. 56–109. 
Giorgi, Amedeo. 1985. The phenomenological psychology of learning and the verbal 
learning tradition. In Phenomenology and psychological research, Amedeo Giorgi, ed., 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, pp. 23–85. 
Grossmann, Reinhardt. 1984. Phenomenology and existentialism: An introduction. London: 
Routledge. 
Grönlund, Henrietta and Anne Birgitta Pessi. 2008. Osallisuuden asenteet ja teot – nuoret 
ikäryhmät vapaaehtoistoiminnassa. In Polarisoituva nuoruus? Nuorten elinolot –
vuosikirja, Minna Autio, Kirsi Eräranta ja Sami Myllyniemi, eds., Helsinki: 
Nuorisoasiain neuvottelukunta and Stakes, pp. 49–59.  
Habermann, Ulla. 2001. Postmoderne helgen? Om motiver til frivillighed. Lund 
Disserations in Social Work 3. Lund: Lunds Universitet. 
Haidt, Jonathan. 2003. Elevation and the positive psychology of morality. In Flourishing: 
Positive psychology and the life well-lived, Corey L. M. Keyes and Jonathan Haidt, eds., 
Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, pp. 275–289.  
Harter, Susan. 1990. Causes, correlates, and the functional role of global self-worth: A life-
span perspective. In Competence considered, Robert J. Sternberg and John Kolligian, Jr., 
ed., New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 67–97. 
Hustinx, Lesley. 2001. Individualisation and new styles of youth volunteering: An 
empirical exploration. Voluntary Action, vol. 4, pp. 57–76. 
Hämäläinen, Raimo P. and Esa Saarinen. 2004. Esipuhe. In Systeemiäly. Näkökulmia 
vuorovaikutukseen ja kokonaisuuksien hallintaan, Raimo P. Hämäläinen and Esa 
Saarinen, eds., Helsinki University of Technology, pp. 3–4.  
Hämäläinen, Raimo P. and Esa Saarinen. 2007. Systems intelligent leadership. In Systems 
intelligence in leadership and everyday life, Raimo P. Hämäläinen and Esa Saarinen, 
eds., Helsinki University of Technology, pp. 3–38.  
Chapter 8: Being Individually Together is Systems Intelligent: Lessons from Volunteerism Research 
 201
Hämäläinen, Raimo P. and Esa Saarinen. 2008. Why systems intelligence? In Systems 
intelligence. A new lens on human engagement and action, Raimo P. Hämäläinen and 
Esa Saarinen, eds., Helsinki University of Technology, pp. vii–ix. 
Hämäläinen, Raimo P. and Esa Saarinen, eds. 2007. Systems intelligence in leadership and 
everyday life. Helsinki University of Technology.  
Hämäläinen, Raimo P. and Esa Saarinen, eds. 2008. Systems intelligence. A new lens on 
human engagement and action. Helsinki University of Technology.  
 Hyyppä, Markku. 2001. Why do Swedish-speaking Finns have longer active life? An area 
for social capital research. Health Promotion International, vol. 16, pp. 55–64. 
Hyyppä, Markku 2002. Elinvoimaa yhteisöstä: sosiaalinen pääoma ja terveys. Jyväskylä: 
PS-kustannus. 
Ihde, Don. 1977. Experimental phenomenology: An introduction. Albany: University of 
New York Press.  
Jakob, Gisela. 1993. Zwischen dienst und selbstbezug. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. 
Keen, Ernest. 1975. A primer in phenomenological psychology. New York: Holt Reinhart 
and Winston. 
Luoma, Jukka. 2007. Systems thinking in complex responsive process and systems 
inteligence. In Systems intelligence in leadership and everyday life, Raimo P. 
Hämäläinen and Esa Saarinen, eds., Helsinki University of Technology, pp. 281–294. 
Luoma, Jukka. 2009. Systems intelligence in the process of systems thinking. Master´s 
Thesis. Helsinki University of Technology. 
Luoma, Jukka, Raimo P. Hämäläinen and Esa Saarinen. 2008. Perspectives on team 
dynamics: Meta learning and systems intelligence. Systems Research and Behavioral 
Sciences, vol. 25, pp. 757–767. 
Martela, Mikko and Esa Saarinen. 2008. The nature of social systems in systems 
intelligence: Insights from intersubjective systems theory. In Systems intelligence. A new 
lens on human engagement and action, Raimo P. Hämäläinen and Esa Saarinen, eds., 
Helsinki University of Technology, pp. 189–210. 
Marx, Jerry D. 1999. Motivational characteristics associated with health and human service 
volunteers. Administration in Social Work, vol. 23, pp. 51–66. 
Maslow, Abraham H. 1970. Motivation and personality. 2nd ed. New York: Harper and Ro. 
McClelland, David C. 1958. Personality. New York: Holt Dryden.  
McClelland, David C. 1989. Human motivation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McCullough, Michael E., Shelley D. Kilpatrick, Robert A. Emmons and David B. Larson. 
2001. Is gratitude a moral affect? Psychological Bulletin, vol. 127, no. 2, pp. 249–266.  
Miller, Neal E. 1951. Learnable Drives and Rewards. In Handbook of experimental 
psychology, S. S. Stevens, ed., New York: John Wiley, pp. 435–472.  
Morfei, Milene Z., Karen Hooker, Jamie Carpenter, Carolyn Mix and Eric Blakeley. 2004. 
Agentic and communal generative behavior in four areas of adult life: Implications for 
psychological well-being. Journal of Adult Development, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 55–58. 
Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 202
Morrow-Howell, Nancy and Ada Mui. 1989. Elderly volunteers: Reasons for initiating and 
terminating service. Journal of Gerontological Social Work, vol. 13, pp. 21–34. 
Okun, Morris A., Alicia Barr and A. Regula Herzog. 1998. Motivation to volunteer of older 
adults. Psychology and Aging, vol. 13, pp. 608–621. 
Omoto, A.M. and Snyder, A. 1993. AIDS Volunteers and their motivations. Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership, vol. 4, pp. 157–176. 
Pessi, Anne Birgitta. 2008. What constitutes experiences of happiness and the good life? 
Building a novel model on the everyday experiences. CollEgium − Studies Across 
Disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences, vol. 3, pp. 59-78. 
Pessi, Anne Birgitta. 2009. Altruism. In International encyclopedia of civil society. 
[forthcoming, 2009]. 
Pessi, Anne Birgitta and Bente Nicolaysen. 2009. Towards good life by volunteering? − 
Bringing the work of Charles Taylor into dialogue with sociological research on 
volunteering. − Diaconia. [forthcoming, 2009]. 
Pessi, Anne Birgitta and Juho Saari. 2008. Hyvä tahto − auttamisen asenteet ja rakenteet 
Suomessa. Helsinki: STKL. 
Post, Stephen and Jill Neimark. 2007.  Why good things happen to good people? New 
York: Broadway Books. 
Saarinen, Esa. 2008. Philosophy for managers: Reflections of a practitioner. Philosophy of 
Management, vol. 7, Supplement. 
Saarinen, Esa and Raimo P. Hämäläinen 2004. Systems intelligence: Connecting 
engineering thinking with human sensitivity. In Systems intelligence: Discovering a 
hidden competence in human action and organizational life, Raimo P. Hämäläinen and 
Esa Saarinen, eds., Helsinki University of Technology, pp. 9-38.  
Saarinen, Esa, Raimo P. Hämäläinen and Ville-Valtteri Handolin. 2004. Systeemiäly 
vastaan systeemidiktatuuri − 50 kiteytystä. In Systeemiäly. Näkökulmia 
vuorovaikutukseen ja kokonaisuuksien hallintaan, Raimo P. Hämäläinen and Esa 
Saarinen, eds., Helsinki University of Technology, pp. 7–20.  
Salaspuro-Selänne, Reija and Sanna Soini. 2004. Systeemiälykäs opettaja systeemisessä 
luokassa. In Systeemiäly. Näkökulmia vuorovaikutukseen ja kokonaisuuksien hallintaan, 
Raimo P. Hämäläinen and Esa Saarinen, eds., Helsinki University of Technology, pp. 
95–120. 
Schondel, Connie K. and Kathryn E. Boehm. 2000. Motivational needs of adolescent 
volunteers. Adolescence, vol. 138, pp. 335–344. 
Serow, Robert C. 1991. Student and voluntarism: Looking into the motives of community 
service participants. American Educational Research Journal, vol. 28, pp. 543–556. 
Sokolowski, S. Wojciech. 1996. Show me the way to the next worthy deed: Towards a 
microstructural theory of volunteering and giving. Voluntas, 7, pp. 259–278. 
Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1975. Doing phenomenology. Essays on and in phenomenology. 
Hague: Martinus Hijhoff. 
Chapter 8: Being Individually Together is Systems Intelligent: Lessons from Volunteerism Research 
 203
Spinelli, Ernesto. 1989. The interpreted world. An introduction to phenomenological 
psychology. London: Sage.  
Stolorow, Robert D. and George E. Atwood. 1992. Context of being − The intersubjective 
foundations of psychological life. Hillsdale: Analytic Press.  
Stolorow, Robert D., George E. Atwood and Donna M. Orange. 2002. World of experience: 
Interwaving philosophical and clinical dimensions in psychoanalysis. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Taylor, Charles. 1992. The ethics of authenticity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Til, Jon van. 1988. Mapping the third sector. Voluntarism in a changing social economy. 
New York: The Foundation Center.  
Trivers, robert L. 1971. The Evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of 
Biology, vol. 46, pp. 35–57.  
Vilén, Jaakko. 2004. Systeemiälyn pelisäännöt − systeemiäly sosiaalisena taidokkuutena. In 
Systeemiäly. Näkökulmia vuorovaikutukseen ja kokonaisuuksien hallintaan, Raimo P. 
Hämäläinen and Esa Saarinen, eds., Helsinki University of Technology, pp. 227–234. 
Waugh, Christian Emil and Barbara L. Fredrickson. 2005. Nice to know you: Positive 
emotions, self-other overlap, and complex understanding in the formation of new 
eelationships. Journal of Positive Psychology, vol. 1, pp. 93–106. 
Wertz, Frederick J. 1985. Method and findings in a phenomenological psychological study 
of a complex life-event: being criminally victimized. In Phenomenology and 
Psychological Research, Amedeo Giorgi, ed., Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
pp. 155–216.  
Wuthnow, Robert. 1995. Learning to care: Elementary kindness in an age of indifference. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Wuthnow, Robert. 1998. Loose connections. Joining together in America’s fragmented 
communities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Wuthnow, Robert, ed. 1994. “I come away stronger”: How small groups are shaping 
American religion. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans. 
Yeung, Anne Birgitta. 2004a. The octagon model of volunteer motivation: Results of a 
phenomenological analysis. Voluntas. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit 
Organizations, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 21–47.  
Yeung, Anne Birgitta. 2004b. Individually together. Volunteering in late modernity: Social 
work in the Finnish Church. Helsinki: The Finnish Federation for Social Welfare and 
Health. 
Yeung, Anne Birgitta. 2006. Altruism and civil society. In search of a good society: 
Introduction to altruism theories and their links to civil society. CSWP Series, 25. 
London: London School of Economics. 
 
 
Essays on Systems Intelligence 
 204
Author 
Pessi works as an Academy Research Fellow, as well as a project leader and a deputy 
director, in Collegium for Advanced study, University of Helsinki. She is an Adjunct 
Professor in theology (church and social studies) and in sociology (welfare sociology). 










Cinema Author’s Embodied Simulatorium – 
a Systems Intelligence Approach 
Pia Tikka 
The essay relates the cinema author’s creative processes to the systems 
intelligence approach. The underpinning assumption is that cinema stands forth 
as an intersubjective frame of sensemaking. This idea is reflected against the 
early systemic views of the Russian filmmaker and theoretician Sergei M. 
Eisenstein. In its unfolding, the cinema author’s creative processes are 
described from a particular point of view, that is, that of the enactive mind 
point by means of introducing the neuroscientific concept of embodied 
simulation as the bodily basis of these processes. This is applied in the 
hypothetical model of cinema author’s mental workspace, the embodied 
simulatorium as it is termed. In this paper it will be discussed how embodied 
processes constitute what in this volume is referred to as systems intelligence. 
Introduction
In the first half of 20th century, the Russian film director Sergei M. Eisenstein was 
engaged in the challenging process of describing the organizational principles of the unified 
systemic whole of an artistic process, in particular, that of authoring cinema.53 He held that 
the status of film director (later ‘author’) should not be like that of a dictator but rather one 
of a holistic agent, whose creative work synthesizes the socio-emotional needs of his 
audience, that was to say, the interest of the Soviet citizens. This was so not only in 
theoretical terms but also in practice. Eisenstein was situated right in the eye of the storm of 
radical social changes, doing his best to make things work in the Soviet system. Loosely 
related to the present context of this volume, Eisenstein was making his best out of the 
conditions of his life-environment in terms of what may be called systems intelligence. 
My focus will be on reflecting the embodied aspects of cinema authoring process, as 
I’ve conceived of them in my book Enactive Cinema: Simulatorium Eisensteinense (2008), 
                                                 
53 I argue elsewhere (Tikka 2008, 2009) that an important framework of Eisenstein’s systemic thinking was Alexander 
Bogdanov’s scientific Marxism formulated in Essays in Tektology: The General Science of Organization (1913-1922). 
Tektology formed the underground force of the Soviet ‘psychoengineering’ and may retrospectively be acknowledged as 
pioneering Cybernetics and General Systems Theory in Europe and in the United States. (see Susiluoto 1982, Biggart el 
al. 1998).  
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against the holistic framework of systems intelligence. To meet this challenge, I will 
highlight what may be called author’s embodied simulatorium (Ibid., p. 243). The notion 
refers to a kind of mental workspace that enables the author to imagine, create, and manage 
cinematic processes that are assumed emotionally coupled to those of the spectators (Ibid., 
p. 230). Apparently conflicting with the first impression, this assumes that the processes 
within embodied simulatorium are assumed to be, to a great extent, sharable, 
intersubjective, and socially conditioned. Eisenstein seems to talk about the intersubjective 
core of what is now described as embodied simulatorium when he writes: ”It is obvious that 
a work of this type has a very particular effect on the perceiver, not only because it is raised 
to the same level as natural phenomena but also because the law of its structuring is also the 
law governing those who perceive the work, for they too are part of organic nature (…) the 
secret consists of the fact that in each case both us and the work are governed by one and 
the same canon of law” (Eisenstein 1987, p. 12). 
Intuitively seen, considering the multiple agents involved in creating cinematic systems 
(e.g., actors, other artistic and technological collaborators, and ultimately, the spectators), 
the authoring process seemingly calls for socio-emotionally sensitive authorship that 
performs in a systems intelligent manner. Referring to Saarinen and Hämäläinen (2004, p. 
3), a systems intelligent author, employs the pragmatic 
and collaborative attitude of an individual in her efforts 
of making things work within “feedback intensive” 
social environments. At its best, a systems intelligent 
effort may empower an upward-spiraling movement of 
“cumulative enrichment and improvement” (Saarinen 
and Hämäläinen 2007, p. 64). In his times, Eisenstein 
exemplified such a positive attitude, when he dreamed 
of ‘psycho-engineering’ the Soviet working masses 
towards social well-being with the help of his emotion-driven machinery of cinema.54 
Highlighted as "a key form of human intelligence and a fundamental element in the 
adaptive human toolbox" (Hämäläinen and Saarinen 2004, p. 3), which fundamentally 
involves also human sensitivity (Saarinen and Hämäläinen 2004, p. 9), systems intelligent 
approach may be argued to involve similar aspects of socially oriented psycho-engineering 
that were elaborated in Eisenstein’s times. 
The early Russian systems scientist Alexander Bogdanov’s Tektology: The General 
Science of Organization (1913–28) and the contemporary German holism in the field of 
biology seemed to converge in Eisenstein’s approach to human cognition as a 
“multisensuous” emotion-based system (Tikka 2008). While many later systemic 
approaches aimed at a similar kind of universal explanation framework, they seemed to 
overlook the emotional aspects of human nature in favor of the rational engineering aspects. 
In 1948, the year of Eisenstein’s death, Norbert Wiener introduced cybernetics mainly as a 
theory of governing complexities, followed by Ludvig van Bertalanffy’s influential 
General Systems Theory (1968). Today’s systems theories tend to emphasize rather the self-
                                                 
54 The idea of artists as ‘psycho-engineers’ and art as a method for organizing “the human psyche through the emotions" 
was also advocated in the writings of Sergei Tretiakov, a close friend and collaborator of Eisenstein. (In Tretiakov 1923, 
p. 202 in Manovich 1993, p. 22; Bordwell 1993, pp. 5, 116, 136; Tikka 2009, p. 222) 
Apparently conflicting with the 
first impression, the processes 
within embodied simulatorium 
are assumed to be, to a great 
extent, sharable, 
intersubjective, and socially 
conditioned. 
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organizing characteristics than ‘steering’, with regard to human technological, biological, 
cognitive, and social systems (e.g., Varela et al. 1991). However, only recently the 
unconscious emotional aspects of human cognition, which Eisenstein emphasized, have 
been legitimated as the fundamental basis of the ‘higher-level’ cognitive systems, for 
example, in neurosciences (e.g., Damasio 1999, 2003), or in cinema studies (e.g., Tan 1996, 
Grodal 1997, Smith 2003, Tikka 2008). Instead, outside of the earlier, what one may call 
‘emotion-hostile’ scientific discourse, the cinema practice has for over the last hundred 
years relied on the author’s intuitive abilities to harness the embodied emotional systems 
into the service of practical cinematic systems.  
In this essay systems intelligence is viewed as an omnipresent defining characteristic 
cognition, or mind. It will mainly draw from the enactive cognitive sciences and 
neurosciences, thus deliberately deviating from the psychological or philosophical views on 
learning organizations, team dynamics, or artificial intelligent systems, which so far have 
dominated the discussion on systems intelligence. Cinema author’s creative process is 
tackled in terms of today’s scientific understanding on enactive mind (Varela et al. 1991) 
and embodied simulation (Gallese 2003, p. 2005). The article is concluded with a case 
study, applying the conceptual model of embodied simulatorium (Tikka 2008) in practice. 
Enactive Mind  
Many contemporary cognitive scientists would consider mind as an emergent feature of 
a psychophysiological brain or brain–body system, while the most radical group goes as far 
as to argue that the mind transgresses from the traditional brain–body system to the world. 
As representatives of the latter view, the proponents of enactive cognitive sciences, 
Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch (1991), assume that mind is 
embodied and emerges in the holistic first-person experience of being and playing a part in 
the intersubjective world. In this essay the notions of mind, body, and world are considered 
as interrelated, interdependent, and to constitute parallel conceptual perspectives on the 
subject’s enactive situatedness. In agreement with the dynamist view, I presume that a 
systems intelligent cinema author not only observes and manipulates the system ‘from 
outside’, but herself exists and acts  ‘within’ the system, i.e. the system embeds the author 
as well as is embodied in the author’s enactment. A guiding metaphor for the enactive 
cognitive scientists features “a path exists only in walking” (Varela et al. 1991, p. 239), i.e., 
an enactive mind comes into being through its continuously changing situatedness in the 
world.  
According to other contributions systems intelligence 
seems to be an elementary aspect of what I’ve come to 
understand as an enactive cognition, in deviation from 
traditional cognitivist views. For comparison, consider how 
Varela et al. (1991) differentiate the ‘cognitivist’ and 
‘enactivist’ answers to the question what is cognition? The 
cognitivist relies on “information processing as […] rule-
based manipulation of symbols” (Ibid., 42), while an enactivist relies on “history of 
structural coupling that brings forth a world” (Ibid., 206). For the second question, how 
cognition works, the cognitivist harnesses “any device that can support and manipulate 
If cinematic systems are
assumed to model the
recursive character of
cognition,   they should
also meet the recursive
character of such systems.
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discrete functional elements —the symbols. The system interacts only with the form of the 
symbols (their physical attributes), not their meaning” (Ibid., 42), while for the enactivist 
the system works “[t]hrough a network consisting of multiple levels of interconnected, 
sensorimotor subnetworks” (Ibid., 206). Further, when one wants to know when a cognitive 
system is functioning adequately, the cognitivist would answer: “When the symbols 
appropriately represent some aspect of the real world, and the information processing leads 
to a successful solution to the problem given to the system” (Ibid., 42–43). An enactive 
cognitive system, instead, functions adequately “[w]hen it becomes part of an ongoing 
existing world (as the young of every species do) or shapes a new one (as happens in 
evolutionary history)” (Ibid., 207). 
Generally, a cognitive entity can be modeled as a dynamical system involved in 
continuous interaction processes with other entities, the underpinning cognitive dynamics 
of which emerge in a complex self-referring dynamics, as stipulated by Port and van 
Gelder’s dynamical approach to cognitive structures (1995), the developmental dynamics 
of Thelen and Smith (1996), or the dynamical patterns theory of Kelso (1995), and carrying 
similarities with, for example, the Multiple Drafts model by Dennett and Kinsbourne 
(1992). The dynamist’s basic explanatory toolbox applies also for the system around of the 
systems intelligent person. Such processes are characterized by ‘inputs linked with 
outputs’, intra- and interrelated feedback loops, top-down processes interacting with 
bottom-up processes, bifurcations and transgression in continuously fluctuating states, to 
name few of the plausible functions. As Hämäläinen and Saarinen note, the system 
theoretical concepts “may seem technical but they are directly applicable in the 
characterization of systems intelligence”, and useful tools for, to name an example, 
analyzing social dynamics of a problem solving situation (2007, p. 72). Also, complex 
cognitive or social systems typically generate effects beyond the modes and functionalities 
of their components, have primacy over their components while at the same time these 
components influence the system, and, in addition, show emergent features, not reducible to 
the features of its elements (Saarinen and Hämäläinen 2004, pp. 11–12).  
Inspired by the dynamical systems view to mind, I posit that cinema can be seen to 
reflect the underlying psycho-dynamics of human experience by applying the bio-
cybernetic concepts of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1980). In this light, 
cinema can be seen to stand, on one hand, for (1) an emergent embodiment of an author’s 
creative expressiveness built on both conscious and unconscious dimensions of mind 
(autopoietic system), and, on the other, for (2) an authored simulation model of the 
experiential world, which in the cinema composition becomes partially framed according to 
the author’s subjective selective decisions (allopoietic system). The latter kind of system 
carries features of an autonomous, self-referential simulation system, which, when once 
produced and set into movement, goes on playing out the fictional world independently of 
its author.  
The human body could be viewed as an organic framework, the psychophysiological 
principles of which define the framework of any cinematic system, but also, in reciprocal 
manner, the dynamics of cinematic work could be understood as modeling human thought. 
This suggests that a complex system authored by a cognitive entity would constitute a 
model for aspects of its author’s proper mind, such as attitudes, interests, aesthetic 
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preferences, and ethics, embedded in the cinematic work as a particular kind of expressive 
worldview. 
The two hypothetical domains of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ are often modeled as separate 
domains of mind, this for the sake of conceptual clarity. Yet, the reader is reminded that the 
holistic view to cognition allows converging both the unconscious and conscious 
conceptualizations of human mind into one notion of embodied, or enactive cognition. In 
Damasio’s terms, on the one hand, this perspective reveals one’s conscious, cognitive act of 
perceiving oneself in interaction with the world (exteroception), and, on the other, it 
involves simultaneous unconscious perceptual activities (interoception), which are oriented 
to controlling the wellbeing of the subject (2003, p. 107). Consequently, adopting the first-
person perspective and subjectivity may lead to a distorted understanding of mind, if only 
the conscious aspects of mind are taken into consideration. Alas, cinema can be regarded to 
represent simultaneously a kind of miniature model of phenomenal world (an exteroceptive 
model ‘outwards’) and a model of the emotion dynamics of the embodied simulatorium (an 
interoceptive model ‘inwards’) (Tikka 2008). 
Although cinema can be seen as a model of human experience, the practical 
implementation is at any rate complicated, particularly if modeling complexity of the scale 
of mind is set as the starting point. Consider, for example, the recursive character of 
cognition that suggests a subject’s earlier experience (e.g. memories, habits, and bodily 
routines) modifies all new experiences (e.g. perception, imagination, and anticipation), as 
implied by Neisser (1976). Such cognitive processes are understood to emerge in what have 
been characterized as ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ loops of cognition, the first “deeply rooted in its 
physical implementation as its most immediate environment (inner loops of mind-
environmental participation)” and the latter “extensively involved in the surrounding 
environment in terms of culture, society, economy, etc. (outer loops)”  (Kaipainen 1996, 
266). Although cinema may be claimed to “externalize” its creator’s mental processes, the 
traditional linear structure of cinema is typically ‘fixed’ and lacks the dynamics of 
reorganization “on the fly”. From the dynamical systems point of view, if cinematic 
systems are assumed to model (even partially) the recursive character of cognition, they 
should also meet the recursive character of such systems. To create a model of such a 
system, the author may introduce a feedback loop into the cinematic framework. In fact, 
elsewhere I have sketched a new genre of enactive cinema (Tikka 2008, 2006), which 
constitutes a direct systemic coupling between the spectator’s psychophysiology and the 
cinematic system.  
While the attribute of ‘enactive’ carries the explicit sense of meaningful, read here, 
systems intelligent, acting in the world, it is the embodied simulation of the world and the 
other people that will provide the environment for creative enactment of the cinema author. 
Embodied Simulation 
In contrast to the common view to cinema as a private subjective experience, Gallese’s 
concept of embodied simulation (2005) allows a description of cinema as an intersubjective 
experience. Elsewhere I have argued that embodied simulation constitutes the cinema 
author’s neuronal basis of understanding and imagining the behavior and feelings of other 
people (Tikka 2008). Furthermore, the concept of embodied simulation allows framing the 
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creative process of filmmaking and the related spectator experience into one 
intersubjectively shared complex system. 
My understanding of this draws also from the discovery of the mirror neuron system, 
first in monkey brain (di Pellegrino et al. 1992, Rizzolatti et al. 1996, among others) and in 
human brain (e.g., Fadiga et al. 1995, Hari et al. 1998). Their findings suggest that merely 
observing someone to grasp an object actually activates in the pre-motor regions of the 
brain the same neural networks that would be activated if the observer were actually 
grasping the object herself. This discovery has been celebrated amongst the neuroscientists 
as a plausible neuronal explanation for intersubjectivity and socio-emotional behavior, such 
as empathy.55 As Gallese argues, embodied simulation involves “mediating between the 
multi level personal background experience we entertain of our lived body, and the implicit 
certainties we simultaneously hold about others. Such personal body-related experience 
enables us to understand the actions performed by others, and to directly decode the 
emotions and sensations they experience” (2005, p. 42). Embodied simulation may be 
assumed to be in work when the art gallery visitor ‘feels’ the movements of the artist’s 
hand working on an art object only by looking at the brush traces on its surface (Freedberg 
and Gallese 2007, pp. 200).  In a similar manner, in her “embodied simulatorium” the 
cinema author may ‘imagine’ or ‘feel’ how her characters experience the events of their 
fictive lives, or even how the future cinema viewer, elsewhere referred to as ‘simulated 
spectator’ (Tikka 2008), experience these events.  
Emerging form the author’s embodied simulatorium, the allopoietic product of her 
cognitive processes (cinema montage) is understood to equip cinema with an 
intersubjective frame of sensemaking. Neuroimaging experiments of intersubjective 
correlation (ISC) by Uri Hasson and others (2004) support the assumption that if several 
people are watching the same cinema scene, their individual cortical activities have the 
tendency to synchronize with others. However, in 
another experiment they have also shown that the 
intersubject correlations differ in terms of the film 
genre and the level of aesthetic control of the films, 
a higher aesthetic control relating to higher 
intersubject correlation, and vice versa (Hasson et 
al. 2008). This implies that creating shared 
emotional experience within groups of people is not 
for granted but it relies greatly on the cinema author’s systems intelligent performance, the 
capability to simulate other people’s emotional dynamics. This not only includes 
understanding the emotional imagination of individual spectators, but also, at the same, 
elaborating cinematic material so as to make different spectators’ emotional systems pulse 
together. 
At conscious levels of cognition individual differences often become more apparent 
than the dominating similarities driven by the emotional system, which indisputably 
constitutes the basis of complex social behavior and social organizations. However, at the 
biological, physiological level the behavior of individuals seems much more similar. This is 
                                                 
55 For further reading on the neuronal basis of social interaction, see Hari and Kujala (2009). 
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not only due to physiological similarities, but also due to environmental and cultural 
conditions, for example, natural living environments, education, religion, gender views, and 
historical situatedness.  
When Eisenstein argued in his time that the dynamical structures of the author’s 
creative mind surrender themselves to further scrutiny in the functional structures of artistic 
productions, he believed that psychology would provide the instruments for describing “in 
exactly the same way” both “the complex compositional elements of form” and “the content 
of the work for itself” (Eisenstein 1987, p. 10). Today, if accepting the holistic enactive 
approach to mind, such activities as intuition, association, metaphoric thinking, conceptual 
blending, or imagination, which are typically related to creative aspects of cognition, 
involve a continuous retrieval, recycling, and reconstruction of the complex total of 
embodied (unconscious or conscious) memory traces of ones whole life. The theory of 
embodied metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999) suggests that our languages, 
conceptualizations, and symbol systems are actually based on bodily being-in-the-world, 
such as “walking a path” or “falling like a stone”, but even in expressions like “under-
stand”. In their framework lived experiences constitute so-called image-schemas that 
become projected to more abstract conceptualizations. Relying on recent neuroscientific 
views on human concept formation (Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998, Lakoff and Gallese 2005, 
Hari and Kujala 2009), I consider the role of embodied metaphors as constituting the 
conceptual-bio-cultural simulation interface between the domains of subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity, thereby forming the basis of shared understanding, and what is here 
discussed as systems intelligence in general. 
But it is worth noting that already Eisenstein recognized the significance of body-based 
metaphors as the means of sharing subjective emotional experiences with the others (Smith 
2004, p. 314). He often compared the process of filmmaking to basketweaving or orchestral 
composition, in which carefully selected threads of ‘being-in-the-world’ folded in such a 
way that they support the construction of complex spatio-temporal rhythms of the cinema 
experience. On one hand, the cinema author’s embodied simulation determines the 
emotional basis for all ‘forms’ of enactive cognition. On the other, the author’s embodied 
simulatorium harnesses these emotive-cognitive activities to serve the creation of culturally 
shared end products. 
Case Study: Embodied Simulatorium Applied 
In order to focus on the idea of embodied simulatorium as a mental workspace 
enabling any agent’s systems intelligent performance, an imaginary case study is discussed. 
As the reader is encouraged to imagine herself in a creative process of filmmaking, the 
complex bio-cultural aspects related to the embodied simulatorium can be highlighted.   
Our imaginary cinema author might be elaborating a fiction film based on a script by a 
professional screenwriter. Imagine, that the socio-emotional treatment of the film she is 
developing seems to demand showing the acts of torture experienced by the main 
characters in the hands of the superior political agents. The scene may feature an 
interrogation of a woman and her young daughter, during which the child is sexually 
violated. Taken the fact that a major part of our daily information flow cultivates scenes of 
violence (e.g., everyday life, news, entertainment, etc.), this short scene description may 
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already have caused the reader’s imagination to involuntarily start off on fly, images 
automatically emerging in the reader’s embodied simulatorium without calling them.  
Though the scene, which describes the painful and shameful experiences of the 
characters, could be constructed through non-showing, our filmmaker may decide to rely on 
the realistic construction instead. In order to be able actually to show the scene, one has to 
imagine how the characters behave and what they actually experience.  
In the light of professional filmmaking practice, producing a realistic torture scene 
seems a relatively easy task as one may rely on a group of actors, set-designers, special 
effect designers and cinematographers, perhaps even experts working with the issues 
related to the practice of torture (e.g., prisoners, physicians, military officers, etc).  
The systems intelligent embodied performance of the filmmaker embraces social world 
defined by general conventions, norms, education, religion, and so on. When considering 
the obvious injustice executed by superior powers, it may be interesting to refer to the 
neuroscientific findings (Singer et al. 2006), which suggest that the intensity of empathic 
activation in brain is directly related to the subject’s judgment of right or wrong acts of 
another person. This altruistic punishment (e.g., ’She got what she deserved’) embedded in 
our brain may explain the popularity of action or thriller films, where suffered unfairness is 
revenged. However, in our imaginary scene no revenge takes place, only humiliation. 
Our question is, how the filmmaker in her creative mind simulates the pain, 
humiliation, and fear of death on behalf of the tortured, on the one hand, and the pleasure of 
power, routine work, or self-disgust on the part of the torturer, on the other. Despite the 
cultural conventions and professional instruments, the final scene will eventually arise from 
the filmmaker’s own socio-emotional experiences and her attitude towards what is 
described, converging in the enactment of her embodied simulatorium. As was also 
emphasized in Eisenstein’s thinking, the filmmaker’s attitude towards what is represented 
frames the (socio-emotional) system of the systems intelligent performance into the focus. 
For further elaboration of the embodied simulatorium in general, consider the 
differences between the following experiences in particular: (1) observing a violent event (a 
rape) only a few steps away from herself, which demands immediate reaction (a ‘real’ 
world context),  (2) observing the same event on the 
screen reinforced by a dramatic sound environment 
(a spectator context) or, (3) imagining a violent 
event happening just a few steps away from herself 
‘as-if’ the violation would take place ‘in reality’ 
(cinema author context). Although events (1), (2), 
and (3) differ in terms of the socio-cultural context 
of ‘real’ and ‘not-real’, however, in the embodied 
simulation context they are assumed to represent variations of the same neural activation in 
someone’s brain.  
The first case (1) without doubt calls for a particularly systems-intelligent enactment 
and may carry severe consequences also for the observer herself. However, I deliberately 
ignore this first case for the favor of the cases (2) and (3), which directly relate to the 
filmmaking process. For some spectators of screen event (2) living through the violence on 
screen is too disturbing and they simply have to block their eyes and ears. Yet, the 
embodied mind continues simulating the scene based on the awareness that the event is 
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making sense of what is happening 
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one’s experiential background. 
Chapter 9: Cinema Author’s Embodied Simulatorium – a Systems Intelligence Approach 
 215
going on. The effort invested in voluntary rejection, on the one hand, and the involuntary 
emergence of the events on the spectators’ mental screen, on the other, enforces the fact 
that she cannot escape the scene. Embodied simulation allows assuming that the spectator 
‘feels’ the fear and the pain of the violated through the involuntary simulation of her own 
experiences of pain and humiliation. But according to my claim, this is assumed to hold for 
the authoring process. Imagine that the imaginary cinema author may not be 
psychophysiologically capable to simulate the scene (3), because it is just too painful. If 
unwilling to modify the original scene by rescuing the woman and the child in the last 
minute, the filmmaker can always return more associative treatment of the scene. As many 
skillful filmmakers, with Eisenstein in the frontline, have emphasized that meaningfulness 
is not embedded in one-to-one depiction of what is happening. Meanings emerge in the 
mind’s simulatorium in the process of making sense of what is happening in ‘between the 
lines’ against one’s experiential background.  
One enacts inseparable manner with the phenomenal world. The convergence of 
observation, motor enactment, and imagination of the same type of act in the cortical 
simulation processes has also consequences for the conceptual treatment of what is 
typically understood as ‘real’ and ‘not-real’. Generalizing a bit, but keeping the particular 
torture scene in mind, it is obvious that a systems intelligent cinema author should be 
capable of compensating the limits of her practical experiments with the all-embracing 
possibilities of her embodied simulatorium. In the embodied sensemaking, as exemplified 
above, the real and fiction mix. Enactive perception-action theory argues that conducting so 
called ‘pure’ reduction of the phenomenal world into non-embodied or ‘objective’ aspects 
is irrelevant (and implausible) (Noë 2007). This holds also for what is typically conceived 
of as ‘pure’ fiction or ‘pure’ fact. In a similar manner, applying only ‘pure’ professional 
methods does not make our imaginary scene come alive, but the holistic socio-emotionally 
meaningful complexity created by an embodied, systems intelligent agent. The meaning 
dynamics of cinematic art, paradoxically, is all about “the hidden” in imagery but “the 
exposed” in embodied simulatorium. 
Conclusion 
The essay has related a cinema author’s creative processes to the systems intelligence 
approach. The underpinning assumption was that cinema stands forth as an intersubjective 
frame of sensemaking. In its unfolding, the cinema author’s creative processes were 
described from the enactive mind point of view, through introducing the neuroscientific 
concept of embodied simulation as the bodily basis of these processes. This was followed 
with a related hypothetical model of cinema author’s mental workspace, the embodied 
simulatorium. 
Eisenstein was the one who recognized that unconscious dynamics dominate not only 
the spectator’s behavior but also the author’s own cognition. From his own experiential 
resources of embodiment Eisenstein found his emotional themes, to discover “whole new 
tracts of utterly unexpected territory whose existence [he] never dreamed of” (Eisenstein 
1995, p. 14). Today, to study oneself, to analyze the emotional ‘feelings’ and the author’s 
own attitude towards different themes, remains as fuzzy an effort as it was in Eisenstein’s 
time. However, two distinct Eisensteinian kinds of method exist to tackle the problem at 
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hand. On one hand, the cinema author may gain control over the underpinning dynamics of 
her own embodied resources by widening her life-experience, for example, through 
professional practice and personal education. This accumulated experience then, in a 
reciprocal manner, feeds back and shapes the author’s autobiographic self. On the other, the 
recent neuroscientific methods may help to understand the underpinning neural dynamics 
of the authoring process, as well as those of the spectator experience. By acknowledging 
the prevailing modes of socio-emotional interaction and gaining more understanding on the 
psychological aspects of cinematic arts one may for her part contribute to wellbeing, thus 
empowering in positive manner what Eisenstein’s contemporary discourse described as 
‘life-building’, and which could be referred to as ‘systems intelligent performance’ today. 
So far, direct correlation between neural activities and the mental imagery of the 
filmmaker’s creative mind still remains inaccessible. While the future may hold the keys 
for gaining access to inner neural activities of the mind’s creative systems, understanding 
the implications of the embodied dynamics to the systems intelligent authoring process 
already frames one of the most interesting research questions. How does our biological 
similarity support intersubjectivity and cultural sharing? Put in other words, to what extent 
can we claim to share (embodied) experiences with the others? Above, the embodied 
simulatorium has been described as being fundamentally conditioned by life-long socio–
emotional situatedness. The case study has helped to discuss how these embodied processes 
constitute what in this volume is referred to as systems intelligence. The assumed cinema 
author studying her embodied ‘feelings’ and ‘thoughts’ has been shown to perform within 
the socially conditioned domain of systems intelligence. To conclude, I wish the essay will 
open some paths for theoretical and practical elaboration of the embodied simulatorium and 
the related systemic approach. 
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